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ABSTRACT
This dissertation involves an examination of the 
effects and implications of three modes of citationality: 
hearsay, testimony and conference. As a term coined by 
Jacques Derrida, citationality involves the
problematization of questions related to borders and limits 
and to the attempt to re-present the originary event 
thought to lie beyond the performance of citational acts of 
bearing witness.
In chapter one I situate my project theoretically 
through an examination of the principles of deconstruction. 
In particular, Jacques Derrida's work on the metaphysical 
concepts of presence and speech, in terms of repeatability 
or iterability, bears heavily on my study. As a function of 
iterability, citationality refers to the potential inherent 
in every element, textual, linguistic, or otherwise, to be 
disseminated and cited in a plurality of contexts and to 
assume a new and different meaning. It is from this 
perspective, from the possibility of citation, of exceeding 
limits and escaping regulation, that I conduct my analysis 
of what I call "hearsay," "testimony," and "conference" in 
certain twentieth century texts.
Chapters two through four focus on an application of 
the previously mentioned modes of citationality in the 
texts of Marguerite Duras, Maurice Blanchot and Jacques 
Derrida, respectively. In chapter two, I examine Marguerite
vi
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Duras' Lol V. Stein cycle in which a reliance on hearsay 
impedes textual closure while generating a multiplicity of 
other texts that cite and re-cite one another. In chapter 
three, I analyze several rScits by Maurice Blanchot in 
terms of testimony. These texts reveal the problematic in 
attempting to access and re-present that which has already 
been present and result in an effect of mise-en-abfme of 
citations. Chapter four involves a reading of several 
polylogues by Jacques Derrida as instances of conference. 
Their insistence on a plurality of voices enables a 
deconstruction of the logos of restitution.
While chapters two through four are devoted to a 
narrow application of a practice of citationality, chapter 
five marks the expansion of my topic. In this chapter, I 
situate previously raised questions of citationality in 
contemporary contexts with political and cultural 
implications.
vii
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INTRODUCTION
This dissertation involves an examination of the 
concept of citationality, a term coined by Jacques Derrida 
through his extensive work on the deconstruction of 
fundamental elements of the Western metaphysical tradition. 
What is to be gained from my study of hearsay, testimony 
and conference is a discussion of citational modes that 
problematize questions of borders, of accessing and re­
presenting the "true event" that precedes the performance 
of these acts of bearing witness. This project therefore 
raises questions pertaining to speech and presence as well 
as origin through an analysis of the texts of Marguerite 
Duras, Maurice Blanchot and Jacques Derrida.
In the first chapter I establish the theoretical 
framework that informs this study. Since my work on 
hearsay, testimony and conference has grown out of Jacques 
Derrida's reworking of logocentric concepts, a presentation 
of the basic principles of deconstruction, as relates to 
citationality, constitutes the majority of this chapter.
In the first section of this chapter, I will provide a 
synopsis of Antoine Compagnon's comprehensive study of the 
citation while revealing how his approach proves too 
limiting for my project. In La Seconde main, ou le travail 
de la citation, Compagnon insists that citation functions 
within a closed system where the citation, or foreign 
textual element, is safely inserted in the host text,
1
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2protected by quotation marks which prohibit contact and 
thus contamination between texts. He declares cases of 
citation void of quotation marks as out of control and 
capricious. However, it is my contention that all citation 
has the potential to escape attempts at control and 
regulation, as my analyses of various functions of 
citationality will show.
With the evident limitations of Compagnon's study, I 
turn to Derrida's work on the iterability, or 
repeatability, of signs which emphasizes the graphic 
qualities common to all forms of language that enable their 
potential citation and re-citation. This, of course, 
necessarily entails an overview of what Derrida considers 
to constitute the Western metaphysical tradition. I will 
commence with an explication of Plato's and Aristotle's 
privileging of the phone, followed by an overview of 
Ferdinand de Saussure's work on the sign and John Austin's 
definition of the performative as a component of speech act 
theory, two further instances of the insistence of speech 
over writing that bear heavily on my discussion of 
citationality.1 These sections prove to be an indispensable 
step toward achieving an understanding of the concepts 
informing my project.
Chapters two through four constitute a narrow 
application of my practice of citationality in the works of 
Marguerite Duras, Maurice Blanchot and Jacques Derrida.
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3Through my analysis of their texts, I have found that 
different functions of citationality are in operation. In 
chapter two, for example, I focus on hearsay in the series 
of texts by Marguerite Duras that are collectively known as 
the Lol V. Stein cycle, which includes three novels and 
three films.2 Although numerous critics have already 
published a considerable amount of work on Duras' various 
literary endeavors in general, and this cycle in 
particular, none have explicitly addressed the reliance and 
insistence on hearsay as a function of citationality in her 
texts. Many critics, in fact, have employed psychoanalytic 
and feminist approaches to discuss issues such as feminine 
writing and voicing and autobiography. Sharon Willis, for 
example, has such a perspective evident in her discussion 
of the Lol V. Stein cycle as does Susan Cohen.3 Certainly, 
Jacques Lacan's well-known essay "Hommage a Marguerite 
Duras" is an excellent example of this approach to Duras' 
work.4 Trista Selous is one critic who contests the 
essentialist feminist perspective in her treatment of Duras 
opting instead to examine gender issues in a non- 
essentialist manner.5 These critics are but a few who have 
worked on the Lol V. Stein cycle and are fairly 
representative of the types of studies that have been 
undertaken to date.
Although these contributions are undeniably important 
to the field of Duras studies, my project marks a departure
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4from this approach, since I have chosen to explore the 
effects of the citational mode of hearsay in the Lol V. 
Stein cycle. This cycle of texts proves an interesting 
choice for a discussion of hearsay considering the way in 
which these texts are woven together. In other words, one 
text generates, in its wake, another text and each text is 
replete with echoes, or rumors and gossip, of the other 
texts in the cycle. I contend in fact that there is a 
gradual radicalization of hearsay throughout the cycle. The 
textual effects produced by such a movement call into 
question presumed notions regarding narrative authority.
Following my treatment of hearsay in chapter two, I 
proceed to discuss testimony as found in the recits written 
by Maurice Blanchot: La Folie du jour, L'arret de mort and 
L'instant de ma mort.6 Relatively few studies have been 
done on at all on Blanchot's works, in particular these 
short narratives, or recits. In fact, the majority of the 
criticism on Blanchot focuses on the implications of his 
theoretical and philosophical writings, especially L 'espace 
litteraire and L'ecriture du desastre.7 Emmanuel Levinas, 
Roger Laporte, Michel Foucault and Julia Kristeva are among 
those who have worked on his theoretical texts. Of course, 
Jacques Derrida stands as the notable exception since he 
has indeed treated Blanchot's recits such as La Folie du 
jour, L'arret de mort, and L'instant de ma mort in "Living
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
On: Borderlines," "Pas" and Demeure: Fiction et temoignage, 
respectively.
While referring to Derrida's important work on 
Blanchot, I will offer a fresh approach to Blanchot's 
recits by exploring the impact of citational practices in 
these narratives. I will treat the texts not in terms of 
hearsay, as I did for the unique situation of the Lol V. 
Stein cycle, but rather in terms of testimony owing to the 
first-person narrative voice common to these recits. Like 
hearsay, testimony produces textual effects that call into 
question the possibility of re-presenting the event being 
related. Again, textual progression becomes impossible and 
the recit necessarily remains merely the possibility of re­
citing .
For chapter four, I will explore conference as a 
function of citationality, as found in three plurivocal 
texts, "Restitutions," Feu la cendre and Droit de regards 
by Jacques Derrida. My decision to discuss Derrida's 
polylogues holds interesting implications for my project. 
Since Derrida's work on iterability and citationality 
provides the theoretical framework for my study, which 
thereby allows the texts of Duras and Blanchot to become 
objects of analysis, my discussion of Derrida's polylogues 
enables them, in their turn, to also become objects of 
reading. This maneuver effectively folds Derrida into my
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6practice of citationality in that his work helps to 
establish my practice while also becoming part of it.8
Most critical attention granted to Derrida's writings 
involves discussions of his philosophical perspectives 
concerning deconstruction. Geoffrey Bennington, Jonathan 
Culler, Rodolphe Gasche and David Wills, to name but a few, 
have each written considerably on the issues raised by 
deconstruction. Yet, the lack of work on Derrida's 
polylogic writing practice as evidenced in "Restitutions," 
"Droit de regards" and Feu la. cendre demonstrates the need 
for such a study of conference.
Since conference involves a discussion or an exchange 
of comments, there is obviously a plurality of voices. This 
marks a significant departure from the texts of Duras and 
Blanchot. In Jacques Derrida's so-called polylogues, the 
disunity of narrative voice and, even more importantly, the 
undecidability of the number and gender of those very 
voices creates a response to the problems of citationality 
as seen in the cases of hearsay and testimony. This is 
accomplished through the deconstruction of the logos of 
restitution, presence and origin.
While chapters two through four involve the narrow 
application of three modes of citationality in the texts of 
Duras, Blanchot and Derrida, chapter five expands my 
examination of citationality to briefly touch on other 
textual forms of bearing witness, including Latin American
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7testimonio, Holocaust survivors' testimonies, President 
Clinton's impeachment and talk shows. By enlarging the 
scope of my project and situating it the context of 
cultural studies, I am able to address relevant, 
contemporary political and sociological issues affected by 
the questions I have previously raised in terms of 
citationality.
Notes
1. Aristotle, Poetics, translated by Leon Golden 
(Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1981); J. L. 
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Marguerite Duras.
3. Susan Cohen, Women and Discourse in the Fiction of 
Marguerite Duras (Amherst: University of Massachusetts,
1993); Sharon Willis, Marguerite Duras: Writing on the Body 
(Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987).
4. Jacques Lacan, "Hommage a Marguerite Duras, du 
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7. Maurice Blanchot, L'ecriture du desastre (Paris: 
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1955) .
8. This practice is similar to what Jacques Derrida 
describes as the "re-trait" in "La loi du genre," from 
Parages (Paris: Galilee, 1986).
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CHAPTER ONE 
CITATION AND CITATIONALITY 
Introduction
Citationality is a term I borrow from Jacques Derrida 
to invoke the radicalized quotational practices inherent in 
certain twentieth century texts in which there is a 
problematization of textual borders, or, in other words, a 
collapse of internal boundaries. Derrida has devoted much 
attention to what he calls the law of iterability and many 
of his texts address, in one way or another, its effects as 
a condition of generalized writing.
In this chapter, I will trace the work of Ferdinand de 
Saussure and J. L. Austin, among others, as well as 
Derrida's readings and critiques of them, which remain 
indispensable to my conceptualization of citationality.
For, it is citationality that emerges from the iterability 
or repeatability that, according to Derrida, conditions all 
language. This view in turn stems from Derrida's insistence 
on the generalization of writing, that is, the extension of 
the rules that condition language, in the conventional 
sense, to encompass the oral, the written, indeed all forms 
of utterance. This movement toward a generalization of the 
conditions governing writing entails a deconstruction of 
the system that has subjugated writing, in the strict 
sense, and of the negative terms associated with it such as 
absence.
9
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What I aim to show in this chapter is that Derrida's 
movement toward a generalization of writing enables and 
even evokes my discussion of traditionally oral modes of 
communication as subgenres of citationality. Through this 
discussion, I will raise questions of presence and absence, 
property and authority as well as origin and copy. I will 
explore how the graphematization of all language and signs 
problematizes the presumedly rigid borders between speech 
and writing, producing in its wake textually destabilizing 
effects.
Since Antoine Compagnon has worked extensively on 
citation, I will commence with his definition of this term 
and his explanation of its functioning in terms of 
semiotics. I hope to demonstrate why such a definition 
proves insufficient for my project. Having disclosed the 
limitations of Compagnon's model of citation, I will 
subsequently turn to Derrida's notion of citationality 
which holds numerous possibilities for my project since it 
allows the calling into question of the limits imposed on 
writing, not only textually, but also linguistically and 
philosophically. This obviously necessitates an exploration 
of Saussure's theory of signs and Derrida's critique of it, 
particularly in De la grammatologie. This deconstruction of 
positive and negative values imposed, respectively, on 
speech and writing leads in its turn to a reading of speech 
act theory as promulgated first by J. L. Austin and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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subsequently by his successor John Searle. At this juncture 
in the chapter, Derrida's critical responses to speech act 
theory and the status of the performative, as seen in 
"Signature Eveneraent Contexte" and "Limited Inc a b c..." 
in particular, are crucial to the development of an 
understanding of iterability and citationality.
From such a Derridean perspective, citational modes of 
communication raise questions of property, authority and 
origin, in addition to a reconsideration of conventional 
assumptions regarding speech and writing. In this project I 
will explore how these issues, which stem from quotational 
practices where there are no quotation marks to delineate 
host text from cited text, function in a variety of textual 
forms. This condition of citationality produces effects of 
textual destabilization in the selected works by Marguerite 
Duras and Maurice Blanchot. Subsequent to my discussion of 
those writers, I will then turn to the polylogues of 
Jacques Derrida which reveal the emergence of a discourse 
differing considerably from the hearsay and testimony found 
to inhabit the Duras and Blanchot texts, in that the 
polylogues are not necessarily a textual manifestation of 
citationality but rather a response to it.
Citation
In La Dissemination, Derrida writes, "tout commence 
dans le pli de la citation."1 As the locus of product and 
production and the repeated utterance and the utterance of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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that repetition, this fold does indeed mark the ultimate 
point of departure for my project. For it is along that 
very crease that issues I wish to address become 
problematized. The question of origin emerges with the 
inability to distinguish it from its citation/repetition, 
from its source, thereby rendering this problem of origin 
endemic. If we can consider the functioning of this fold in 
much the same way as Derrida's notion of the hymen,2 than 
we can treat it as a parergonal structure, a boundary on 
which citation resides that is neither internal nor 
external but both at once. Citation is within and without 
host text and, obviously, we can challenge the usage of 
such terms as host text and cited text as the borderlines 
between them become blurred. Citation is a mark of origin, 
of its source, yet citation is also the mark of difference, 
of differing and of being deferred from its origin. Reading 
the fold as parergon calls into question notions of the 
fold especially as they pertain to proprietorship. It 
becomes virtually impossible to settle the issue of 
authority since the fold places the citation on either side 
of itself at once, thereby rendering any claims to 
ownership necessarily disputable and ultimately 
indeterminate.
That citation produces such destabilizing effects on 
speech, writing, presence and authority is no surprise when 
we begin to contemplate the dictionary definition of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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word "citation" itself. The English verb "to cite" is 
derived from the French verb "citer," a word that initially- 
appeared in legal terminology meaning "to summon." In being 
cited one is required to present oneself for scrutiny 
before a court. In juridical terms, citation is related to 
adduction and the verb "to cite," therefore, implies the 
presentation of evidence "as an example or means of 
proof."3 Evidently, through its usage in law, citation is 
related to questions of authority and property as well as 
to matters of proof and truth, which holds interesting 
implications for my discussion.
Although they are used synonymously with "to cite" and 
"citation," the English verb "to quote" and its substantive 
derivative "quotation" are not related to matters of 
judgement, but rather to the concept and convention of 
numbers and measure as in, for example, to divide into 
chapters and verses (ibid., p. 23). This definition of 
quotation already carries with it the concept of boundaries 
and division between texts. It is clear to see how it has 
come to signify a delineation between primary and secondary 
texts. Like the word "citation," carrying with it juridical 
connotations, the word "quotation" bears its own useful 
connotations since what is at stake in matters of 
citationality is really the rupture of those divisions and 
boundaries between cited and host text.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Although "quotation" has now come to suggest the 
insertion of markers in the text to delineate sections and 
fragments of "other" texts, it did not always carry with it 
this significance. Indeed, prior to the use of quotation 
marks as an indicator of cited passages, italics were 
employed as early as the 16th century to mark citations in 
texts. The innovation of quotation marks, or "les 
guillemets" in French, came with the advent of printing and 
were first employed by the printer Guillemet from whom 
these marks received their name in French. In order that a 
text not be inadvertently attributed to the incorrect 
source, quotation marks have become common practice in 
writing. Quotation marks serve then to differentiate the 
same from the other, the "main discourse" from the 
secondary, foreign textual fragment.
To arrive at a contemporary understanding of the 
function of quotation and to provide fundamental background 
knowledge for my study of citationality, I will first 
discuss Antoine Compagnon's exhaustive study of the 
citation, La seconde main, ou le travail de la citation 
Compagnon commences his work by examining the conditions of 
repetition which "regulate" citation's use and role in 
language.
Compagnon undertakes this study by borrowing from both 
Emile Benveniste and Ferdinand de Saussure. In his 
Problemes de linguistique generale, Benveniste employs the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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distinction between "langue" and "discours," evoking,
obviously, Saussure's "langue" and "parole," but with one
important difference. For Benveniste, "discours" is not
synonymous with "parole." This is due to the fact that
Benveniste insists on "discours" as a "manifestation
vivante de la langue."5
Thus "langue" refers to the system/the global and
"discours" to the individual/the actualization of an
element of that system. Compagnon extends this notion to
the extensive/the infinite and the comprehensive, where the
extensive is the ensemble of elements in the system and the
comprehensive is the relation of elements within that same
system (La Seconde main, ou le travail de la citation, p.
50). He writes:
Sous le regime de 1'infini, du hasard, de 
1'eventuel, la moindre repetition, non plus 
contrainte mais contingente, est pertinente et 
signifiante, elle est un fait de langage, une 
relation a analyser comme telle: elle devient une 
forme capable d'une fonction. Alors que dans la 
langue il n'y a que des choses repetees, dans le 
discours il y a la repetition des choses. (Ibid., 
p. 52)
In this passage, Compagnon explicates the distinction 
between "langue" and parole" while attempting to establish 
the validity of undertaking the study of discursive 
repetitions, previously dismissed by linguists as 
impertinent compared to studies of linguistic repetitions.
Yet, if we reconsider the previously mentioned strict 
legal definition of citation as a presentation of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
evidence/proof, citation always already refers to an act of
repetition. It establishes, indeed, a double articulation
between the singular and the universal. This dialectic of
the universal and the singular called into play by an act
of repetition is elaborated on by Gilles Deleuzes:
Si la repetition existe, elle exprime a la fois 
une singularity contre le general, une 
universality contre le particulier, un 
remarquable contre 1'ordinaire, une instantaneite 
contre la variation, une eternite contre la 
permanence. A tous egards, la repetition, c'est 
la transgression. Elle met en question la 
loi 6
In other words, repetition, and likewise citation, as one 
of its basic forms, concerns an instance that is neither 
interchangeable nor replaceable. It is, according to 
Deleuze, the condition of the universality of a singular. 
Repetition is described as universal, because, to be 
recognized as repetition, its singular instance must occur 
more than once; this is not unlike Derrida's insistence on 
the iterability of the sign, a concept crucial to the 
phenomenon of citationality to be addressed later in this 
chapter.
Discursive repetitions are always already 
interdiscursive since the repetition would occur in at 
least two different instances, or discourses, and the 
relationship between one discourse and another must be 
taken into consideration. For Compagnon, citation is but 
one example of possible interdiscursivity. Other examples 
would include pastiche, proverb, commentary and imitation.
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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I, however, view the above as forms of citation, since the 
most rudimentary repetition defined by Compagnon is 
"repetition d'unite de discours dans un autre discours; 
elle apparait comme la relation interdiscursive primitive" 
(La seconde main, p. 54). Therefore, for Compagnon, this 
simplest form of repetition must be considered not only as 
a product, "enonce," but also as a production, an 
"enonciation repetante," a definition the dictionary fails 
to take into account, acknowledging simply the citation as 
product.
In order to account for his insistence on citation as 
a system, incorporating, as mentioned above, both product 
and production, Compagnon devises a scheme that becomes 
more elaborate throughout his study. The fundamental system 
of citation as conceived by Compagnon is composed of two 
texts, "Tl" and "T2" and the authors of those texts, "Al" 
and "A2," respectively. The citation itself is denoted by 
the letter "t," representing its function as the object of 
exchange between the two texts. Obviously, a potential 
problem inherent in such a formulation is that it assumes 
that "t," the repeated utterance, appears identical in both 
texts. There is no allowance made at all for the 
possibility that the citation will be modified, a fairly 
serious oversight since repetition itself marks difference; 
indeed, all repetition is itself difference. As Deleuze 
writes, "La difference est entre deux repetitions... la
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repetition aussi est entre deux differences" (Difference et 
repetition, p. 104).
Yet, the apparently reductive schematization of 
Compagnon's system of citation does enable, as he aims to 
demonstrate, one to confer the value of sign to the 
repeated utterance, or citation, because of its appearance 
in the two systems, where "SI"="T1"+"A1" and 
"S2 " = "T2 " -t-"A2 . " This move allows Compagnon to undertake a 
study of citation as discursive repetition in much the same 
way as linguistic repetitions are studied by linguists as 
pertinent elements of language.
Compagnon's rather conventional view of the role of 
citation in texts establishes an apparent dichotomy between 
so-called good citations and bad ones. For him, good types 
of citations play by the rules. Quotation marks, for 
example, escort or accompany "t" into "S2," where it 
remains distinguished from its host text "T2." There is no 
confusion instigated by its appearance as a foreign element 
in another text, because the quotation marks serve not only 
to mark it as such, but also to prevent the contamination 
of the host text.
Compagnon devotes the last sections of his study to a 
discussion of the "bad" forms of citation, which he can 
only describe as anomalies and perversions of writing. It 
is these cases that Compagnon views as the particular 
instances that emerge when there is a loss of markers that
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would normally contain the citation within its boundaries 
in the host text. Once the quotation marks are lost, so too 
is the regulatory function of citation on behalf of the law 
of writing:
La structure 'normale' de la citation, qui a la
fonction d'un principe de regulation de
l'ecriture, met en relation deux systemes 
semiotiques, chacun presume complet et autonome 
(compose d'un sujet et d'un texte) ainsi 
qu'independant de 1'autre. La liaison instauree 
par une citation est done partielle et 
ponctuelle. Une aberration pour cette structure 
est une citation qui abolit 1'independance des 
deux systemes, qui les accouple ou meme les
confond - e'est le cas de la copie. (La seconde
main, p. 3 70-71)
This passage raises several interesting notions that must
be addressed. First, if the function of quotation marks is
to act as a regulator, as a code of the law of writing that
maintains textual boundaries both externally and
internally, then it is clear that the loss of such marks
jeopardizes this very system and serves to threaten the
economy of writing. Any instance of citation is thereby
rendered dangerous. As Deleuze insists, all repetition "met
en question la loi..." (Difference et repetition, p. 9),
whereas it is evident that for Compagnon only the
occasional "aberrant" citation produces such an effect.
A second problematic arises in the formula for the
function of the citation in that it assumes there to be an
autonomous, completely closed system of author-producer and
text-product that remains impenetrable, immune from
"foreign" influence. The allowed exception is the brief
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insertion of "t" carefully and protectively bound in 
quotation marks to keep its impact on the second semiotic 
system at a minimum. The limitations of Compagnon's study 
become apparent here through his insistence on the "texte" 
and "hors-texte," which he clearly delineates and in terms 
of which citation is the mere partial and temporary 
insertion of a "foreign" text into another.
What Compagnon evidently views as an aberration and, 
hence, a negative, unfortunate phenomenon is the deviation 
of certain contemporary writings from the code of citation 
which institutes the regulation. He even goes so far as to 
question "la valeur de cette sorte de repetition" which he 
finds much too unsystematic and unmotivated (ibid, p. 370) . 
Finally, he reproaches Borges who "pervertit 
systematiquement l'economie classique de l'ecriture"
(ibid.). Therefore, when a citation can no longer be 
readily recognized as an "insertion" set off 
typographically from the "main discourse," the relationship 
between texts becomes what Claudette Sartiliot calls a 
"form of complicity" (Citation and Modernity: Derrida,
Joyce and Brecht, p. 20).
It is my contention that all forms of citation fit 
into the category for which Compagnon reserves "la citation 
capricieuse." Indeed, my study reveals the potential 
inherent in all citations to "echappe[r] au controle" and
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"f[aire] douter de la notion meme d'equilibre" (La seconde 
main, p . 362) .
Citationality
As stated earlier in this chapter, my project entails
an exploration of concepts such as presence, iterability,
intentionality and, of course, citation itself. Given the
limitations found in Compagnon's definition of citation, it
is instructive to consider how Derrida approaches the
question of citationality. In order to arrive at an
understanding of Derrida's term, we must begin by tracing
his re-conceptualization of speech and writing. It is
Ferdinand de Saussure's Cours de linguistique generale that
contributes an essential component to Derrida's critique of
the Western logocentric tradition as evidenced by his
reading of Saussure in De la grammatologie, one of the most
elemental texts of deconstruction.7 In this text Derrida
undertakes a deconstruction of Saussure's Cours which he
views as emblematic of the problematic of western
metaphysics in general. He accomplishes this by drawing the
connection, as Spivak explains, of:
...this phonocentrism to logocentrism -- the 
belief that the first and last things are the 
logos, the Word, the Divine Mind, the infinite 
understanding of God, an infinitely creative 
subjectivity, and, closer to our time, the self­
presence of full consciousness.8
Derrida necessarily elucidates the link that has long been
established between phone and the logos by tracing the
voice and speech as the closest means of expression and
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communication to the soul, to truth and to thought. He
relates how speech has come to be intertwined with the
phenomenological concept of "hearing-oneself-speak" as a
means of coming into self-presence:
On pressent done deja que le phonocentrisme se 
confond avec la determination historiale du sens 
de 1'etre en general comme presence avec toutes 
les sous-determinations qui dependent de cette 
forme generale et qui organisent en elle leur 
systeme et leur enchainement historial (presence 
de la chose au regard comme eidos, presence comme 
substance/essence/existence (ousia) , presence 
temporelle comme pointe (stigme) du maintenant ou 
de 1'instant (nun), presence a soi du cogito, 
conscience, subjectivite, co-presence de 1'autre 
et de soi, intersubjectivite comme phenomene 
intentionnel de l'ego, etc.). Le logocentrisme 
serait done solidaire de la determination de 
l'etre de l'etant comme presence. (De la 
gramma, tol ogi e, p . 22)
This confounding of speech with presence in all its "sous-
determinations" holds rather serious implications for
writing. As is the case with traditional binary oppositions
(speech/writing, presence/absence, male/female, etc.), one
term maintains privileged status over the other. This
hierarchization of orality over writing has been documented
as far back as Plato and Aristotle and since what is at
stake in this project are questions of the "written," I
find it necessary to examine these assumptions of speech as
opposed to writing in order to demonstrate how they are
called into question by the phenomenon of citationality.
In De la gramma tologie, Derrida addresses the value
distinctions imposed on speech and writing, revealing that
speech has been privileged for its immediacy and it has
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maintained its dominant status over writing as the primary 
mode of communication due to its presumed accuracy and 
directness via "un rapport de proximite essentielle et 
immediate avec 1'ame" (ibid., p. 22).
This tendency to subjugate writing in favor of speech 
can be traced to Plato and Aristotle, in particular, who 
wrote of the relation of the voice and speech to the soul. 
If we briefly review Plato's work, we can trace for 
ourselves the emergence of such a view. In the famous and 
often cited Book III of The Republic, Plato unveils his 
classification of literary genres. The two forms of lexis, 
or the way of speaking, are mimesis and diagesis, which 
compose the two modes of repetition of others' words. 
Mimesis is basically synonymous with imitation and involves 
what Plato calls indirect style, where the poet assumes the 
voice of another. Diagesis, or the simple mode, involves 
the poet speaking in his own voice to narrate the story.9
As explained in The Republic, Plato expresses his 
desire to exclude forms of poetry that invoke dangerous 
lamentations and excessive laughter which would potentially 
impede readers from learning the value of shame and self- 
control. It is during this discussion that Plato proceeds 
to reproach his contemporary poets, most notably Homer, for 
the deceitful assumption of another's voice in order to 
narrate his story. Additionally, poets who employ the 
mixed style, that is, a combination of direct and indirect
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styles of narration, obviously weaken their poetry by 
resorting to the mimetic form in order to accomplish the 
story (ibid.).
Homer, for example, employed the mixed style and the 
following passage illustrates the difference between the 
direct and indirect styles. Simple narration proceeds as: 
"So now they were in the deep valley of Lacedaimon, and 
drove up to the gate of the illustrious King Menelaos,"10 
whereas imitation would result in the concealment of Homer 
as narrator resulting in the narration of the passage in
the first person, as if Homer had assumed the identity of
one of King Nestor's sons.
In The Poetics, Aristotle appears to diverge
drastically from Plato's classification of literary genres 
when he states that mimesis is the form of all literary 
endeavors. Indeed, he valorizes mimesis as the ambition of 
all poets. Its two subgenres are direct style and indirect 
style and it is here that the undeniable proximity to 
Plato's schema is revealed.11 Aristotle's direct style 
corresponds to Plato's notion of imitation or mimesis where 
the poet assumes the voice of another as a means of 
narration. Aristotle's notion of indirect style or 
narrative also finds its synonym in Plato's mode of 
diagesis. Aristotle however declares the recit of mixed 
styles as the universal literary form where verbal and non­
verbal matters are represented in the same way. Genette
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essay "Frontieres du recit."12
Returning to Plato, we see that he proceeds to 
establish a distinction between eikon and phantasma, in The 
Sophist.13 He further differentiates between types of 
repetition and imitation and privileges one form of copy 
over another. Eikon are copies that respect the proportion 
of the object being copied or represented. Such copies 
resemble the idea so very closely that the detection of the 
copy on the very basis of the object copied would not be an 
easy task. This type of copy flows directly from the 
thought/idea and as such is the truest form of copy. 
Phantasma, on the other hand, consists of copies of copies, 
where there is movement from eikon to copies of it 
resulting in the subsequent prevalence of distortion and 
the creation of a sense of illusion, or of simulacra. It is 
interesting to note that Compagnon actually introduces the 
question of citation as simulacra, a copy of a copy, or the 
repetition of another's words. This conception renders 
citation a poor image of thought, already removed from the 
eidos, or thought.
Two discourses arise therefore out of Plato's and 
Aristotle's contemplations on literary genres and the 
imitative nature of narration, that of direct and indirect. 
Whereas Plato dismisses mimetic forms, or the indirect 
style, for the poet's deception in assuming another's voice
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 6
and thereby producing simulacra., Aristotle, at first 
appearance, rehabilitates mimesis by validating its role as 
the ambition of all artists. Yet, a closer look at 
Aristotle's divisions of genres actually reveals a 
proximity to those of Plato and even more importantly, 
their views on writing indicate its devaluation.
If we consider Plato's formulation of thought/idea and 
copies drawn directly from it, contrasted with copies based 
on those copies, we can see, by extension, how these 
concepts of eikon and phantasma implicate speech and 
writing. Speech draws directly from thought or "les etats 
de I'ame" whereas writing is a copy of that copy, a 
derivative prone to distortion and inaccuracy owing to its 
distance from thought.
Despite the commonly held belief that Derrida uses the 
first part of De la grammatologie to discredit Saussure's 
Cours de la linguistique generale for being steeped in 
logocentric views that merely sustain the privileging of 
the phone, it is indeed true that Saussure actually 
provides his own limited critique of the metaphysics of 
presence, an important aspect of his text that readers of 
De la grammatologie often neglect. However, in spite of 
Saussure's re-articulation of language in terms of the 
arbitrary and difference, there are, as we shall see, 
moments where his work does seem to affirm the logocentrism 
against which he attempts to articulate his theory.
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What is especially important in Saussure's conception 
of language as a system of signs is that it is based on an 
understanding of their operation as arbitrary and 
conventional. For example, he illustrates the arbitrariness 
of the sign with the word "soeur" which is linked "par 
aucun rapport interieur avec la suite de sons s-o-r qui lui 
sert."14 In other words, each sign is defined by its 
relation to other signs and not by any essential properties 
it may possess. A sign can thus be described as "immotive, 
c'est-a-dire arbitraire par rapport au signifie, avec 
lequel il n'a aucune attache naturelle dans la realite"
(ibid., p . 101).
The relational nature of systems indicates that there 
are no positive terms; there are only differences. As 
Saussure explains:
...dans la langue il n'y a que des differences.
Bien plus: une difference suppose en general des 
termes positifs entre lesquels elle s'etablit, 
mais dans la langue il n'y a que des differences 
sans termes positifs" (Ibid., p. 166).
This system of differences is in fact how Saussure
conceives of what constitutes "langue" or language. If
"langue" refers to the system of signs, then Saussure's
term "parole" designates the speech events that render the
system, or "langue" possible. This is not unlike Derrida's
notion of the originary trace which he identifies in
Saussure's system in that there is only infinite referral
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to other traces without a fixed, inherent meaning in any 
one trace.
while Saussure's work offers an innovative means of
considering language and has had an immeasurable impact on
various aspects of post-structuralist thinking, the
logocentric aspects with which Derrida takes issue emerge
in Saussure's attitude to writing, which, as in Plato, is
relegated to a secondary and derivative status in the
Cours. According to Saussure:
...langue et ecriture sont deux systemes de 
signes distincts; 1'unique raison d'etre du 
second est de representer le premier; l'objet 
linguistique n'est pas defini par la combinaison 
du mot ecrit et du mot parle; ce dernier 
constitue a lui seul cet objet" (Cours de 
linguistique generale, p. 45).
With the spoken word and the spoken word alone constituting
the object, writing, therefore, is merely a device that
allows for the representation of speech and, if we accept
Saussure's contention, does not need to be considered in a
discussion of the sign. It is this apparent dismissal of
writing that Derrida regards as yet another example of the
privileging of the phone. This hierarchization of speech
over writing is endemic to the Western metaphysical
tendency to treat writing as a dangerous artifice, or like
the pharmakon offered in Plato's Phaedrus, a remedy that is
simultaneously treated as a poison.15
The fundamental basis of the connection between speech 
and thought stems from the privileging of presence, as
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mentioned previously. Derrida views this problematic as one
of equating the "etre de l'etant" with "presence," where
presence refers to that of the thing, to presence as in
essence and existence, to presence as temporal in the
"here" and the "now" and finally, presence as in conscious
subjectivity:
Au regard de ce qui unirait indissolublement la 
voix a l'ame ou a la pensee du sens signifie, 
voire a la chose meme...tout signifiant, et
d'abord le signifiant ecrit, serait derive. Il
serait toujours technique et representatif. II 
n'aurait aucun sens constituant. Cette derivation 
est l'origine meme de la notion de "signifiant."
La notion de signe implique toujours en elle-meme 
la distinction du signifie et du signifiant, fut- 
ce a la limite, selon Saussure, comme les deux 
faces d'une seule et meme feuille. Elle reste 
done dans la descendance de ce logocentrisme qui 
est aussi un phonocentrisme: proximite absolue de 
la voix et de l'etre, de la voix et du sens de
l'etre, de la voix et de l'idealite du sens. (De
la grammatologie, pp. 22-23).
Jonathan Culler elucidates the intertwining of phone with
the logos seen in the expression "s'entendre parler" which
means not only "hearing-oneself-speak" but also
"understanding oneself" as in the phenomenological sense of
coming into full presence. According to Culler, there are
no grounds for claiming that voice delivers thoughts
directly and precisely even though that appears to be the
case when one hears oneself speak at the moment of
speaking. As Culler points out, speech, just as writing, is
a "sequence of signifiers...open to the process of
interpretation. 1,16 This view follows Derrida's contention
that if writing is defined by qualities traditionally
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assigned to it, then speech, by extension, can likewise be
considered a form of writing. He states, "Le langage
'originel,' 'naturel,' etc., n'ait jamais existe, [qu']il
n'ait jamais ate intact, intouche par l'ecriture, [qu'il]
ait toujours ete lui-meme une ecriture" (De la
grammatologie, p. 82). It is here that Derrida's
formulation of "l'ecriture generalisee" emerges as an
infrastructure to which oral language, just as writing, in
the conventional sense of the word, belongs. Derrida
attributes the elements traditionally pertaining
exclusively to writing to generalized writing, which
encompasses speech as well. Geoffrey Bennington explains:
"Writing" implies repetition, absence, risk of 
loss, death; but no speech would be possible 
without these values; moreover, if "writing" has 
always meant a signifier referring to other 
signifiers, and if, as we have seen, every 
signifier refers only to other signifiers, then 
"writing" will name properly the functioning of 
language in general.17
By rearticulating conceptions of speech and writing and by
deconstructing the hierarchy that privileges speech as
presence over writing and the absence it denotes, Derrida
initiates a movement toward the graphematization of
language, both oral and written.
The graphematic in general comprehends five basic
systems as outlined by Rodolphe Gasche in The Tain of the
Mirror. Briefly, these systems are that of the "arche-
trace," "differance," supplementarity, "re-mark" and
iterability.18 Although all of these systems are
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intertwined and overlap one another, for the purposes of my 
discussion of citationality, I will focus, obviously, on 
the question of iterability since it is, quite simply, the 
possibility of repeatability and, as such, bears most 
directly on my study. Now that we have viewed all language 
in general in terms of the graphematic, following Derrida's 
deconstruction of the binary opposition speech and writing, 
as found in Saussure's discussion of the sign, we shall 
consider the performative utterance as defined by J.L. 
Austin.
Speech Acts
The movement toward the concept of generalized writing 
enables an examination of Speech Act Theory as promulgated 
by J. L. Austin that will in turn bring us one step closer 
to comprehending what is understood by the term 
citationality. Because Derrida's reading of Austin's text 
and the subsequent polemic it provoked with Searle, 
commonly thought of as Austin's greatest disciple, are 
crucial to the development of the concept of citationality,
I find it indispensable to devote attention to the basic 
principles of this theory.
In How To Do Things With Words, Austin offers his 
working definition of the performative utterance as 
compared to the constative, where the performative does not 
describe or affirm and is neither true nor false, but 
instead "performs" a "speech act."19 This differentiation
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of constatives and performatives arose out of Austin's own 
critique of the belief that the important element of 
statements is their "truth" or "falsity." While Austin's 
argument against this tradition shares some common points 
with Derrida's work, it, like Saussure's text, ultimately 
discloses its entrenchment in that very tradition. Through 
his discussion of what constitutes the performative, Austin 
ends up reaffirming phonocentrism.
Regarding the constative, Austin describes this type 
of utterance as a statement of fact, as in a report that 
can be either true or false. A performative, on the other 
hand, is an utterance that participates in doing an action 
(performing something) which normally would not be 
described as saying something. It is an utterance necessary 
to accomplish an act and so conforms to pre-established 
societal norms and conventions. One of the most excellent 
examples of the performative cited by Austin is the 
utterance "I do" spoken during a marriage ceremony. Such a 
phrase is considered performative, since it is indeed 
"contractual" or "declaratory" (How to Do Things With 
Words, p. 6) and the utterance of those words is part of 
the performance of an act. Shoshana Felman explains that 
such an utterance involves the production and the 
accomplishment of the event and not its description.20 It 
is neither true nor false but only successful or 
unsuccessful. Austin uses the terms "felicitous" and
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"infelicitous," respectively, to denote the success or 
failure of any given performative. According to Austin, a 
felicitous speech act occurs when correctness of form and 
propriety of context are followed. As Christopher Norris 
states, "To fail in any of these counts is to fall into 
idle talk or other more insidious kinds of linguistic 
delinquency."21 Furthermore, Austin categorizes the types 
of failure of infelicitous performatives, which he 
considers as either misfires or abuses. Misfires result 
when the act, or promise, is not carried out. Abuses, on 
the other hand, are acts achieved, but in bad faith. An 
example is a marriage ceremony conducted under duress, 
where one of the parties involved goes through with the act 
despite (his/her) intentions to the contrary.
At this juncture in How To Do Things With Words,
Austin commences his categorization of the performative 
into serious and non-serious types of uses, and he excludes 
the non-serious performative as an "ill" (ibid., p. 21). He 
asserts that "a performative utterance will, for example, 
be in a peculiar way hollow or void if said by an actor on 
the stage, or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in 
soliloquy" (ibid., p. 22). On the grounds that such an 
instance of language use is not serious because it acts in 
ways "parasitic upon its normal use - ways which fall under 
the etiolations of language," Austin excludes it from 
consideration in his discussion. As Culler points out, the
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use of the word "parasitic" to describe non-serious uses of
language suggests a certain supplementarity, that such
categories are in addition to "normal," serious language
uses (On Deconstruction, p. 108). Obviously, this alludes
to a "restatement of the philosophic stance that privileges
'speech' at the expense of writing," (Norris,
Deconstruction: Theory and Practice, p. 109) . In conformity
with the sign as defined by Saussure in terms of the spoken
word, writing exists for Austin also outside of the system
of language, as a derivative, a signifier of a signifier
(De la grammatologie, p. 22) .
Austin's assertion that literary language should not
be considered an ordinary and normal use of language stems
from his belief that, as Sandy Petrey notes, "When words
enter a text... they move beyond the reach of the social
conventions with which they must interact in order to
perform."22 According to Austin, the conventions of
correctness and propriety that guide the performative cease
to operate when language is used non-seriously. Literary
language, in particular, as Petrey writes, is
"'parasitic'...an enfeebled 'etiolation' of language...a
copy rather than an original, an echo rather than speech"
(ihid, p. 51). Petrey goes on to question Austin's
reasoning for his acts of exclusion by posing the question:
Agreed that I can't do what Donne orders when I 
read his injunction to go and catch a falling 
star or get with child a mandrake root, why does 
that mean the absence of conventions rather than
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the presence of the conventions defining literary
language? {Ibid, p. 52)
Indeed, Petrey concludes, it would make the difference 
between "interpretation versus execution of the imperative" 
{ibid.).
What is especially interesting in the case of Austin's 
exclusions of literary language, is his use of such 
language in order to illustrate his points. Norris and 
Petrey both astutely point to the fact that Austin himself 
resorts to "storytelling and fictionalizing to make his 
claims about speech act theory" (Deconstruction: Theory and 
Practice, p. 109) yet he "excludes the literary from his 
theory as a non-serious and abnormal use of language"
(Speech Acts and Literary Theory, p. 52) . In The Critical 
Difference, Barbara Johnson adds, "Left to their own 
initiative, the very words with which Austin excludes 
jokes, theater, and poetry from his field of vision 
inevitably take their revenge"23 reiterating the 
inevitability of Austin's employing the very terms and 
examples to explicate his principles while attempting to 
exclude those types of examples.
While Johnson asserts that Austin is "done in" by his 
words and that the "joke ends up being on Austin" {ibid.), 
Shoshana Felman, however, posits her hypothesis that 
perhaps Austin's exclusion of jokes and literature is 
really a joke itself, emphasizing the playful aspects of 
his work {The Literary Speech Act Don Juan with J.L.
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Austin, or Seduction in Two Languages, p. 27). In fact, she 
draws comparisons between Austin's and Don Juan's seductive 
abilities, which Jonathan Culler contends "only emphasizes 
the inappropriateness of excluding non-serious discourse 
from consideration" (On Deconstruction, p. 118) .
Regardless of the seriousness, or lack thereof, of 
Austin's writings, his definition of the performative in 
terms of presence, intentionality and, therefore, 
authenticity remain points with which Derrida takes issue. 
Since a performative utterance is contractual under 
appropriate circumstances, the parties involved must act in 
good faith. This bears heavily on the speaker of the 
utterance, obviously, because such an utterance of a 
promise entails an intention to keep one's word. In 
addition to the speaker uttering the performative seriously 
and in good faith, a burden falls on the recipient of the 
utterance as well. If the speaker uses words seriously with 
the intention of keeping his/her word, the utterance must 
be taken and understood as such. The promise must be heard 
by someone and must be understood as a promise. Therefore, 
an utterance spoken under appropriate circumstances and in 
good faith qualifies as a serious use of language.
It is quite evident from the preceding passage that 
Austin's conception of the serious performative utterance 
relies on speaker and receiver being face-to-face in an 
oral exchange. Petrey elaborates on Austin's insistence
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upon the interlocutors' presence to achieve the utterance: 
"The key criterion is presence: speaker and listener in the 
presence of one another, meaning and intention present in 
spoken words, those words themselves present both as the 
physical reality of sound and the mental reality shared by 
the communal parties" (Speech Acts and Literary Theory, p. 
134) .
In "Signature Evenement Contexte," (to be referred to 
as "SEC") Derrida commences his reading of Austin with a 
commentary on communication, addressing Austin's 
requirement that the speaker be fully involved with his/her 
utterances.24 Derrida writes that the marks produced by the 
sender/addressor are cut off from him/her yet these marks 
"continue[nt] de produire des effets au-dela de sa presence 
et de l'actualite presente de son vouloir-dire, voire au- 
dela de sa vie meme..." (ibid., p. 372). Whereas writing, 
in the conventional sense, has been viewed as a mere 
representation to supplant presence and to act as a 
placeholder in the absence of a receiver, Derrida asserts 
that these traits of writing are generalizable and hold 
true for all signs, even those presumed to be determined by 
"presence" (ibid., pp. 373-74).
It follows therefore that every sign presupposes "un 
certain absolu de 1'absence" that renders it "repetable - 
iterable - en 1'absence absolue du destinataire ou de 
1'ensemble empiriquement determinable des destinataires..."
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{ibid., pp. 374-75) . Indeed, it is this iterability that
structures the mark of writing, regardless of the type of
writing under consideration {ibid.) . Gasche defines
iterability as a "repetition...that would be capable of
accounting for the fact - the possibility and the necessity
- that any singular and unique moment must be repeatable in
order to exist" {The Tain of the Mirror, p. 212).
The iterability (a word traced by Derrida via the
Latin "iter" to the Sanskrit "itara," meaning "other") of
the mark thus denotes its ability to function in the
absence of the addressor and addressee. If a mark can
function without and beyond the conscious presence of
addressor and addressee, it functions likewise outside the
intentionality of the sender/addressor and the response of
the receiver/addressee. The possibility that writing can
continue to act under these conditions of absence is,
according to Derrida:
Possibility de prelevement et de greffe 
citationnelle qui appartient a la structure de 
toute marque, parlee ou ecrite, et qui constitue 
toute marque en ecriture avant meme et en dehors 
de tout horizon de communuication semio- 
linguistique; en ecriture, c'est-a-dire en 
possibility de fonctionnement coupe, en un 
certain point, de son vouloir-dire 'originel' et 
de son appartenance a un contexte saturable et 
contraignant. ("SEC," p. 381)
The iterability of the mark implies both repetition and
difference, or as Gasche prefers, it "subsumes the
possibility of repetition and the possibility of
alteration" (The Tain of the Mirror, p. 212). In other
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words, what is reproduced through repetition or citation 
can never be identical to itself. There will always be a 
loss, or remainder. Therefore, language always says 
something other than what one wishes it to say. This is 
why, for Compagnon, citation takes on the connotation of a 
"clin d'oeil," a sort of gaming of opening and closing not 
at all unlike Freud's fort/da game of disappearance and 
return (La seconde main, p. 34). Therefore, when I quote 
and wink at you, I am at once both present and absent, 
meaning and not meaning what I say. According to Sartiliot, 
Derrida shows "through a disseminative process, that the 
text says a son insu (unwittingly, unconsciously) -- and 
especially 'a l'insu' of its author -- something other than 
what it means to say" (Citation and Modernity, p. 47) .
This is why Derrida sees citation as both 
dissemination (of seeds) and theft ("vol," which also 
carries with it the connotation of flight), not at all 
unlike Deleuze's definition of repetition as both gift and 
theft (Repetition et difference, p. 11). In other words, 
any mark is capable of rupturing with its "present" context 
and becoming situated in a plurality of other (con)texts. 
This point differs radically from Austin's emphasis on the 
context of the performative as total and complete, which, 
according to Derrida, suggests that "no residue escapes the 
present totalization" and that there is no "dissemination 
escaping the unity of meaning" ("SEC," p. 188). Christopher
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Norris adds that the very iterability of the mark, spoken 
or written, is evidence "that speech acts cannot be 
confined to the unique self-present moment of meaning" 
(.Deconstruction: Theory and Practice, p. 110) . Indeed they 
"partake of the differance, a distancing from the origin 
that marks all language in so far as it exceeds and pre­
exists the speaker's intention" (ibid.).
That speech acts, as a form of generalized writing, 
can escape the "self-present moment of meaning" 
demonstrates that there is no totalizing context to contain 
them. It might be that meaning is context-bound, as Culler 
puts it, but context is itself boundless and as such is 
open to alteration (On Deconstruction, p. 55). Derrida 
refers to context as "non saturable." He writes:
Tout signe, linguistique ou non linguistique, 
parle ou ecrit (au sens courant de cette 
opposition), en petite ou en grande unite, peut 
etre 'cite,' mis entre guillemets; par la il peut 
rompre avec tout contexte donne, engendrer a 
1'infini de nouveaux contextes, de fagon 
absolument non saturable. ("SEC," p. 381)
Thus, the citationality common to all signs means that all
signs are subject to being repeated and to taking on new
meaning once grafted or cited in new contexts, and despite
any intentionality on the part of the speaker.
In his article "Reiterating the Differences: A Reply
to Derrida," which appeared in the same issue of Glyph as
did Derrida's article, Searle disputes Derrida's claims of
generalized writing and citationality.25 He insists that
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Derrida has misunderstood Austin's work by confusing the 
terms parasitic discourse, citationality and iterability.
He reverses Derrida's statement concerning iterability, 
writing instead that "the iterability of linguistic forms 
facilitates and is a necessary condition of the particular 
forms of intentionality that are characteristic of speech 
acts" {ibid., p. 208). Norris discloses the fallacy of 
Searle's argument by stating that Searle "presupposes what 
Derrida denies to begin with: that language is properly 
adapted to communicate meaning, and -- as a corollary to 
this -- that whatever obstructs communication is either 
deviant or somehow beside the point" (Deconstruction:
Theory and Practice, pp. 111-12). Searle neglects to 
realize that Derrida considers all language as containing a 
certain element of indeterminacy no matter whether it is in 
a "serious" or "non-serious" context. As Norris explains, 
"language reveals aberrations and never arrives at a stable 
order of meaning" {ibid., p. 113).
In "Limited Inc a b c...," Derrida's reply to Searle's 
"Reply," Derrida cites the example of a personal shopping 
list, a list destined for himself issued by himself, a list 
which remains utilizable later, "a un autre moment, en mon 
absence, en 1'absence de moi-present-maintenant.1,26 He goes 
on to say, "Le recepteur et l'emetteur de la shopping list 
ne sont pas le meme: meme s'ils portent le meme nom et sont 
forts de l'identite du moi" {ibid) . If this were not the
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case, if repetition did not occur with alteration, then why 
would one need to bother with a personal shopping list? If 
there is an alteration, a differentiation that takes place 
between moments of presence then producing a list that can 
be written now but function later, in a different time and 
place, makes sense.
In his reply, Searle ignores what Derrida calls the 
marginal or fringe cases; yet, it is the very existence or 
occurrence of such cases that renders potential failures of 
all performatives, of any communication, a necessary 
possibility.
In "Limited Inc a b c . . . , " Derrida explicates this
indeterminacy or undecidability in terms of iterability's
engendering not only repetition, but also the
transformation of that repetition as an alteration or
difference that is a function of something being repeated:
L'iterabilite altere, elle parasite et contamine 
ce qu'elle identifie et permet de repeter; elle 
fait qu'on veut dire (deja, toujours, aussi) 
autre chose que ce qu'on veut dire, on dit autre 
chose que ce qu'on dit et voudrait dire, comprend 
autre chose que...etc. (Ibid., p. 33)
Since iterability alters what it enables to repeat or to be
repeated, there is always a difference between what is said
and what is meant. Here, I would like to recall Compagnon's
comparison of quotation, signalled by the quotation mark,
with the blink of an eye. It is precisely this alternance
between presence and absence, between what is said and
meant, that indicates the instability of meaning what one
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says and saying what one means. While Searle accuses 
Derrida of being obsessed with what lies behind utterances, 
he seems to regard intention as "something separate, 
intrinsic and behind the expression" where there is no 
space between the expression and intention. Searle 
apparently confounds the two, considering expression, or 
the "utterances" as serious literal speech.
In terms of performativity then, we must reconsider 
Austin's and Searle's insistence on intention as a 
determining factor in the success of any utterance. Since 
performatives also adhere to certain conventions, they 
repeat and re-cite those stipulations in order to be 
completed and in this sense are derivative of those very 
conventions.
In "Burning Acts: Injurious Speech," Judith Butler
addresses questions of the prosecution of hate speech in
terms of the performative, a category of utterances which
exceeds the singularity of its eventhood/occurrence as
event owing to the iteration always already inscribed in
every mark.27 She writes:
If a performative provisionally succeeds... then 
it is not because an intention successfully 
governs the action of speech, but only because 
that action echoes prior actions, and accumulates 
the force of authority through the repetition or 
citation of a prior and authoritative set of 
practices. It is not simply that the speech act 
takes place within a practice, but that the act 
is itself a ritualized practice. (Ibid., p. 157)
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Butler's view of the performative basically reiterates the
claims that Derrida made in "Signature Evenement Contexte"
and points to the fact that the driving force of
iterability or citationality must always remain open, must
always remain a possibility: "Could a performative
utterance succeed if its formulation did not repeat a
"coded" or iterable utterance..." (ibid.) . The answer is
obviously no. The success of a performative relates
directly to its recognition as conforming to a certain,
pre-determined convention. A wedding, for example, could
not be considered successful if it did not cite or repeat
the code for such ceremonies.
The questions of iterability and contextualization
form the crux of David Wills' forthcoming article "Lemming:
Reframing the Abyss." Wills explicates the process of
iteration or citation as that which is capable of breaching
one context only to broach, or to be called to function, in
a newly engendered context:
Once one accepts that sense "moves" in order to 
function, and Derrida insists that there must be 
such a break with the intactness of a self- 
presence in order for there to be any meaning 
whatsoever -- a play of sense rather than some 
impossibly ideal immediate and permanent 
transparency of meaning -- then limiting the 
extent of that "movement" or spacing becomes an 
insoluble problem or question. From this point of 
view language and meaning take place as a form of 
rupture; they occur over an abyss .28
Once citationality comes into play, it enables the
generation of a plurality of new contexts, actualized
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through the dissemination or grafting of the mark. While 
the possibility of such an operation must be a given, 
according to Derrida, the effects of citationality remain 
to be explored. First, the creation of new contexts stems 
from Derrida's insistence that there is no "hors-texte;" 
there are only contexts. Because context begets context 
interminably, citationality produces an abyssal structure. 
In other words, the incessant emergence of new contexts in 
which one finds the iterated mark -- the repeated and 
altered mark -- places that mark en abime.
This process of mise-en-abime serves to reinforce the 
rupture with the originary mark, or rather its deferral, 
therefore rendering access to it impossible and perpetually 
displaced.
Geoffrey Bennington writes:
No natural necessity prevents any statement from 
being lifted from "its" context and grafted into 
another. Once more, it is writing which best 
illustrates this general property of language: 
writing is by definition destined to be read in a 
context different from that of the act of its 
inscription (Jacques Derrida, p. 85-86).
Citationality therefore emerges from the graphematization
of all signs, all language. It allows speech to be
discussed in the same ways as writing and holds speech
subject to the same problems and questions that have been
commonly attributed to writing. While allowing a
reformulation of what elements constitute speech and
writing, that is, what is "proper" to each, citationality
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also produces effects that call into question borders and 
frames, private and public, authority and property and 
origin and repetition.
What happens then to traditionally oral modes of 
communication when they are indeed shown to be subject to 
the same problems/questions facing writing, in the 
conventional sense? What happens when these modes function 
in narrative, in writing? How does this problematize 
narrative? What does this mean in terms of the performative 
when these categories of orality subscribe to juridical 
conventions? How are borders and frames affected, indeed 
exceeded and ruptured as the result of citationality? These 
are but a few of the questions to which the following 
chapters will attempt to respond.
It is precisely this citationality or iterability and 
its effects that I wish to study in the works by Marguerite 
Duras, Maurice Blanchot and Jacques Derrida. What I see as 
the different functions of citationality manifest 
themselves in the various texts I have selected for this 
proj ect.
I call such functions "hearsay," "testimony" and 
"conference" where an insistence on the juridical aspects 
of these terms allows a questioning of presence, property 
and authority and as such introduces a problematic, as 
previously discussed, inherent in all signs: that is, their 
possibility of being repeated, disseminated and therefore
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of coming to function in a variety of contexts escaping 
attempts to control or regulate their appearance and use in 
these new contexts. This slippage between contexts and the 
resultant inability to affix a stable order of meaning 
merits textual analysis, and has been conspicuously absent 
from otherwise productive work on Duras, Blanchot and 
Derrida.
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CHAPTER TWO
HEARSAY: MARGUERITE DURAS' LOL V. STEIN CYCLE
Introduction
Marguerite Duras' 1964 novel, Le Ravissement de Lol V. 
Stein, marked a departure from her previous works and a 
move toward a more experimental type of writing. Through 
effects of citationality which prevent an absolute closure 
of the narrative, Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein in turn 
generated a multiplicity of texts, including novels, 
screenplays and films, known collectively as the Lol V. 
Stein cycle.
Most of the critical work dedicated to this phase of 
Duras' writing focuses on Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein. 
Psychoanalysts and feminists in particular have devoted 
much attention to the character of Lol V. Stein and to the 
ball scene at T. Beach, especially addressing questions of 
memory and oblivion as well as feminine writing and 
desire.1 Certainly, the importance of these contributions 
to studies of Duras' work cannot be underscored.
Yet, what I see at work in certain phases of Duras' 
writing, in particular the Lol V. Stein cycle, which 
includes the texts of Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein, Le 
Vice-Consul, L'amour, India Song and Son nom de Venise dans 
Calcutta desert are citational practices which undermine 
the classical economy of textual production to such an 
extent that the narratives resist closure and remain for
50
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the most part simply a series of attempts at narrative.
Such citational practices operate at both the intertextual 
and intratextual levels in the Lol cycle.2
At the intratextual level, that is, within each of 
these texts themselves, the use of hearsay as a (oral) 
function of citationality serves to underscore the lack of 
textual stability, as the narrators are dependent upon it 
in order to attempt their narratives.
Further destabilization and disruption occurs among 
the above-mentioned texts where we find a citation and re­
citation of narrative aspects of the other texts. The texts 
of the Lol cycle cite each other. Therefore, the narratives 
consist of an attempted re-writing, re-constitution of 
various facets of Lol's own story. The narratives feed off 
each other, appropriating and thus repeating, yet always 
with a difference, certain textual threads of the other 
texts. Citationality among the texts destabilizes the 
entire cycle by preventing closure from text to text and 
allowing the generation of a plurality of texts.
While I will certainly discuss textual elements such 
as characters, places and events which are disseminated and 
cited within and among these texts, I will also show that 
what is at stake in this cycle is the progressive 
radicalization of the function of hearsay marked by the 
"mot-trou," or "word-hole," as first mentioned in the 
seminal narrative of the cycle, Le Ravissement de Lol V.
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Stein. This impossible word or "would-be word" functions as 
the mark of the origin, which necessarily remains 
inaccessible. It is my contention, therefore, that since 
access to the origin is severed, the narratives of the 
cycle exhibit a strong reliance on hearsay in a futile 
attempt to recuperate this lost originary event. These 
repeated efforts manifested in the citational practices of 
hearsay generate the production of numerous narratives 
while rendering absolute narrative closure impossible.
In Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein, for example, the 
hearsay upon which the text is built focuses on the effort 
to recuperate the lost scene of Lol's ravishing, or 
abandonment, at the T. Beach ball years earlier. The trace 
of this ball is carried in the "mot-trou" and subsequently 
becomes articulated through the "cri," or scream. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, any sign, linguistic or 
not, is subject to the condition of a potential iterability 
and, by extension, to citational modes such as hearsay.
Yet, the scream is an utterance that is neither within 
speech nor exterior to it. Therefore, the scream can be 
viewed as treading the borderline of speech itself, 
threatening to collapse into the abyss of the "mot-trou."
What I will show is that it is indeed in the 
subsequent texts of the cycle that the scream is put into 
circulation through an insistence on hearsay and that this 
hearsay becomes increasingly focused on the scream. In Le
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Vice-Consul, for example, the "mot-trou" is found in the 
scream of both the Vice-Consul and the beggar woman, who 
are two characters figured as impossible owing to the 
inability of naming the unnameable of their stories. In 
other words, the inability to achieve access to what has 
rendered them impossible in the text results in the 
marginalization of these two characters by the European 
community. The impossibility of accessing their stories 
leaves them incapable of uttering anything other than a 
scream. This (in)articulation of the "word-hole" remains in 
circulation throughout the cycle and progressively consumes 
what is being heard and said.
Proceeding to L'amour, we will see how the use of 
hearsay in the cycle becomes indeed increasingly 
disjunctive. In this telegraphic-style text that 
incessantly cites and re-cites itself, the "cri de S.
Thala" resonates most clearly and frequently.
Hearsay becomes further radicalized in the film-text 
India Song through the discontinuity between the visual and 
auditory fields of the film. I see hearsay in this text as 
condensing further into the re-citation of the "mot-trou, " 
or scream, since the citation of other textual elements, 
such as places and characters, appears to be increasingly 
filtered out of circulation.
This condensation of hearsay culminates in Son nom de 
Venise dans Calcutta dSsert, a film that discloses the
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irrecuperable disjunction between the visual and auditory 
domains through its citation of India Song's soundtrack and 
its characterless shots of the embassy in ruins. With this 
final text in the Lol cycle, hearsay has moved from the 
heard and said to simply the heard. Since all other textual 
elements of the cycle are apparently portrayed as dead or 
"deserted," all that remains to circulate is the scream as 
the (in)articulation of the "mot-trou." As stated earlier, 
a scream is on the threshold of speech; it is an utterance 
that, in these instances, is difficult to determine. 
Therefore, what Son now involves is the point at which 
everything is still heard, since all is carried within the 
scream of the word-hole, but nothing is said any more.
It is within this framework that I will first explore 
each of these texts individually before moving to the cycle 
as a whole, where I will examine the process and 
implications of hearsay from a larger intertextual 
perspective. However, before delving into an analysis of 
the Lol V. Stein cycle of texts, I intend to first discuss 
how hearsay and its modes operate as a function of 
citationality.
Hearsay
Derived from the verbs "to hear" and "to say," hearsay 
commonly denotes the repetition of what another has already 
said. In its legal definition, hearsay is "information 
relayed from another person to the witness before it
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
55
reaches the ears of the court or jury. "3 Contrary to 
testimony, where the (twice present) witness offers first­
hand knowledge obtained through the observation of or 
participation in the event, hearsay suggests the possession 
of second-hand information by the witness and hearsay 
evidence therefore consists of extra-judicial statements 
made by the witness or another. Due to its unreliable and 
often incompetent character, hearsay evidence is generally 
inadmissible in court.
Hearsay is a term I choose to use in my discussion of 
Duras owing to what it evokes between writing and speech as 
well as property and authority with regard to Derrida's 
notion of citationality. Often used interchangeably with 
rumor and gossip, hearsay actually denotes a more general, 
traditionally oral mode of communication and information 
dissemination. In order to dispel the commonly held belief 
that two of hearsay's modes, gossip and rumor, are 
synonymous, I will briefly differentiate them from one 
another.
Gossip appears dependent on a pre-established social 
network for the dissemination of typically personal 
information regarding a member of the social group. It is 
therefore spread in a highly selective manner within a 
fixed social network.
The word gossip is derived from "god-related" and was 
used to designate godparents. Eventually the meaning of
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gossip expanded to include any close friend. In the 18th 
century Samuel Johnson offered another definition of gossip 
which linked the word to women for the first time: "one who 
runs about tattling like women at a lying-in."4 It was only 
at the beginning of the 19th century that gossip came to 
signify a type of conversation and not a person: "idle 
talk, trifling or groundless rumor; tittle-tattle" (CED). 
The current definition of gossip as given by Patricia Meyer 
Spacks is "chat or light writing" or "idle talk about 
someone not present" (Gossip, p. 14).
Whereas gossip has traditionally been attributed to 
women, Duras, in the Lol cycle, employs male narrators in 
Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein and Le Vice-Consul who rely 
on gossip in order to attempt the narrative. Such a 
technique itself raises interesting questions related to 
gender and gossip. Indeed, I view this as an oppositional 
maneuver on Duras' part that destabilizes traditionally 
held assumptions of women as purveyors of gossip.
Sociological studies have in recent years examined the 
process and the implications of gossip in social groups as 
compared with rumor, which will be addressed below. Studies 
in general have found that gossip holds relevance only for 
a specific group and as stated above is disseminated 
selectively only through friends and acquaintances and 
remains limited to them. According to one researcher, the 
law of gossiping, of hearing and subsequently repeating
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information, is "a privilege extended only to those who 
mutually recognize themselves as members" of the group.5 It 
represents, in other words, an excellent case of "clique 
phenomenon" (ibid.).
In her book entitled Gossip, Spacks distinguishes two 
modes of gossip, distilled malice and serious gossip. The 
former plays with truths and falsehoods and serves the 
speaker who seeks some sort of political or social gain at 
the expense of others by playing with their reputations. 
Serious gossip, on the other hand, serves to solidify a 
group's sense of self, by distinguishing insiders from 
outsiders. As a function of intimacy, serious gossip is 
talk about others in order to reflect on oneself (Gossip, 
p. 19) .
Considered "intellectual chewing gum," gossip usually 
denotes simple idle talk, as both Heidegger and Kierkegaard 
suggest. According to Spacks, their definition of gossip is 
the desire to say something without having to think too 
much (ibid.). Yet there is a danger lurking in the 
definition of gossip as "idle talk," presumably harmless, 
for its potential destructiveness is concealed. It does not 
announce its intention. This contributes to the suspicion 
that gossip is subversive, particularly in terms of the 
question of public versus private discourse. It appears 
that gossip blurs the boundary between the two, giving rise 
to an anxiety over where gossip goes and how far-reaching
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its effects are. For even the most private of 
communications can create an impact of "incalculable scope" 
(Gossip, p . 23).
Sociological researchers, such as Jorg Bergmann, have 
found that gossipers themselves are "border-runners" who 
delight in excursions into the improper. Fully aware of the 
boundaries, gossip producers disdain the borders between 
public and private, decent and indecent, truth and lies 
(Discreet Indiscretions, p. 118) .
Interestingly enough, gossipers often resort to the 
use of citations as a means of presenting a "true event" 
(ibid.). At the same time, citation provides the 
opportunity for a fictionalization since it is a mode of 
reconstruction. In other words, an event is not copied in 
quotations in the form of a document, but instead it is re­
written. Its subjects, as Bergmann points out, are not 
imitated, but imitatively stylized, as evidence in the Lol 
V. Stein cycle suggests, where events are not replicated in 
the narratives, but reconstructed.
Citations, commonly used in gossip, allow the 
possibility of exaggeration of what is disseminated. The 
gossip producer's presentations cannot be verified by the 
recipients and are as a consequence difficult to doubt.
This is especially true when the gossiper indicates through 
quotations that s/he possesses first-hand information. With 
such speakers, who possess privileged information, however,
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minor deviations from the truth seem harmless, as they are 
undetectable by the receiver. Gossipers accentuate the 
extraordinary in order to prove or justify the worthiness 
of their communication, which enables a dramatization of 
the original event. Exaggeration can also express a 
heightened experience of an extreme situation for which 
there is no adequate possibility of communication.
Quotations therefore constitute a structural basis for 
exaggeration while at the same time functioning as a means 
of authentication of the disseminated information. In 
summary, gossip "raises questions about boundaries, 
authority and the nature of knowledge" and has "subversive 
implications" for operations of knowledge (Gossip, p. 12) .
Although the Random House Dictionary offers rumor as a 
synonym for gossip, rumor is distinguishable in that it 
suggests a more easily disseminated piece of information. 
Since it is spread in an unspecific way, its origin is 
lost. Rumor is information that is neither substantiated 
nor refuted, and it is spread when there is a strong desire 
for meaning or a quest for clarification and closure. Like 
gossip, rumor usually has a pejorative connotation as it is 
often associated with scandal and mischief. Some social 
scientists, though, view the purpose and function of rumor 
more positively (Discreet Indiscretions, p. 27). For them 
rumor is not pathological, but essential to the social 
process of group problem solving, since it reflects a
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normal desire for meaning in events. The propensity for 
rumor is established when events are important and the news 
concerning them is ambiguous or lacking.
To briefly summarize, rumor can generally be defined 
as a piece of unverified information, which suggests a 
process of widespread oral dissemination occurring in a 
rapid and unspecific manner. The quick and easy dispersion 
of the information results in the nearly always guaranteed 
loss of its source of origin. Gossip, on the other hand, 
appears to be dependent on a pre-established social network 
for the dissemination of typically personal information 
regarding a member of the social group. It is therefore 
spread in a highly selective manner within a fixed social 
network, yet still involves the loss of the information's 
origin. These two modes of unauthenticated second-hand 
information dissemination are to be considered as different 
functions of hearsay, as hearsay refers to a more general 
dissemination of second-hand information. In addition to 
denoting simply the general circulation of second-hand 
information, the use of the term hearsay, furthermore, 
allows a discussion of property and authority since it 
carries with it juridical connotations.
Based on the above definition of hearsay and the fact 
that courts generally prohibit the introduction of hearsay 
evidence due to its unreliable nature and the lack of 
competence associated with it, we can now examine how this
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translates into hearsay's role in narrative. In Gossip, 
Spacks contends that gossip (and likewise, hearsay) is 
indeed a very useful narrative technique serving to impel 
plots. While on a certain level the transmission of 
information concerning a text's characters provides the 
reader with the background necessary to arrive at an 
understanding of characters' motives and actions, I contend 
that the punctuation of a narrative by gossip or hearsay is 
potentially more disruptive than useful, as evidence found 
through an analysis of Duras' texts seems to suggest. As 
Ross Chambers articulates in his work on gossip's role in 
the novel, its disruptiveness stems from the destabilizing 
effect it has on the authority of the narrative, thereby 
rendering the narrator unreliable and decentering, 
fragmenting even, the formerly stable, omnipotent authorial 
voice.6 In Room for Maneuver, Chambers states that gossip's 
status as unreliable is "structural" and not "accidental" 
since once "'truth' has become inaccessible, all 
information without exception becomes misinformation, there 
being no guaranteed criterion against which to measure its 
veracity and/or accuracy."7 This inaccessible truth (of 
Lol's ravishing, of the beggar woman's story, of the Vice- 
Consul's unspeakable incident at Lahore) is in fact what 
appears to propagate the hearsay responsible for the Lol V. 
Stein cycle. With this in mind, we can explore hearsay's
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
62
impact within and among the texts of the cycle, beginnning 
with an analysis of Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein.
Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein 
The first example from the Lol cycle I wish to examine 
is Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein, the generative text of 
the cycle. Composed almost exclusively of hearsay, this 
text involves an attempted re-writing of Lol V. Stein's 
story by the narrator, Jacques Hold, a 36-year old doctor 
newly arrived in S . Tahla to work in the hospital. Hold has 
an affair with Tatiana Karl, the wife of Hold's colleague 
Pierre Beugner. As it turns out, Tatiana is the childhood 
friend of Lol. Introduced to Lol by Tatiana, Jacques Hold 
subsequently becomes obssessed with her and driven to re­
construct her story after hearing how her fiance Michael 
Richardson abandoned her at the Casino ball, by leaving 
with the mysterious Anne-Marie Stretter. The locus of Lol's 
ravishing is therefore this ball scene which terminates 
with Lol's scream as she leaves the casino ballroom.
Having occurred a decade before the actual beginning 
of the novel, this event around which the whole of the text 
centers is lost and the novel immediately sinks into an 
attempt at the recuperation of this lost event, which 
Jacques Hold tries to accomplish by means of questioning 
and probing various sources of information on Lol, her 
childhood and the ball itself. As Leslie Hill states:
What the novel dramatises is a crisis in 
knowledge; it is continually citing, juxtaposing
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and thereby questioning a range of different 
discourses of interpretation as represented by 
each one of the characters in the novel - all of 
which claim some purchase in the story of Lol, 
but none of which are finally validated or proven 
to be adequate by the writing of the text."8
The narrator's account of obtaining information from other 
sources in order to reconstitute the ball scene v/here Lol's 
ravishing took place ultimately culminates in the re­
enactment of it, when Hold accompanies Lol to T. Beach. It 
is as if the story attempts to repeat the event it is 
trying to tell, collapsing eventually and inevitably into 
the citation of citations of a lost event.
"Difficile a capter" and "etrangement incomplete," Lol 
V. Stein is herself figured as a sort of presence-absence, 
neither here nor there, but rather quite fragmentary in 
nature. Numerous critics have found evidence of this in 
Lol's name itself. Perhaps the most notable of these is 
Jacques Lacan for whom the "V" in Lol's name represents 
both wings and scissors which cut her into pieces.9 
Further evidence of Lol's fluid, mobile and fragmentary 
character exists, for example, in the names she is called 
throughout Le Ravissement, and indeed in its citations of 
that text in subsequent texts of the cycle, which reinforce 
the fact that Lol is not a fixed character at all. She is 
called everything from Lola Valerie Stein to Lol V. Stein 
to Lol and, by the time, of L'amour, simply "la femme." At 
any one time in the text she appears as only a fragment of 
the whole, a partially present, partially absent figure,
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never complete or anchored. "Lol est en cendres" (p. 49)
gives one indication of how her character is portrayed in
the text. In general, descriptions of her in Le Ravissement
focus on the negative and at one point in the text, Hold
announces, "Elle n'est personne" (p. 47) thereby utterly
negating her.
Tatiana sheds light on Lol's childhood when she
explains to the narrator, "Au college, dit-elle, et elle
n'etait pas la seule a le penser, il manquait deja quelque
chose a Lol pour etre - elle dit la" (p. 12). As Hold
continues his investigation of Lol's childhood, he provides
another account of Lol, as relayed to him by Tatiana:
Une part d'elle-meme eut ete toujours en allee 
loin de vous et de 1'instant. Ou? Dans le reve 
adolescent? Non, repond Tatiana, non, on aurait 
dit dans rien encore, justement rien.
Tatiana aurait tendance a croire que c'etait 
peut-etre en effet le coeur de Lol V. Stein qui 
n'etait pas - elle dit: la... (p. 13)
This passage reveals the fragmentary nature of Lol - not
only is she not really "la," but it is even impossible to
pinpoint exactly what about her is lacking, as Tatiana can
only hypothesize that it is possibly "le coeur."
Later in the text, Hold comments, "Je reconnais
1'absence, son absence d'hier, elle me manque a tout
moment, deja" (p. 136). Hold finds himself already
subjected to the oddly, partially absent Lol: "L'approche
de Lol n'existe pas. On ne peut pas se rapprocher ou
s'eloigner d'elle" (p. 105) . Lol's effect on Hold becomes
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
more evident as he explains, "...il manquait quelquechose a 
Lol, deja elle etait etrangement incomplete..." (p. 80). 
Hold states:
Je sais: je ne sais rien.
Ne rien savoir de Lol etait la connaitre deja. On 
pouvait, me parut-il, en savoir moins encore, de 
moins en moins sur Lol V. Stein, (p. 81)
Instead of drawing nearer and nearer to Lol, Hold now finds
himself in the peculiar position of not being able to draw
closer to her, but of experiencing a sort of recoil by her.
In other words, the closer he gets to her, the further away
she goes, leaving Hold with less and less knowledge of her.
This effect of Lol's is painful for Hold, as he is so
driven to write her story. Yet, this story remains an
impossibility, given Lol's present-absent nature and her
constant fragmentariness. Hold is, therfore, prevented from
accomplishing of her story.
What I consider to be a physical citation of Lol's and 
the story's impossibility arises on the actual pages of the 
novel. The disruption of the printed text by lacunae of 
plain white space seems to be a manifestation of what is 
taking place within the printed text and serves as yet 
another means of destabilizing the narrative, by impeding 
continuity.10
Faced with the impossibility of knowing Lol, who is 
neither complete nor fixed, Hold's narrative is therefore 
already on shaky ground. This lack of narrative stability 
is most evident in Hold's narration itself and its reliance
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on hearsay. The first part of the text is comprised of 
first-person narration without any indication at all 
concerning to whom the "je" of the narrator refers. There 
is however a sudden shift to third-person narration, as the 
narrator describes Lol following and being followed by an 
unnamed man on the street. At this juncture in the text the 
narrator names himself as Jacques Hold and only then does 
it become clear that the "je" and the "il" are one and the 
same. The slippage from first- to third-person and back 
undermines the integrity of the narrator and calls into 
question the authority he maintains over his narrative.
Although one would tend to expect the destabilizing 
effects of the shifts in narrative voice to diminish 
subsequent to the revelation of the narrator as Jacques 
Hold, one senses more acutely that Hold, obviously 
overwhelmed by Lol and his feelings for her, actually has 
no "hold" whatsoever over the narrative. In fact, the 
slippage from "je" to "il" provides evidence of the little 
control he actually retains over his attempt at narrative.
In Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein, Jacques Hold's 
authority over Lol and the text becomes further 
questionable and undermined as it is revealed that he bases 
much of what he feigns to know of Lol on unauthenticated 
second-hand information obtained from friends and 
acquaintances of Lol. The narrative's insistence on 
citationality calls into question the authority of that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6 7
very narrative by casting Hold as unreliable and the text 
overall as destabilized. Jacques Hold's impossible attempt 
at and desire for a re-writing or a re-construction of 
Lol's story for himself is indicated at the novel's onset, 
where Hold states, "je raconterai mon histoire de Lol V. 
Stein" (p. 14). Hold proceeds to piece together "his 
narrative" with fragments of various aspects of Lol's life 
and story that he acquires from Tatiana, Lol's mother, Jean 
Bedford and Pierre Beugner, in addition to various other 
anonymous sources.
Here, I would like to recall the process of hearsay as 
was previously discussed, whereby the speaker often relies 
on quotation in an attempt to lend authentication to 
his/her information/story. Since the one who allegedly 
relayed the information to the speaker is not present, 
there is no means of verification of what is passed on. The 
tendency of the interlocutor is to accept the information 
rather than doubt it since the use of quotation lends an 
air of authority to the speaker. Therefore, when Hold 
states that "Tatiana dit que" and "Tatiana dit encore que," 
Hold expects the interlocutor to accept what he relates as 
true because he is the one in possession of privileged 
information about Lol.
Yet, the very fact that he relies on hearsay in order 
to write his story renders him immediately suspect as a 
narrator. Since verbal citation enables a fictionalization
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of what is being said, strictly because it is impossible to 
verify and because it demands a suspension of disbelief, 
trust as to the accuracy of the reported information is 
weak. As far as accuracy is concerned, one must remember 
that hearsay, coupled with the use of quotation, amounts to 
a reconstruction of an event, meaning that the event is not 
merely copied or replicated but entirely re-written, as 
Hold attempts to do.
If Hold feigns authority by presenting his information 
as authenticated due to his use of quotations he attributes 
to others, he begins to call his authority into question as 
a narrator by moving from "Tatiana dit que" to phrases such 
as "Tatiana avait tendance a croire que c'etait peut- 
etre..." (p. 13). This raises two possibilities. First, it
provides an indication of the pressure Hold could be 
applying on Tatiana to give as much story as possible to 
him, in which case she is in the position of resorting to 
conjecture in order to fulfill Hold's desire. This assumes 
however that Hold relates verbatim what Tatiana tells him, 
without fictionalization or exaggeration on his part.
Second, it is rather more probable that Hold himself begins 
to resort to fictionalization or exaggeration of Tatiana's 
alleged account of Lol since he in fact reveals his 
distrust for the information supplied him by Tatiana: "Je 
ne crois plus a rien de ce que dit Tatiana, je ne suis 
convaincu de rien" (p. 14). Once he himself begins to
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question the hearsay he receives from his sources, one can 
hardly avoid questioning his reliability as narrator.
Since his sources can provide only fragmentary 
information concerning Lol, about whom information can be 
only fragmentary at best, Hold supplements this with his 
own first-hand observations. Yet, this still fails to 
complete Lol's story. The narrator's reliance on 
unauthenticated second-hand information reveals the lack of 
a unified, stable narration.
The narrator's effort at narrative thus turns out to 
be based on hearsay, that is unverified information he 
obtains second-hand, which automatically renders it 
suspect, and on sheer speculation and conjecture on his 
part. It becomes apparent in fact that the text is nothing 
more than the citation and re-citaion of hearsay concerning 
various aspects of Lol. The absence of the traditional 
quotation marks, which would attribute specific pieces of 
information to the rightful sources, serves to destabilize 
further the authority of the narrative, as it becomes 
impossible to distinguish the hearsay from the narrator's 
first-hand observation and then from his apparent 
inventions of what possibly happened to Lol.
In fact, desire for "mon histoire de Lol V. Stein," 
for access to the locus of her ravishing, accentuated by 
Hold's increasing distrust for what Tatiana Karl tells him 
and the ultimate failure on Tatiana's part to ever fill in
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Che gaps of Lol's story for Hold, forces Hold to resort to
utter invention in a desperate attempt to recuperate her
story. As Ross Chambers states, when information is
unavailable, as is the case in this text:
People interpret signs as best they may...They 
thus invent for themselves an alternative 
knowledge to substitute for the information that 
is unavailable. (Room for Maneuver, p. 206)
This is quite often the case involving hearsay, when the
desire for knowledge about a certain subject is very strong
and the access to complete information from various sources
is impossible. The tendency .exists to plug in pieces of
information, either through exaggeration or distortion of
the information at hand or through the invention of other
information to substitute for what is lacking. Obviously,
in Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein, much indeed is lacking,
due to Lol's nature and to the general function of hearsay
as well. Having established early in the text his distrust
for what Tatiana tells him, Hold moves toward the
inevitable invention of various fragments of Lol's story.
The text subsequently becomes punctuated by Hold's
interjections which directly precede his "writing" of the
story. The following examples are but a sampling of
expressions replete within the text, "J'aime a croire
ceci..." (p. 48) followed several pages later by
"J'invente, je vois" p. 56) and then "Je ne sais plus...je
crois voir ce qu'a du voir Lol V. Stein" (p. 59). The
speculation and uncertainty of these expressions again
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offer evidence of Hold's unreliable status. One of the most 
telling moments is found on page 121 when Hold recounts his 
observation of Lol through a window. Right at the end of 
the passage Hold announces, "Je mens. Je n'ai pas bouge de 
la fenetre."
Lol's figuration as a sort of presence-absence 
"difficile a capter" and "etrangement incomplete" forces 
Hold to confront the impossibility of ever achieving the 
story and grasping, "holding" both Lol and the narrative. 
The impossibility of saying what is impossible to be said 
resonates like the "mot-trou" and threatens the text with 
the collapse of any and all narrative stability and 
authority. This is obviously set in motion by Hold's 
reliance on hearsay for the re-constitution of Lol's story, 
and once he realizes the inevitable failure of hearsay to 
accomplish his project, he resorts to invention in an 
impossible attempt to fill the lacunae. Rather than provide 
him with all the missing links and pieces of Lol's life, 
the hearsay and conjectures fail miserably and eliminate 
any remaining shred of narrative authority by casting Hold 
as utterly unreliable.
Le Vice-Consul
The propagation of hearsay in response to the scene of 
Lol's ravishing in Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein functions 
like the "mot-trou" where the event or word itself is 
inaccessible yet its reverberations are incessantly
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produced. The failure of the novel to gain access to the 
originary event results therefore in the dissemination of 
certain textual elements throughout the subsequent texts of 
the Lol cycle.
In Le Vice-Consul the word-hole resonates in the "cri" 
or scream of two of its characters and re-cites the "cri" 
uttered by Lol at the end of the ball. The reliance on 
hearsay in Le Vice-Consul produces a problematization of 
textual borders. It is in effect a story set within a 
story. In fact, this text is the attempted narrative of the 
mysterious Vice-Consul of Lahore intertwined nearly 
seamlessly with Peter Morgan's attempted writing of the 
story of the "mendiante," a bald-headed beggar woman 
roaming the streets of Calcutta with the lepers. The story 
of the "mendiante" parallels in some respects that of the 
Vice-Consul, as they are both figured by Duras as 
impossible, as marginalized from the same society and as 
two characters for whom a lack of information exists, 
provoking the desire for knowledge of their stories among 
the members of the European circle.
The demarcation between the beggar woman's story, 
narrated by Peter Morgan, and the story within which it is 
framed, and within which Peter Morgan and the beggar woman 
are placed, is not always distinct. In other words, the 
beggar woman who is a character in Morgan's story is not 
confined to the pages of his story but re-surfaces in the
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framing story of the Europeans, a story in which Morgan is
himself a character. What happens in this text is the
observation of and limited interaction with the beggar
woman by the Europeans as recounted in the main story. For
example, reference is made to Anne-Marie Stretter giving
instructions to leave left-overs for the beggar woman and
others. In addition, Morgan often discusses this woman with
other Europeans to obtain ideas about her life for the
story he is writing. But, as Sharon Willis states, the
writing of the story and the observation of the beggar
woman on the streets are not always two distinct
occurrences in the text (Marguerite Duras: Writing on the
Body, p. 103). The seam between the two in fact is mostly
obscured and the text switches from what could constitute
the Europeans' observation of the beggar woman to what
could be considered Peter Morgan's account of her life. The
lack of definitive borders between the two tales produces a
contamination between them, as Mieke Bal writes:
On ne sait plus lequel de ces deux recits est 
1'hypo-recit...La structure narrative, si nette, 
si rassurante au debut signifie sa propre 
impossibility... La destruction, comme la lepre, 
est contagieuse: les deux recits s'infectent l'un 
1' autre.11
Much as Jacques Hold attempts to write Lol's story by 
piecing together his observations with second-hand 
information, Morgan also relies on conjecture and on 
information on the beggar woman supplied to him by others, 
including Anne-Marie Stretter:
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La vente d'une enfant a ete racontee a Peter 
Morgan par Anne-Marie Stretter. Anne-Marie 
Stretter a assiste a cette vente, il y a dix-sept 
ans, vers Savannakhet, Laos. La mendiante, 
toujours d'apres Anne-Marie Stretter, doit parler 
la langue de Savannakhet. Les dates ne coincident 
pas. La mendiante est trop jeune pour etre celle 
qu'a vue Anne-Marie Stretter. Cependant Peter 
Morgan a fait du recit d'Anne-Marie Stretter un 
episode de la vie de la mendiante. (pp. 72-73).
The preceding passage demonstrates how the beggar woman's
story is being (re-)constructed in the text through Peter
Morgan's reliance on second-hand information, or hearsay
provided by his friends. Morgan in fact appropriates and
re-cites that which is told to him in order to complete his
story, thereby subjecting his narrative to the same
uncertainty as was found in Le Ravissement.
Figured as an impossibility, "enfermee dans le mot
Battambang" which is her "maison fermee," the beggar woman
protects herself with the word "Battambang" and as such is
constructed as lost and cut off from her past, her only
memory being "Battambang": "Battambang la protegera" (p.
65). Her impossible nature is disclosed in examples such as
"Un rien 1'amuse" (p. 81) and "Elle fait des discours
inutiles" (ibid.) which negate any access one might have to
her. Later, we read, "A Battambang, il y avait une ecole. Y
en avait-il une a Battambang? Elle a oublie." Although it
is not clear at this point if this belongs to Peter
Morgan's story or not, he apparently decides that the
beggar woman retains no memory of her experiences because
the text states, "Peter Morgan voudrait maintenant
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substituer a la memoire abolie de la mendiante le bric-a- 
brac de la sierrne." (p. 73). The very "bric-a-brac" of
Peter Morgan's memory is constructed as such owing to all 
the unverified information and speculation on the beggar 
woman's life that he has obtained. "Peter fait un livre a 
partir de ce chant de Savannakhet?" Peter replies, "Je 
prends des notes imaginaires sur cette femme" because "rien
ne peut plus lui arriver. . . 1 (p. 157) .
Described by Anne-Marie Stretter during the ball as 
"un homme mort" (p. 128), the Vice-Consul himself is 
figured as impossible, which is the word repeated most 
often whenever he is mentioned in the text. His face, for 
example, is described as "impossible encore" (p. 78) and he 
is considered "quelqu'un d'impossible" (p. 104) before 
being told by Charles Rossett at the end of the ball, "Vous
etes impossible, decidement" (p. 146) . He is rendered as
such by what occurred at Lahore before his arrival in 
Calcutta as a letter in his dossier indicates, "Je me borne 
ici a constater 1'impossibility ou je suis de rendre compte 
de fagon comprehensible de ce qui s'est passe a Lahore."
(p. 39). When his aunt is questioned about his childhood, 
all she is able to offer is, "presque rien" for the dossier 
(p. 46). Reference to the contents of the dossier surface 
several times in the text, with Michael Richard at one 
point stating, "Il y a dans le dossier le mot impossible"
(p. 159).
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The impossibility of the Vice-Consul is again 
indicated at the end of the ball when Peter Morgan replies 
to his pleas to remain with them, "Ce n'est pas possible, 
dit Peter Morgan, excusez-nous, le personnage que vous etes 
ne nous interesse que lorsque vous etes absent" (p. 147).
Curiosity over the Vice-Consul and the lack of 
knowledge about what exactly happened to him at Lahore 
causes much speculation and conjecture about him, in very 
much the same way as happens in the case of the beggar 
woman. Hearsay concerning him spreads rapidly throughout 
the European group in Calcutta, neatly placing the Vice- 
Consul into circulation, "Le Vice-Consul fait des 
confidences au directeur du Cercle, dit Charles Rossett, et 
il ne doit pas ignorer que presque tout est repete." (p.
42). Yet oddly enough, the Vice-Consul seems oblivious to 
what happens to his words after speaking with the director.
Thirst for knowledge about the Vice-Consul is further 
demonstrated in the following, "Le directeur du Cercle est 
souvent questionne sur ce qui lui raconte Le Vice-Consul. A 
Calcutta on veut savoir." (p. 75). Desire for information
on Lahore coupled with the lack of available information 
prompts a demand for any and all information, because, "on 
veut savoir." Yet, here, as is the case with Le 
Ravissement, there are indications that information 
concerning the Vice-Consul will remain sketchy or 
fragmentary at best.
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Charles Rossett speaks to the Vice-Consul at the ball
and broaches the subject of Lahore and the dossier, in
which the Vice-Consul is described as "quelqu'un
d'impossible" followed by the words "le pire, c'est Lahore"
(p. 104) . Rossett continues trying to discuss Lahore with
the Vice-Consul, by stating "Je m'excuse de vous dire qa,
mais on ne peut pas comprendre Lahore" (p. 104-5).
Anne-Marie Stretter subsequently dances with the Vice-
Consul, during which time she speaks to him about Lahore,
which is yet again marked by the impossibility of saying
what is impossible to be said:
Le mot le plus juste pour dire qa...Elle ne 
cherche pas le mot. - Le mot pour le dire? - 
C'est-a-dire que le premier mot qui parait 
convenable, ici aussi, empecherait les autres de 
vous venir, alors...(p. 123)
This passage again offers further evidence of hearsay
contaminating the narrative of Le Vice-Consul as the "mot-
trou" of Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein seems to resurface.
The impossibility of finding the word to express what took
place at Lahore is also reflected in the voice of the Vice-
Consul , which seems strangely anomalous with the character
who speaks through it:
La voix du vice-consul, quand il parle a Anne- 
Marie Stretter pour la premiere fois, est 
distinguee, mais bizarrement privee de timbre, un 
rien trop aigue comme s'il se retenait de hurler.
(pp. 123-24)
Since "le mot pour le dire" cannot issue forth from the 
Vice-Consul as it does not even exist, a shout or a cry
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
78
appears to be the only means of articulating this lack, "On
a peur. L'heure du vice-consul est arrive. Il crie." (p.
146). Mieke Bal views the cry of the Vice-Consul as the
only means of communication remaining open for him; it
signifies "la communication echouee, la tentative ultime et
desesperee d'echapper a l'isolement. Les cris etablissent
une communication en-dega des mots, negative, qui denonce
l'echec de communication verbale" (Narratologie, p. 79). In
accordance with Bal, Viviane Forrester writes that the cry
takes the place of what cannot be said or proposed.12
Therefore, it follows that the cry is the (in)articulation
of the impossible and as relates to hearsay, the cry is
heard but not said:
Parce que j ' ai 1'impression que si j'essayais de 
vous dire ce que j'aimerais arriver a vous dire, 
tout s'en irait en poussiere...- il tremble -, 
les mots pour vous dire, a vous, les mots...de 
moi...pour vous dire a vous, ils n'existent pas.
Je me tromperais, j'emploierais ceux...pour dire 
autre chose...une chose arrivee a un autre...(p.
125) .
Again, the Vice-Consul attempts to verbalize Lahore for 
Anne-Marie Stretter and again, he is unsuccessful, 
realizing that if he were to use the only words available, 
he would say something else entirely. This passage reveals 
another displacement that arises out of the impossibility 
of saying that which is impossible to be said. We are left 
instead with the "poussiere" of the "mot-trou" which 
resonates here again as "un gong vide." Yet another 
discussion over what happened at Lahore is attempted at the
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ball and one overhears, "II a fait le pire, mais comment le 
dire?" (p. 94). Indeed, how to articulate, verbalize, the 
impossible? Here again can be felt the resonance of the 
"mot-trou" of Le Ravissement.
When the ball begins, the narrative suddenly becomes 
punctuated by phrases such as "On dit: Vous avez vu?" or 
"On dit, on demande." This change in narrative voice 
disrupts the continuity of the story concerning the 
Europeans, as the previously unremarkable narrative voice 
suddenly allows the intrusion of what "on" sees, hears and 
discusses at the ball. Such expressions as "on dit" or "on 
pense" indicate the free circulation of hearsay at the 
ball, where much of the attention of the evening is focused 
on the Vice-Consul (here we recall that "A Calcutta, on 
veut savoir"); it appears that all eyes are upon him and 
that all the guests chat in clusters, discussing the Vice- 
Consul's actions and appearance, "tout Calcutta est au 
courant" (p. 137). Somehow the interruption of the 
narrative by "on" places the reader, temporarily at least, 
within the group of guests at the ball. Yet, this status is 
short-lived as the "on" voice disappears and the reader 
loses the privilege of obtaining other perspectives on the 
evening.
To conclude, Le Vice-Consul concerns the textual 
attempts to access the event(s) which rendered the beggar 
woman and the Vice-Consul mad. Their difference or rather
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the impossibility of naming their unnameable stories 
marginalizes them from the European community. Yet, the 
narrative persists in its impossible movement toward the 
originary event of both characters which in turn propagates 
hearsay in order to fill in the gaps concerning them. As in 
Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein, the reliance on hearsay 
problematizes the narrative; in the case of Le Vice-Consul 
the boundaries between the two stories is obscured in such 
a way as to weave them together and to allow one to cite 
the other.
L'amour
The following text in the cycle, L'amour, commences 
some seventeen years after the ball scene of Le Ravissement 
de Lol V. Stein where Lol had been abandoned by her fiance 
Michael Richardson. In this novel, as in the preceding 
texts of the cycle, the narrative hinges on hearsay and 
marks the increasing condensation of that hearsay as the 
narrative is considerably more barren in its information. 
Hearsay in this case contains residual information from Le 
Ravissement that is only vaguely recollected. The 
characters incessantly cite and re-cite each other and seem 
to have heard certain things, but they cannot quite say 
them, since they lapse repeatedly into states of 
forgetfulness.
The text involves three characters, two men and one 
woman. One of the men is designated "le voyageur" and can
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later in the text be considered Michael Richard(son). The
other man is known simply as the madman and the woman as
"la femme." The traveler has apparently returned to this
seaside town after having abandoned his wife and children.
It appears he has come to commit suicide and speaks
incessantly of the voyage he has undertaken to arrive
there. This voyage culminates in his return to the casino
ballroom which has long since been deserted.
This text opens on the beach in S. Thala with two men
and one woman moving about:
Le triangle se ferme avec la femme aux yeux 
fermes. Elle est assise contre un mur qui 
delimite la plage vers sa fin, la ville. Du fait 
de 1 'homme qui marche, constamment, avec une 
lenteur egale, le triangle se deforme, se 
reforme, sans se briser jamais, (p. 8 ) .
The triangle formed by the three on the beach reflects the
narrative(s) of the Lol cycle in that the triangle, like
the narrative, remains fluid and mobile. The lack of a
fixed or anchored form at the text's opening hints at the
fluid circulation of hearsay within the text itself.
The telegraphic style of the narrative also suggests
the repetition by transformation of numerous phrases and
textual threads. For example, "II la regarde" (p. 10) is
re-cited several lines later as "La femme est regardee" (p.
10). In this way the narrative stops and starts, moves
tentatively forward then seems to regress or become
momentarily static just as the triangle on the beach "se
deforme, se reforme" (p. 8 ):
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Le pas reprend.
Irregulier, incertain, il reprend.
Il s'arrete encore.
Il reprend encore, (p. 1 1 )
The textual emphasis on the word "pas" which is repeatedly 
employed throughout the narrative raises some interesting 
points for discussion. In this sense "pas" refers to the 
steps of the characters, implying forward motion. Of 
course, "pas" also forms part of the negative expression 
"ne...pas" itself suspended, as Sharon Willis observes in 
Marguerite Duras: Writing on the Body, around the verb it 
negates {ibid., p. 122). Therefore, the narrative moves 
forward while it negates itself. The characters' memories 
reawaken only to be forgotten. Repeated throughout L'amour, 
these steps remain spaced out, punctuating the text and 
mimicking its own attempt to narrate itself.
This narrative repetition that somehow punctuates 
while remaining incomplete, also surfaces in the 
characters' discourse, in which one character's lines are 
subsequently repeated by another character without ever 
filling out the thought or statement. For example, the 
woman explains to the traveler that, "Ici, c'est S. Thala 
jusqu'a la riviere" (p. 15); yet the traveler later re­
states the phrase and adds "Apres la riviere c'est encore 
S. Thala" (p. 20).
Numerous examples of such inter-textual citations 
exist, with one of the most-often repeated being "Vous etes
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venu" sometimes extended to "vous etes venu pourquoi?" or 
"vous etes revenu."
The individual characters cite and re-cite themselves 
in addition to citing each other. Each time it seems as if 
they have heard something said about what they are saying, 
but the access to the source of che statement is cut off 
and they seem to retain only a vague recollection of their 
previous statements. Therefore, the woman announces, "Je 
suis venue vous voir pour ce voyage que vous voulez faire" 
(p. 62) which is subsequently repeated as "Je suis venue 
vous voir pour ce voyage" (p. 107) and then as "Ce voyage a 
S. Thala, vous savez." (p. 107).
In L'amour there is again the citation of the 
impossibility of articulation found previously in Le 
Ravissement and in Le Vice-Consul. The characters are 
speechless at various instances in the text, trapped in the 
"impossibility de repondre" (p. 18). At one such point, the 
woman, speaking about the man, "voit 1 'effort qu'il fait 
pour essayer de parler, son impuissance a y parvenir" (p.
92). This indicates the inaccessibility of the originary 
event bound up in the "mot-trou," the would-be response or 
resolution.
Pages after the opening of the text the story itself 
begins. Just as the triangle formed by the three characters 
ultimately dissolves, so too does the story ultimately 
begin again, introduced by the scream or cry that seems to
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re-cite that of Le Vice-Consul and the resonance of the
"mot-trou." This cry stirs something within the woman and
only then does the story appear to begin:
L'histoire. Elle commence. Elle a commence avant 
la marche au bord de la mer, le cri, le geste, le 
mouvement de la mer. Le mouvement de la lumiere.
(p. 13) .
Anterior to its explicit textual form, the story has 
(always) already begun, despite its announcement several 
pages into the narrative. It too, though, is punctuated, is 
fragmented: "L'histoire. Elle commence." Sharon Willis 
views this passage as an "autonomous inscription" of the 
story which remains "suspended, in a sentence of its own" 
{Marguerite Duras: Writing On the Body, p. 122). She 
elaborates:
....the story begins after the text has begun, 
only to begin by telling us that it has already 
begun, before. It has begun anticipating the cry 
already emitted. It has, in effect, just 
remembered, only to forget again, its own 
beginning -- its own anteriority. {Ibid.)
This forgetting, or even obliteration of memory, by the
story itself, manifests itself in the characters as well.
Once at the casino where "il n'y a plus de bal" (p. 127),
the traveler asks the man to recognize the woman. Yet when
he is asked her name, he answers, "Je ne sais plus rien"
(p. 131) . The man then says a name for the traveler, who
asks, "Voulez-vous repeter ce nom?" Yet the man appears to
have already forgotten the name he had said just moments
before, since the traveler has to prompt him, "celui que
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vous venez de dire..." (p. 131). The man, we read, "repete 
clairement, completement, le nom qu'il vient d'inventer"
(p. 131).
The preceding example is representative of the 
exchanges of recollection and forgetting taking place among 
the characters. The text is in fact riddled by this 
perpetual forgetting and reawakening to memory which 
subsequently collapses into an obliteration of that memory 
on the part of the characters. This oscillation between 
memory and forgetting reveals, on another level, the 
indeterminacy which emerged figuratively in the fluidity of 
the triangle formed by the characters.
For Sharon Willis, L'amour is precisely as much about 
this fluidity and indeterminacy as it is about a 
crystallization of Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein. In what 
she terms a story of "suspense," L'sunour is itself 
suspended with Le Vice-Consul on the flanks of Le 
Ravissement. Textually, everything in the narrative deals 
with suspense -- the suspension of memory, of thoughts, of 
looks, of sentences, of movements (Marguerite Duras:
Writing on the Body, p. 125). Obviously, the suspension of 
narrative devices indicates that the story can never be 
accomplished. The indeterminacy of the narrative derives 
from the impossibility of recuperating the scene of Lol's 
ravishment. The fact that this event remains severed from 
the characters results in the multiplication of citational
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effects -- instances of hearsay/recollection coupled with
informational void. In L'sunour is once again the impossible
attempt to articulate the impossible articulation of Lol's
ravishing that is carried in the cry which opens the text.
As Lucy Stone McNeece writes in Art and Politics in
Duras' India Cycle:
The story has no content: It is trace, resonance, 
reflection, echo. It is sensation, not action; 
place, not event...The story is important because 
it is about the impossibility of telling a 
story.13
Coinciding with the impossibility of telling the story, as
evidenced in the indeterminacy and suspension operating at
various textual levels, is the impossibility of achieving
some sort of closure. In fact the last word of the text is
"exterieure" which serves to figuratively push the
narrative in an outward direction and to maintain its
openness. Carol J. Murphy remarks on the explicit lack of
finality to L'sunour, as well as to the other texts of the
cycle: "What is important is the shifting or glissement
between two poles (the beginnning and the end) with the
hint of a new beginnning at the story's 'tentative' end. " 14
This is accomplished through the use of the future tense in
the last passage of the novel:
-- Pendant un instant elle sera aveuglee. Puis 
elle recommencera a me voir. A distinguer le 
sable de la mer, puis, la mer de la lumiere, puis 
son corps de mon corps. Apres elle se separera le 
froid de la nuit et elle me le donnera. Apres 
seulement elle entendra le bruit vous savez...? 
de Dieu?... ce true...?
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
87
Ils se taisent. Ils surveillent la progression de
1'aurore exterieure. (p. 143)
This closing passage reveals how the text itself impedes 
its own closure, which enables, in its turn, the textual 
multiplication and generation already instigated by the 
first text of the cycle, Le ravissement de Lol V. Stein. Of 
course, this possibility of engendering other texts 
develops as a result of the reliance on hearsay. As we have 
seen in this text, hearsay forms the basis of the narrative 
in a more radicalized way than seen in the previous texts.
India Song
While the insistence on hearsay in the other texts of 
the Lol V. Stein cycle has operated as a compelling force 
behind each of those narratives, the function of hearsay 
moves increasingly toward a focus on the scream. In what I 
call a condensation, other textual elements become less 
integral to the circuit of hearsay. With the increasing 
emphasis on re-citation of the scream as the 
(in)articulation of the "mot-trou," hearsay becomes 
progressively radicalized in the citation of what is heard; 
yet, nothing is really said at the limits of speech itself.
This movement becomes especially acute in India Song 
since it marks a discontinuity between the visual and 
auditory fields. Although the characters of the beggar 
woman and the Vice-Consul are heard screaming, they do not 
produce any comprehensible utterances.
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The multi-genred text India Song, subtitled "texte- 
theatre-film" was first published in script form in 1973. 
The following year Duras directed the film version of the 
text. As Carol J. Murphy points out, the doubling of India 
Song -- that is, its double production as text and film -- 
echoes and re-cites ad infini turn other aspects of the Lol 
V. Stein cycle, while rearticulating much of Le Vice-Consul 
(Alienation and Absence in the Novels of Marguerite Duras, 
p. 79). Again, this text, as others previously discussed, 
hinges on the circulation of hearsay as it weaves together 
three characters: the beggar woman, who is often heard 
chanting Laotian phrases, but never seen, the Vice-Consul 
of Lahore and Anne-Marie Stretter.
In the film, the characters on the screen rarely 
speak. Instead, as Trista Selous explains in The Other 
Woman, one overhears voices questioning each other about 
the general story of Le Vice-Consul, while on screen, one 
sees several actors "represent, rather than portray the 
protagonists in a way which is linked to the story that 
unfolds, but which is obviously not meant to be an accurate 
depiction of that story."15 Lucy Stone McNeece cautions 
against making the assumption that India Song is the mere 
cinematographic adaptation of Le Vice-Consul. As she 
explains, it produces a "new signifying structure organized 
according to different principles" {Art and Politics in 
Marguerite Duras' India Cycle, p. 122) . 16
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In what Michel de Certeau refers to as a writing "en 
cendres, " 17 India. Song accomplishes a rupture between the 
visual and the auditory, which we will find pushed to its 
extreme in Son nom de Venise dans Calcutta desert, a film 
that in its own way stands as the re-citation and 
irrevocable destruction of India Song. This break in India 
Song that occurs between the visual and auditory is 
effected, as we shall see, through a reliance on voice 
over.
The discrepancy between the voices of the soundtrack
and the images seen on the screen produces an interference
of sorts that in turn creates an air of uncertainty for the
viewer. As Trista Selous explains:
Nothing is present, the images may refer to the 
story, but they do not tell it, the story itself 
is a reconstruction of something in the past, the 
protagonists are dead. (The Other Woman, p. 13 6 )
Selous in fact sees the disconnection between sight and
sound as an impossibility of "visual representation of
where that knowledge might be" (ibid.).
Duras' use of voice-over, a technique conventionally
reserved for commentaries in documentary-style films by
male voices, subverts that tradition in this film in
several ways. First, and most obviously, there is no
unified, singular voice. Instead, there are four principal
voices, two of which are female. In addition, other voices,
echoing those of the characters encountered in Le Vice-
Consul, are granted audible space. These voices include the
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beggar-woman, the Vice-Consul and Anne-Marie Stretter. 
Furthermore, these voices are completely disembodied. The 
viewer has absolutely no idea as to the identity of these 
voies.
Whereas voice-over traditionally comprises a 
commentary on the visual images on screen, in India Song, 
these voices actually partake in a limited commentary since 
they address one another without demonstrating a full 
cognitive realization that there are spectators listening 
to their dialogue. Indeed, they randomly "disseminate the 
elements of narrative" (Art and Politics, p. 131) .
The first two voices are feminine and hold an 
"illogique" and "anarchique" memory of their own 
relationship with each other. The fragmented recollection 
of their rapport is juxtaposed with fragments of other 
texts of the Lol V. Stein cycle to which the viewer does 
not have access. What becomes readily apparent is Voice l's 
attraction for Anne-Marie Stretter while Voice 2 remains 
impassioned for the first voice. Their desires are deferred 
and never requited during the course of the film as neither 
voice obtains access to the object for which she pines.
This slippage underscores the impossibility of the story of 
Le Vice-Consul.
While the two female voices are caught in a game of 
desire, the two male voices demonstrate in a different way 
the effects of this slippage of memory. Voice 3 has
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apparently forgotten the chronology of the story and asks 
Voice 4 questions regarding events, people and places. 
Voice 4 willingly supplies the missing information.
The destabilizing effects of Duras' technique of 
voice-over are evident to the viewer upon hearing the 
voices in the film and seeing the disconnection between 
them and the images. As Madeleine Borgomano states, these 
voices:
demeurent sans aucun lien avec l'histoire qui se 
deroule sous nos yeux; elles ont l'air de 
decouvrir, elles aussi, de regarder en meme temps 
que nous les images, et de recolter autour 
d'elles des bribes de vieux souvenirs.18
This strange sensation of the voices not really commenting
on the visual aspects of the film, that is, the failure of
the voices' remarks to coincide with the images on screen,
disrupts the continuity of the film and raises more
questions, as Susan Cohen observes:
Projecting towards something they barely 
remember, they create a past not their own. Its 
equivocal "truth" status results from the 
impossibility of verification, from faulty 
memory, from the implied interchangeability in 
memory of knowing and reading. Did the speakers 
"know" the events as witnesses? Were they told 
the story? If they read it, what did they read,
Duras' novels or something else? In contrast to 
classical techniques, Duras' manipulation of 
narration undermines her speakers' authority.
Filtered through the disembodied voices, these 
ambiguities open the play of intertextual 
reference to the earlier works.19
The "impossibility of verification" and the "play of
intertextual reference" are the result of the circulation
of what I am calling hearsay in the cycle. The fragmentary,
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incomplete information possessed by the speakers stems from 
the denial of access to the full story. The voices operate 
within the circuit of hearsay, thereby perpetuating its 
propagation. For example, the second speaker states, "Pour 
elle il avait tout quitte. En une nuit" (p. 14). Voice 1 
replies, "La nuit du bal?" before apparently reading from a 
text:
Michael Richardson etait fiance a une jeune fille 
de S. Thala. Lola Valerie Stein. Le mariage 
devait avoir lieu a l'automne.
Puis il y a eu ce bal. Ce bal de S. Thala...(p.
15)
Another example of the hearsay staged by the speakers 
occurs later in reference to the Europeans' sojourn in the 
Delta of the Ganges where the beggar woman appears to have 
followed them. This re-citation of Le Vice-Consul reads as
follows:
Voix 3: Elle devait suivre Anne-Marie Stretter.
Voix 4: L'invite dit qu'elle l'a suivi jusqu'au 
portail. Qu'elle lui fait peur. II a dit: "Le 
sourire sans fin fait peur." (p. 136)
While the use of these voices, in their number and
gender, coupled with their lack of information and their
inability to comment on the visual elements of the film,
ruptures the auditory aspects, the visual field itself
undergoes a breakdown of sorts.
The extremely slow movement of the camera is yet
another example that underscores the discontinuity of
various levels of the film. Here, Duras destabilizes the
viewer's sense of temporality by having the camera pause
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for minutes at a time in one position. The opening sunset,
for example, lasts approximately ten minutes and the camera
remains focused on it for its duration.
When the camera does pan across the visual field, it
does so extremely slowly, lending the film the impression
of having been shot in slow-motion. This sensation of slow-
motion camera movement is doubled, in effect, since the
characters' movements appear equally drawn out. For
Borgomano, the characters' heavy movements give them the
appearance of being dead and empty, again figuring them in
terms of absence and alienation as Carol J. Murphy has
commented. Borgomano explains:
Leurs mouvements ont toujours l'air de venir de 
tres loin et de rencontrer, dans leur 
developpement, une terrible pesanteur. Leur danse 
meme participe de ce caractere somnanbulique.
Nulle part nous n'avons 1'impression de voir des 
vivants; ils sont devenus des automates, aux 
mouvements difficiles, aux yeux vides.
(L'ecriture filmique de Marguerite Duras, p. 117)
As if to emphasize this emptiness and deadness, the
characters remain detached and distanced from one another.
They rarely interact and for the most part appear oblivious
of others' presence. For example, during a long sequence
they lie motionless on the floor: "Les trois corps aux yeux
fermes dorment" (p. 40).
Coupled with this disruption of the conventional sense
of temporality is the use of frames and mirrors, which
serve to separate and distance while also amplifying,
creating an effect of mise en abime. Curiously, there is a
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notable absence of windows in the salon; in this way, the 
salon remains completely cut off visually and physically 
from the outside. Even when the camera ventures to the 
exterior of the chateau, there is still the overwhelming 
sense of the absolute detachment of the exterior from the 
salon.
To conclude, India Song, while on one level cognizant 
of other texts of the Lol V. Stein cycle, evidenced through 
the use of hearsay in its fragmentary and unsubstantiated 
forms, creates a new a narrative composed of "memoires 
deformantes, creatives" (p. 1 0 ) that upholds the resistance 
to closure found in the other texts. This porosity signals 
not only the impossibility of achieving full access to the 
story, but also the possibility that story has of 
persisting and generating other narratives in its wake.
Son nom de Venise dans Calcutta desert
Whereas India Song is the recalling of the memory of 
the ball where Anne-Marie Stretter first encountered the 
disgraced Vice-Consul of Lahore, Son nom enacts the 
obliteration of that memory. Through the progression of the 
Lol cycle, the use of hearsay to engender new narratives 
has become increasingly radicalized. What we have just seen 
in India Song with the disjunction between the visual and 
auditory fields becomes irrevocably ruptured in Son nom. 
This film therefore involves the citation of the scream, an 
utterance traced to Le Ravissement as the "mot-trou."
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Since we established in the first chapter that any sign, 
any mark, can be cited and re-cited, we have been able to 
view the hearsay and citation of the scream in such a way. 
With this film we will see the breakdown of hearsay itself.
The title of the film itself is a citation from the 
end of the reception in India Song:
Que crie-t-il?
Son nom de Venise dans Calcutta desert:
Toute la nuit dans Calcutta, il a crie ce nom 
(Marguerite Duras, p. 63)
The repetition of this phrase and its inscription in the
title of the film alludes to the film as both reading and
destruction, as appropriation and effacement. As Madeleine
Borgomano explains there is a paradox inherent in the title
of the film, of Calcutta as desert, as deserted:
Pour accomplir la destruction 'capitale,' il 
fallait faire disparaitre cette image, il fallait 
que Calcutta devienne desert, pour que son nom 
puisse resonner dans le vide, avant de s'effacer 
dans la nuit de l'oubli. (L'ecriture filmique de 
Marguerite Duras, p. 129)
This desertification occurs through the piercing cry of the
Vice-Consul. For Lucy Stone McNeese, Son nom, rather than a
destruction of the cycle, is more an epilogue, "a
decomposition of spectacle" necessitated by the
"resignation to the impossibility of re-presenting the
story in an unified form" (Art and Politics, p. 152). This
impossibility manifests itself through the irrevocable
rupture between the visual and the auditory. Save for the
final few minutes of the film, there are no characters
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visible on the screen. Duras leaves the visual field
deserted. The women who do appear near the film's end are
immobile and, in Borgomano's words, "memoires d'ombre et de
pierre" (L'ecriture filmique de Marguerite Duras, p. 130) .
This absence of characters in Son nom radicalizes the
disjuncture of sight and sound found initially in India
Song. In Son nom de Venise dans Calcutta desert, the
voices, repeating exactly the soundtrack of India Song,
relate instead the recit of a deserted story with music
remaining from a long deserted ball held at a deserted
chateau, found in ruins.
Furthermore, as Borgomano observes, the mirrors which
enabled the repetition of story in India Song are shattered
in Son nom, no longer reflecting nor repeating. Window
panes too are cracked, representing a destruction of their
previous function as frames, as repetition of what was
viewed within them:
Vitre, fenetres, miroir, tous ces procedes qui 
servaient a decouper, a encadrer, a separer et 
qui multipliaient a 1 'infini des distances, 
d'emblee le film nouveau nous montre qu'il y 
renonce, qu'il les brise, les detruit. {Ibid., p.
131)
The camera slowly moves through the chateau, periodically 
pausing to focus on an object, such as a doorway or the 
staircase. The dim, dusk light contrasts remarkably with 
the brightness that illuminated the same rooms of the 
chateau in India Song when they were still intact. Here in 
Son nom the eeriness of the poor lighting in the ruined
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rooms underscores the deadness of the story and the chateau 
while at the same time blurring what would normally clearly 
delineate frames and borders. At times during the film, the 
camera ventures outside the chateau exploring its exterior 
and the vegetation encroaching on its walkways and walls.
By traversing potential borders and by the broaching of 
separations, such as doorways, between the interior and the 
exterior, the camera itself reinforces the effacement of 
India Song-.
The disjuncture between the visual -- the poorly lit 
rooms with their broken mirrors and window panes, debris 
and dust -- and the auditory renders the radicalization of 
hearsay that was undertaken by India Song as extreme. 
Furthermore, the lack of physicality of characters on 
screen juxtaposed with the soundtrack that re-cites that of
India Song radicalizes the sight-sound rupture to such a
degree that it signals its destruction. The cry of the
beggar woman serves as an auditory frame for the film, as
it both opens and closes it. The replay of the sounds from 
the ball, including snippets of "India Song," the upbeat, 
jazzy blues, and a polyphony of indistinguishable voices of 
ball guests re-cites scenes from Le Vice-Consul and India 
Song, the locus for which is now dead and in ruins, 
eliminating therefore any attempt at a reconstruction of 
the event.
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The visual conclusion of Son Nom de Venise dans 
Calcutta desert suggests that there is still no termination 
at all for the Lol V. Stein cycle. With the cry of the 
beggar woman resonating across the screen, the film closes 
with the camera peering out over the infinite horizon of 
the sea, highlighted by the setting sun. While bringing the 
film to a close, the scream marks the definitive rupture of 
hearsay in that all that remains is what is heard. Since a 
scream inhabits the borderline of speech, I view this 
utterance as approaching speechlessness. Therefore, nothing 
is articulated, or said anymore.
The Lol V. Stein Cycle and Hearsay
To briefly summarize the textual analyses, I will 
state that hearsay is placed into circulation by the crisis 
in knowledge in each text. At the same time, hearsay 
disseminates certain textual threads that cannot be 
contained or controlled by the text or the narrator. This 
is one of the anxiety-inducing effects of hearsay -- its 
impact can be far-reaching and immeasurable. As a result, 
the information cited and re-cited within the texts can 
only be fragmentary at best since hearsay itself can 
provide only a possibility of the reconstruction of the 
event and not the verbatim copying of it, which is what the 
narrators attempt. The reliance on hearsay to re-construct 
or to recover the lost event guarantees the failure of the 
narrative because the "true event" cannot ever be captured
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and repeated. The shifts in narrative voice, which are a 
direct result of the use of hearsay as a means of 
attempting the story, call into question the authority of 
the narrator and prevent the achievement of the narrative. 
While the circulation of hearsay has been explored within 
the individual texts themselves, hearsay is also found to 
destabilize the relations among the different texts of the 
Lol V. Stein cycle itself, an effect made possible because 
it exceeds limits that would be imposed on it.
Between one and another of the texts of the Lol cycle 
there exists the citation and re-citation of certain 
aspects of each. They cite each other in an attempt at re­
writing Lol's story. Such citational practices among the 
texts impede closure within each and therefore destabilizes 
the entire cycle in general.
This sense of destabilization and lack of closure is 
effected more precisely by means of a mise-en-abime of 
citations. Lol's desire for a repetition and, therefore, a 
remembering of the ball scene, coupled with the characters' 
quest for knowledge of Lol's story, both of which remain 
impossibilities -- impossible to be contained and 
impossible to be fulfilled -- result in the citation of 
traces, fragments of the lost event of the ball. Faced with 
the impossibility of what is impossible to be said, yet 
impossible to be closed off, contained, the narratives are 
the reverberation and citation of fragments which approach
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the locus of the loss. Of course, the narratives cannot 
reconstruct it or fill it in. Citationality among these 
texts thus manifests itself on numerous levels, from the 
physical pages of the texts themselves to the characters as 
well as to other textual threads.
Physical evidence of what occurs among the texts can 
be found in the lacunae of the pages of the texts 
themselves. The spacing of the printed text in Le 
Ravissement de Lol V. Stein results in numerous textless 
sections, or blank spaces, separating portions of the 
print. These gaps are re-cited in the other texts of the 
cycle, most strikingly in L'amour. Furthermore, in India 
Song there are auditory blanks between the utterances made 
by the pairs of voices that constitute the dialogue(s). 
These periods of silence in the film can be construed as 
oral lacunae, re-citing in a way that of the written in the 
other texts of the cycle.
Numerous feminist critics of Duras' works have 
addressed the questions raised by the aforementioned 
textual blanks. For Susan Cohen, Duras seems to "stage 
silence on the page" (Women and Discourse in the Fiction of 
Marguerite Duras, p. 149) by leaving gaps between segments 
of text. Marini contends that Duras' writing "creates 
silence and empty space" that for Cohen and other feminists 
indicates the invention of a new "feminine" syntax in which 
silence is included as a component of speech. Xaviere
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Gauthier reads the blanks as the place of the woman, a view 
shared by other feminists who state that the occurrence of 
the blanks is the eruption of the feminine into the 
construct of masculine language.20
Whereas critics such as Cohen and Gauthier celebrate 
the blanks, as well as Duras' writing in general, as the 
emergence of a new "feminine" syntax, which at last affords 
space to woman, critics like Trista Selous, for example, 
view these "visual silences" as the impossibility of 
articulation.
The characters themselves are also subjected to this 
citational practice and, as is expected with such 
repetitions, they are deformed with each subsequent citing. 
As I have mentioned previously, the most obvious example of 
this is found, of course, in the character of Lol referred 
to as Lola Valerie Stein, Lol V. Stein, Lol and, by the 
time of L'Amour, simply "la femme." Michael Richardson, 
Lol's fiance, who left the Casino ball with Anne-Marie 
Stretter in Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein, is recalled as 
Michael Richard in Le Vice-Consul, a member of the European 
circle to which Anne-Marie Stretter belongs, as Michael 
Richardson again in India Song and as "le voyageur" in 
L'Amour.
Striking descriptions of Anne-Marie Stretter appear in 
Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein, Le Vice-Consul and in India 
Song. From Le Ravissement comes the following:
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Elle etait maigre. Elle devait 1'avoir toujours 
ete. Elle avait vetu cette maigreur...d'une robe 
noire a double fourreau de tulle egalement noir, 
tres decolletee. (pp. 15-16)
Reference to Stretter's appearance is again made in Le
Vice-Consul:
Ce soir a Calcutta, 1'ambassadrice Anne-Marie 
Stretter est pres du buffet, elle sourit, elle 
est en noir, sa robe est a double fourreau de 
tulle noir...Aux approches de la vieillesse, une 
maigreur lui est venue, (p. 92)
Whereas the description of her dress is practically the
same, there is a discrepancy with regard to Stretter's
physical stature. In Le Ravissement, she is described as
"maigre," something she has likely always been. Yet, in Le
Vice-Consul this "maigreur" seems to have been brought on
by age. Here, direct reference is made to what could be
considered the source of descriptions of Stretter's
appearance, Le Ravissement. It is quite interesting to note
that each of the preceding descriptions of Stretter are
connected to a ball in the respective texts. It is, after
all, the locus of Lol's ravishing by her fiance and
Stretter and marks the event to which access remains
impossible.
Place names as well are cited and re-cited: S. Thala, 
where Le Ravissement takes place becomes repeated as S. 
Thala in L'amour, where, as I have commented earlier, the 
town appears to have spread all the way to the beach, 
swallowing up T. Beach from Le Ravissement where the Casino 
ball occurred. The woman in L'amour comments, "Ici, c'est
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S. Thala jusqu'a la riviere" (p. 15), which is subsequently- 
cited by the man who adds, "Apres la riviere, c'est encore
S .  Thala" (p. 20). The S. Thala of L ’amour not only seems 
to be a reconstruction of the S. Thala of Le Ravissement 
but it also surpasses the boundary of the river, spilling 
out beyond it.
The hunger of the beggar woman and her vomiting which 
occurs continously during her ten-year trek southward to 
Calcutta, "Elle vomit, s'efforce de vomir 1'enfant" (p.
18) finds its reverberation in L'amour when the woman 
announces, "J'attends un enfant, j'ai envie de vomir" (p.
23). The inability to control the story and the vomiting is 
revealed in her next statement about it, "9 a ne sert a 
rien, 9 a recommence" (p. 23). The "9 a" that recommences can 
in fact been seen to refer not only to the beggar woman's 
pregnancy and vomiting, but also to the event itself, 
underscoring its ability to begin again in a quite 
different context.
Various narrative threads are also found to run across 
and through the texts. For example, the ball scene in Le 
Ravissement has certainly been "heard about" in Le Vice- 
Consul though no direct mention of it is made within the 
text. The mere (re-)appearance of Anne-Marie Stretter and 
Michael Richard in the novel evokes an indirect 
recollection of the ball scene where Michael Richard(son) 
left Lol for Anne-Marie.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 0 4
If Le Vice-Consul contains no apparent explicit memory 
of Lol's ravishing at the ball, L'amour provides a clearer 
citation of it, with the traveler's return to what is 
presumably the ballroom of the Casino. Prior to his visit 
to the Casino, reference is made to Lol's ravishing when 
the traveler says to her, "Dix-huit ans -- il ajoute -- 
C'etait votre age..." (p. 110-11). He continues attempting
to cite the event of the ravishing, "Quand pour la premiere 
fois vous etes tombee malade -- il ajoute -- Apres un bal" 
(p. 112). This elicits some response from the woman who 
seems to recall "j'ai ete mariee avec un musicien, j' ai eu 
deux enfants..." (p. 113), a citation of Le Ravissement in 
which she had married Jean Bedford.
The traveler returns to the woman, who awakes upon his 
arrival. She states simply, "Vous etes alle demander" (p. 
132) . The traveler replies that he found the place "entre 
les murs" and that "on voit aussi la porte par laquelle 
nous sommes sortis...separes" (p. 132). This return to the
locked room where "il n'y a plus de bal" (p. 127) fails to 
recreate the scene of the ravishing, lost forever, but 
allows it to once again take place by means of its re­
citation .
The text of India Song contains an important citation 
of the ball from Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein by the 
first voice, who sounds as if she is reading directly from 
a text: "'Michael Richardson etait fiance a une jeune fille
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de S. Thala. Lola Valerie Stein. Le mariage devait avoir
lieu a 1'automne. Puis il y a eu ce bal. Ce bal de S.
Thala' 11 (p. 15) . The line from this passage concerning the
wedding is a direct quotation from Le Ravissement (p. 12).
Another such occurrence is found pages later when the first
voice appears to again be reading from a text concerning
the Casino ball. This time she indicates the moment of
Lol's ravishing, when Richardson and Stretter left her
behind at the ball:
Derriere les plantes vertes du bar, elle les 
regarde. Ce n'est qu'a 1'aurore...quand les 
amants se dirigerent vers les portes du bal que 
Lola Valerie Stein poussa un cri. (p. 36)
Here, I would like to note that in the written text of
India Song, Duras has placed the preceding two passages in
quotation marks, to lend an air of authority to the voices
which do not, however, seem to quite remember the story
they discuss. By reading the above passages in quotation
marks, one is led to believe that the voices are reading
directly from a text, as the notes suggest. Yet, these
notes fail to disclose from what text the voices read,
although the passage obviously recalls Le Ravissement.
Lol's cry emitted following her ravishing at the ball,
"Lol cria pour la premiere fois" (Le Ravissement de Lol V.
Stein, p. 22) can be said to be cited in the cry of the
Vice-Consul which doubled that of the beggar woman's
"battambang" in Le Vice-Consul and in India Song. At the
end of the ambassador's reception in Le Vice-Consul, the
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Vice-Consul screams as he is excluded from the group of
Europeans. His cries merge smoothly into those of the
beggar woman. The cry also has its citation in L'amour:
"l'homme crie" (p. 1 2 ).
The inaccessibility of the origin, or the lack of
access to the event itself which is responsible for the
narrative cycle reveals itself as the "mot-trou" in Le
Ravissement de Lol V. Stein. The following passage, which
is arguably the most celebrated one from the entire Lol V.
Stein cycle and has been treated by the likes of Lacan,
Marini, Montrelay, among others, forms the crux of the
cycle. It is what circulates throughout all of the texts by
means of hearsay.
Que serait-il? Lol ne va pas loin dans l'inconnu 
sur lequel s'ouvre cet instant. Elle ne dispose 
d'aucun souvenir meme imaginaire, elle n'a aucune 
idee sur cet inconnu. Mais ce qu'elle croit, 
c'est qu'elle devait y penetrer, que c'etait ce 
qu'il lui fallait faire, que q'aurait ete pour 
toujours, pour sa tete et pour son corps, leur 
plus grande douleur et leur plus grande joie 
confondues jusque dans leur definition devenue 
unique mais innommable faute d'un mot. J'aime a 
croire, comme je i'aime, que si Lol est 
silencieuse dans la vie c'est qu'elle a 
cru,l'espace d'un eclair, que ce mot pouvait 
exister. Faute de son existence, elle se tait.
Q'aurait ete un mot-absence, un mot-trou, creuse 
en son centre d'un trou, de ce trou ou tous les 
autres mots auraient ete enterres. On n'aurait 
pas pu le dire mais on aurait pu le faire 
resonner. Immense, sans fin, un gong vide, il 
aurait retenu ceux qui voulaient partir, il les 
aurait convaincus de 1 'impossible, il les aurait 
nommes, eux, l'avenir et 1'instant. Manquant, ce 
mot, il gache tous les autres, les contamine, 
c'est aussi le chien mort de la plage en plein 
midi, ce trou de chair. Comment ont-ils ete 
trouves les autres? Au decrochez-moi-qa de
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queiles aventures paralleles a celle de Lol V.
Stein etouffees dans l'oeuf, pietinees et des 
massacres, oh! qu'il y en a, que d'inachevements 
sanglants le long des horizons, amonceles, et 
parmi eux, ce mot, qui n'existe pas, pourtant est 
la: il vous attend au toumant du langage, il 
vous defie, il n'a jamais servi, de le soulever, 
de le faire surgir hors de son royaume perce de 
toutes parts a travers lequel s'ecoulent la mer, 
le sable, l'eternite du bal dans le cinema de Lol 
V. Stein, (pp. 47-49).
The "mot-trou" is therefore impossible to (be) utter(ed),
since it does not exist, although "on aurait pu le faire
resonner" and it does reverberate, cited "sans fin" as a
sort of mise en abime "creuse en son centre d'un trou,"
contaminating all others through its incessant repetition.
Its reverberation or echoing erupts in Le Vice-Consul and
in L'amour in several ways. In Le Vice-Consul, this "mot-
trou" re-emerges first in the form of "Battambang. 11 Sharon
Willis calls it a "perpetually displaced syllabic flow"
which "plies its way between presence and absence, life and
death, 'death in the midst of life, death following but
never catching up' -- the perpetually missed encounter"
(Marguerite Duras: Writing on the Body, p. 70) .
The quest for the absent, non-existent word continues
and the "mot-trou" remains in circulation by means of
hearsay, the infinite citation of something that has always
already been heard. The beggar woman's cry of "Battambang"
is doubled in Lahore in Le Vice-Consul, particularly in the
previously discussed exchange between the Vice-Consul and
Anne-Marie Stretter. It takes on more of an inarticulate
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quality, Anne-Marie Stretter finds herself unable to 
express it, "je ne sais pas comment le dire." The Vice- 
Consul is similarly unable to address it. Saying, "Il n'est 
pas important maintenant," he merely defers it yet again, 
re-instating it into the circuit of hearsay, concluding 
with, "Je cherche le mot. Il y a un autre mot?" Achieving 
access to this word, to the originary event will remain 
impossible, infinitely deferred save for traces, for the 
hearsay erupting in and disrupting the texts of the cycle.
In L'amour, the word-hole of Le Ravissement -- "c'est 
aussi le chien mort de la plage en plein midi" -- is 
literally transformed into a dead dog on the beach of S. 
Thala. In this example we read that the woman "cesse de 
montrer, se detourne de tout, rentre dans le chien mort"
(p. 104). The incarnation of the absence-word as a dead dog 
on a beach is but yet another manifestation of what Willis 
calls a "circuit of repetition" and what I have developed 
as hearsay.
The preceding pages offer but an indication of the 
citationality functioning in the Lol cycle as hearsay, 
operating within and across all the texts we have studied. 
While some critics see the cycle in terms of a 
cannabilization or an annulation of prior texts by the 
subsequent texts of the cycle, Susan Cohen sees Duras' 
rewriting as a means of opening and pluralizing each of the 
texts. She refers to the intertextual citations as
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"conjugations" of previously appearing narrative elements 
with new ones to create yet another narrative permutation 
(Women and Discourse in the Works of Marguerite Duras, p. 
63). I have argued that such conjugations are possible due 
to the process of hearsay, of hearing and saying previously 
heard information. We have found that hearsay operates 
within each text, as a means of disseminating unverified 
and unverifiable information in order to attempt the 
narrative. However, the insistence and reliance on such a 
citational practice serve to undermine the very narrative 
that is being attempted. In addition, the authority of 
narrative/narrator becomes questionable as it is revealed 
that hearsay constitutes the text. The result, as we have 
seen, is a failure of traditional textual production in 
that the expected forms of closure are impeded and the 
narrative remains an effort at, rather than an example of, 
a complete and absolute narrative.
I contend that it is indeed the effects of hearsay 
that propel the generation of "conjugations" or a plurality 
of texts from Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein. This becomes 
increasingly apparent in the hearsay involving the "mot- 
trou" which circulates among all the texts pointing to the 
repeated and re-cited efforts to achieve access to the 
originary event. The "mot-trou" appears initially in Le 
Ravissement and, as I have previously stated, is re-cited 
as the scream of the beggar woman and the Vice-Consul in Le
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Vice-Consul and the dead dog on the beach in L'amour. The 
"mot-trou" persists in being re-cited as heard in the 
resonating screams of India Song and ultimately as its 
radicalized (in)articulation in Son Nom de Venise dans 
Calcutta desert.
As the scope and impact of hearsay in general is 
immeasurable, so too are its effects in narrative. Due to 
the lack of closure of the texts of the Lol V. Stein cycle, 
hearsay places into circulation, in unlimited and 
uniimitable contexts, certain textual threads of the 
individual narratives, motivated in part by the 
inaccessibility of the original event of Lol's ravishing. 
The result is the dissemination of narrative elements, 
which have been previously disclosed, within and between 
the Lol texts. At the outside, hearsay seems to function 
like the "gong vide" of the "mot-trou" whose reverbation is 
continously felt but whose source is cut off and fallen 
into the abyss of the repeating textual forms and fragments 
of the cycle.
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CHAPTER THREE 
TESTIMONY: THE CASE OF MAURICE BLANCHOT'S RECITS
Introduct ion
As one of this century's most enigmatic yet prolific 
writers, Maurice Blanchot has made immeasurable literary 
and theoretical contributions to the domain of French 
literature. His career as a writer stretches back some 
sixty years to the early 193 0s when he first worked as a 
journalist for Journal des Debats. In addition to the 
critical essays Blanchot produced during the 1940s, he also 
wrote several fictional texts including his last novel, Le 
Tres-Haut, and his first recit, L'arret de mort, both 
published in 1948. The renouncement of the novel in favor 
of the recit signalled a movement toward Blanchot's 
exploration of the "space of literature," culminating with 
1955's publication of L'espace litteraire, a crucial text 
in his oeuvre.
The 1950s saw Blanchot embark on further critical 
forays including essays written in response to Barthes, 
Lacan and Levi-Strauss. In addition, the exploration of the 
recit and its limits continued. From the 1960s on,
Blanchot's work became increasingly situated in the 
experimental mode of fragmentary, plurivocal writing as 
best exemplified in Le Pas au-dela, a text whose genre -- 
literary or theoretical -- is impossible to determine.
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Finally, after having abandoned the recit form for years, 
Blanchot published L'instant de ma mort in 1994.
Critics have isolated phases in Blanchot's work and 
have a tendency to focus on the significance of his more 
theoretical texts such as L'espace litteraire and 
L'ecriture du desastre. I do not seek to ignore the 
importance of these texts and indeed they play an important 
role in anyone's reading of his fictional works, for in 
them he establishes the framework within which he writes 
his novels and recits.
Although Blanchot's critical contributions are quite 
relevant to literary studies, I choose, however, to focus 
on three of his rScits, because of their staging of the 
question of citationality. In terms of testimony, the 
citational effects produced by La Folie du jour, L'arret de 
mort and L'instant de ma mort problematize notions of 
narrative.
Testimony: The Legal Tradition 
Defined according to the Oxford English Dictionary as 
"personal or documentary evidence or attestation in support 
of a fact or statement," testimony can be any form of 
evidence or proof, especially an open attestation, 
acknowledgement or confession. Despite being commonly used 
as an interchangeable term for evidence, testimony is 
defined in criminal law usage as statements of witnesses 
taken under oath or affirmation. It is the spoken word of
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witnesses and is considered evidence, although "evidence 
may or may not be testimony, and in most cases, does 
consist of more than testimony."1
In other words, the law stipulates that the witness 
must be twice present, both during the alleged event(s) and 
during subsequent court proceedings. Therefore, testimony 
is admissible where it appears possible for the witness to 
have first-hand or personal knowledge of the facts to which 
s/he testifies. Considered "the eyes and ears of justice," 
the witness does not seem dependent for his/her information 
on the statements of another witness who is unavailable for 
testimony and absent during proceedings.2 The requirement 
of first-hand information and the witness' presence clearly 
distinguishes testimony from another function of 
citationality, that of hearsay which is, as I have 
discussed, generally inadmissible in court as it is 
comprised of second-hand information considered unreliable.
At the time of an appearance during court proceedings,
the witness must offer his/her spoken word under oath
according to a procedure known as the right of 
confrontation. Due to the requirement that testimony must 
be given with a live voice in the first person, other forms 
of testimony, such as technological reproductions, 
including audio and video recordings, for example, are 
hardly ever allowed to take the place of the witness'
presence. A curious exception however is that some
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jurisdictions allow the introduction of a deposition, or 
written record of the witness' statements outside of the 
court, on the grounds that his/her presence is impossible 
owing to good cause. Such an exception was recently made in 
the case of President Clinton's testimony for the grand 
jury investigating his involvement with Monica Lewinsky.
Obviously, testimony is more effective if given in 
person rather than if read before the court because it is 
live and therefore both immediate and direct. This notion 
valorizes the witness' spoken word and as such once again 
demonstrates the juridical privileging of the present and 
the oral, the status of which will prove to be illusionary 
once we explore the doubling of presence and the citational 
nature of testimony.
While the general consensus is that bearing witness 
will result in a few discrepancies in testimony due to the 
time and space differential between the moment of 
occurrence of the alleged event and the witness' re­
presentation of that event before a court, other instances 
of inaccuracy can be attributed in part to the commonly 
used technique of embroidery. Unlike perjury, which is 
deliberate untruthfulness under oath, embroidery involves 
alteration of peripheral facts in order to strengthen a 
case (Courtroom Testimony, p. 35). Facts which are not 
necessarily material to the case are inserted and elicited
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in the testimony. Such a technique will come to bear 
heavily on our reading of testimony as narrative and vice 
versa.
Testimony As Narrative
As its definition suggests, testimony involves making 
something public; that is, disclosing a secret, the 
private. Such a notion suggests a transgression or border- 
crossing.
In addition to rendering the private public, testimony 
also makes what once was present, present again. This 
doubling of presence raises two conditions: the possible 
and the impossible. In Demeure: fiction et temoignage, 
Jacques Derrida describes the possible as the necessity of 
the witness' presence in order for the court to conduct 
testimony procedure.3 Yet, this is, in a sense, rendered 
impossible because the witness has already been present in 
another time and another place, in that s/he was physically 
present as a witness during the occurrence of the alleged 
event(s). Testifying thus destroys its own condition of 
possibility since testimony itself requires the witness to 
be present and subsequently re-present. Following Derrida's 
explanation, we see that the witness must have already 
experienced the event and that that experience must be made 
present again. In other words, two moments involving the 
witness can be isolated, removed both temporally and 
spatially from one another. The initial "moment of the
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witness" is his/her presence during the alleged event, 
which remains distanced from the "moment of bearing 
witness," in which the witness becomes present again. This 
requirement of and attempt at a double presence, 
established by the procedure of testimony itself, denotes 
that there is always already repetition or citation during 
proceedings, in spite, and as a result of the insistence on 
a testimony that is live and spoken in the first person.
Testimony is neither immediate nor accurate since the 
event it refers to has already been experienced. 
Consequently, testimony is always a repetition. As Derrida 
explains, when I say I will tell the truth, I say I will 
repeat myself; I will re-cite and re-present my experience 
{ibid.) . The lack of immediacy is clearly seen as resulting 
from the temporal distance between the two moments of 
witnessing, whereas the lack of accuracy stems from the 
previously discussed technique of embroidery. According to 
Derrida, who addresses the question of embroidery in terms 
of its narrative elements, "le temoin doit a la fois se 
conformer a des criteres donnes et inventer, de facpon 
quasi-poetique, les normes de son attestation..." {ibid., 
p. 26). Despite the accepted use of this technique, which 
for Derrida is not merely a technique but, in fact, the 
constituting structure of testimony itself, authority is 
granted to the witness due to the singularity of his/her 
experience and testimony: " 1 1 faut me croire parce qu'il
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faut me croire. Je suis irremplagable" (ibid.). Derrida 
elaborates:
Meme si nous avons ete plusieurs a participer a 
un evenement, a assister a une scene, le temoin 
ne peut temoigner que la ou il affirme qu'il 
etait a une place unique et ou il pouvait 
temoigner de cela et cela en un ici-maintenant, 
c'est-a-dire en un instant pointu qui supporte 
justement cette exemplarite, c'est-a-dire 
irremplaqable. (Ibid.)
The uniqueness of each witness is made clear in the
preceding passage as each witness can testify from only a
specific position about what s/he experienced. Since
testimony depends upon the singularity of the witness and
his/her ability to testify in the first-person, it renders
each witness irreplaceable and testimony itself thus
becomes autobiographical in nature. Derrida adds, "Je ne
peux temoigner...qu'a 1 'instant ou ce dont je temoigne,
personne ne peut temoigner a ma place. Ce dont je temoigne
est d'abord, a 1 'instant, mon secret, il reste a moi
reserve" (ibid., p. 32).
In Fragments of Redemption: Jewish Thought and
Literary Theory in Benjamin, Scholem and Levinas, Susan
Handelman views testimony as:
An inevitable part of the language of the 
survivor, one who comes from the "other" side 
indeed - who must bring the indescribable to 
description, who tries to say the unsayable, who 
speaks for the impossible and says the 
unthinkable by speaking his own vulnerability and 
exposure.4
For her, the principle objective of testimony is to bear 
witness for the other and not so much to confess what one
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has experienced. The witness who comes from the "other"
side, comes from this privileged position of singularity
where s/he cannot be replaced.
In Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature,
Psychoanalysis and History, Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub
seem to follow Derrida's notion of testimony as embroidery
in that, as a process, testimony is not so much a statement
of truth but a means of access to it:
The emergence of the narrative which is being 
listened to - and heard - is, therefore, the 
process and the place wherein the cognizance, the 
"knowing" of the event is given birth to as the 
creation of knowledge de novo.5
Through her work as a practicing psychoanalyst eliciting
the testimonies of Holocaust survivors, Laub asserts that
bearing witness to a traumatic event involves the "process
by which the narrator (the survivor) reclaims his position
as a witness..." (ibid., p. 85). Yet, this act both "makes
and breaks a promise: the promise of the testimony as a
realization of the truth" (ibid., p. 91). For Laub, the
cognizance of the event fulfills the promise of a return to
the sane and normal. This promise however fails because,
despite a commitment to truth, the testimony cannot capture
or re-create it (ibid.) .
Felman and Laub's definition of testimony as the
"creation of knowledge" and the recognition of its
impossibility to capture the truth, or the event, provides
us with further evidence that allows us to consider all
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testimony as embroidery, as narrative, as inhabiting the 
structure of fiction. However, it should be emphasized that 
this does not disqualify testimony, or mean that all 
testimony is simply fiction, rather that it is caught in 
the paradox of citationality whereby what enables it also 
disables it.
The structural complicity that exists between fiction 
and testimony is therefore self-evident. Although testimony 
is not merely storytelling, but rather a re-citation, it 
does possess narrative elements and even Laub's discussion 
of testimony in which she employs words such as "narrator" 
and "narrative" lends further support to this formulation. 
Obviously, the act of testimony reflects the structure of 
narrative/storytelling itself. There is necessarily 
distance in time and space between the event and the 
relation or the narration of that event. This complicitous 
relationship is most apparent in the fiction of Maurice 
Blanchot.
Testimony and Blanchot
In the case of Maurice Blanchot, testimony constitutes 
the narrative comprising several of his fictional texts, or 
recits, three of which I will analyze in this chapter in 
terms of testimony as a function of citationality. Before 
proceeding to these textual analyses, I will first discuss 
what constitutes Blanchot's definition of recit in order to 
facilitate an understanding of the connection between his
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work and testimony. In "Le Chant des Sirenes" from Le livre 
a venir, Blanchot explicates his concept of recit.6 
According to Blanchot, a recit must be comprised of several 
different criteria. First, it must deal with a single event 
which appears to be out of the ordinary, and, consequently, 
is not subject to laws of ordinary time or reality. 
Furthermore, the recit is not the exact relation or 
disclosure of this unusual event as reported by the 
narrator; it is not an account of the event, but the event 
itself:
Le recit n'est pas le relation de 1'evenement, 
mais cet evenement merae, l'approche de cet 
evenement, le lieu ou celui-ci est appele a se 
produire, evenement encore a venir et par la 
puissance attirante, duquel le recit peut 
esperer, lui aussi, se realiser...Le recit ...ne 
'relate' que lui-meme et cette relation, en meme 
temps qu'elle fait, produit ce qu'elle raconte.
(Le livre a venir, pp. 13-14)
Timothy Clark addresses the reflexive nature of the recit
inherent in this definition (in that the recit becomes the
event it narrates) by citing one of Blanchot's early
recits, L'attente I'oubli, in which the encounter that
forms the basis of the narrative is the encounter to which
it refers.7 A series of repetitions and quotations from
different parts of the text aids in disrupting narrative
time and the event narrated is therefore the narration as
event (ibid.).
Since a recit is a re-citing or rather a r e d t-ing of
an event, it is undoubtedly testimonial. According to
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Blanchot, access to the event itself about which the 
narrator-witness testifies is impossible due to the 
problems of time and space which in turn lead to the 
failure of conventional narrative. The witness' 
inaccessibility to the event is additionally related to 
what Blanchot calls the limit-experience; that is, the 
impossible attempt to put into language what has not yet 
been said and what cannot be said. In L'entretien infini, 
Blanchot writes of the limit experience as something that 
"Nous en parlons comme d'une experience et pourtant nous ne 
pourrons jamais dire que nous l'avons eprouve...Experience 
de la non-experience. "8 As Gary Mole writes in Levinas, 
Blanchot, Jabes: Figures of Estrangement: "Beyond memory, 
the event lies beyond representation (it cannot be re­
presented, brought into the fictive present of the 
recit). "9 The recit attempts to be the relation of an event 
but it becomes the event itself. The act of testimony 
functions in similar manner, as an attempt to reconstitute 
the present-ness of the event, but it fails structurally, 
since the moment of the event's occurrence remains severed 
temporally and spatially from the moment of bearing 
witness.
In La Folie du jour, L'arret de mort and L'instant de 
ma mort, the insistence on testimony, on forcing the 
narrator to bear witness in order to achieve the narrative,
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results in its own failure, such that narrative closure 
remains deferred and appears impossible.
Although the reasons for this failure are text- 
specific, the impossibility of achieving narrative can 
generally be attributed, in these works, to the effects of 
citationality itself. The impact citationality produces on 
narrative is such that it inhibits textual closure and 
tends to collapse the text into citation and re-citation.
As I will reveal in my analysis of La Folie du jour, the 
entirety of the text is the mere citation of itself as 
citation, or rather a mise-en-abime of its own citation, 
whereas in L'arret de mort the narrator's attempt to bear 
witness by writing his testimony in the form of a book is 
never completed or even able to be achieved. The testimony 
that comprises L'instant de ma mort problematizes the 
narrator's testimony about his own death. That narrator 
thus becomes a first-person "impossibility," which 
necessitates a shift to the third-person in order for him 
to "accomplish" the text.
However, it is not just in these particular recits 
that citationality figures in Blanchot's works. In fact, it 
can be seen to function among and between several of his 
texts, as I will examine in the following section, before 
proceeding to an analysis of the aforementioned works.
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Citationality in Maurice Blanchot
The publishing history of several of Blanchot's texts
remains a curiosity, particularly in light of my discussion
of citationality. Different versions of the same text
appear as citations of that very text. A first example:
Thomas 1'obscur, a "roman" first published in 1941,
reappears in 1950 as a "nouvelle version" and no longer a
"roman." The preface to the new version reads as follows:
II y a pour tout ouvrage, une infinite de 
variantes possibles. Aux pages intitulees Thomas 
1'obscur, ecrites a partir de 1932, remises a 
l'editeur en mai 1940, publiees en 1941, la 
presente version n'ajoute rien, mais comme elle 
leur ote beaucoup, on peut la dire autre et meme 
nouvelle, mais aussi toute pareille, si, entre la 
figure et ce qui en est ou s'en croit le centre, 
l'on a raison de ne pas distinguer, chaque fois
que la figure complete n'exprime elle-meme que la
recherche d'un centre imaginaire.10
The preceding captures perhaps the essence of citation
itself in that any text can in its turn generate numerous
versions or citations of itself, each different yet the
same, once its center of authority or origin is displaced
in the way Blanchot describes.
Some of Blanchot's texts, as indicated above, have
been published on separate occasions with textual
discrepancies. La Folie du jour, for example, made its
initial appearance in the literary journal Empedocle and
from the outset its very title problematized questions of
borders, in the sense of interior/exterior and
origin/citation. In Parages, Derrida addresses the issue of
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the recit's title stating that it was indeed Andrzej 
Warminski who informed him of the irregularities in its 
appearance in the journal.11 On the cover page of 
Empedocle, there is a listing of the table of contents 
which includes Un Recit?, the title of a contribution by 
Maurice Blanchot. This title appears to neatly cite two 
instances found within the text of "Un recit?" (La Folie du 
jour, pp. 36 and 38). Yet, the table of contents page 
reproduced inside the journal as well as the first page of 
the recit itself reveal the loss of the question mark in 
the title; it reads simply Un Recit. In 1973, this recit 
was once again published and this particular re-citation of 
the text involves a title change from Un Recit to La Folie 
du jour with no other alterations to the text itself.
A third text of Blanchot which has appeared as two 
versions of itself is L'arret de wort. This text was 
originally published in 1948 with the notation "recit" 
beneath its title. The second version of the text sees the 
deletion of the word "recit" along with the last two pages 
of the narrative.
In addition to the appearance of several versions or 
citations of Blanchot's texts, there have also been 
citations of or references to certain texts within others. 
Although more of a faint echo which recalls the other text 
by citing it without citing it, these instances do stand 
out for one familiar with Blanchot's work as a whole. For
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example, in L'instant de ma mort, "ni 1'absence de crainte 
et peut-etre deja le pas au-dela" cites the text Le Pas au- 
dela without directly or explicitly citing from it. By 
means of this mention of its title, the text of Le Pas au- 
dela is at least potentially folded within that of 
L'ins tant de ma mort.
In Le Pas au-dela, L'arret de mort is ever so subtly 
cited on page 135, "Survive, not to live, not living, to 
maintain oneself, without life, in a state of pure 
supplement, movement of substitution for life, but rather 
to arrest dying, arrest that does not arrest, making it on 
the contrary, last."12 Obviously, while citing or recalling 
L'arret de mort, this phrase also exploits the phrase as 
not only a death sentence but also a halting, or arresting 
("arret") of death and dying.
The preceding examples, although by no means 
comprehensive, demonstrate the effects of citationality at 
work amongst and between Blanchot's various texts. I will 
now turn to the specific recits I intend to analyze.
La Folie du jour 
One of Blanchot's early recits I have chosen to 
analyze is La Folie du jour, a text which poses particular 
problems concerning narrative as testimony, in that the 
text is a citation of itself as testimony.
Mentioned in the previous section of this chapter, the 
discrepancies in the publishing history of La Folie du jour
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indicate the impact of citational effects on it from the 
outset. The re-publication, in 1973, of this text with its 
new title, La Folie du jour, occurs with no other apparent 
modifications to the text. As in the previous title(s) of 
Un recit (?), this newly published title appears to be a 
citation from within the text, "...je fus convaincu que je 
voyais face a face la folie du jour" (p. 22). Derrida 
reminds us however of the impossibility of determining if 
the different titles of the recit are indeed citations from 
the text, or if, instead, the textual instances of these 
phrases "la folie du jour" and "un recit (?)" are citations 
of the titles {Parages, p. 131) . In other words, deciding 
which appearance of these phrases is the origin or source 
and which is its citation remains impossible. With the 
indeterminacy of the function of the title as source or 
citation of the in-text phrases, the recit poses itself as 
problematic from the outset. In Blanchot: Extreme 
Contemporary, Leslie Hill states, "...Each proposed title 
doubles both as a naming of the text and an integral part 
of it, as an address to the text and a quotation from 
it . . . " 13 Indeed it is this very confounding of textual 
borders springing from the indeterminacy of source and 
citation that is exploited throughout the text.
The recit itself concerns of the testimony of the 
narrator, who bears witness to his interrogators, an 
opthamalogist and a psychiatrist, about the events in his
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life prior and subsequent to his admittance to hospital, a
move precipitated by the injury to his eyes. The emergence
of the narrator-witness' madness ("je suis devenu fou quand
ce coup m'a frappe, car c'est un enfer" (p.1 1 )) apparently
precedes this incident while coinciding with "la folie du
monde" or the eruption of war:
Peu apres, la folie du monde se dechaina. Je fus 
mis au mur comme beaucoup d'autres. Pourquoi?
Pour rien. Les fusils ne partirent pas...Le monde 
hesita, puis reprit son equilibre. (p. 1 1 )
Here, it is interesting to first note that in L'instant de
ma mort there is a citation of this autobiographical
passage in which the witness finds himself placed against
the wall of his house where he is to be executed by German
soldiers: "Le nazi mit en rang ses hommes pour atteindre,
selon les regies, la cible humaine" (L'instant de ma mort,
p. 9) . Additionally, in contrast to "la folie du monde,"
the madness of the narrator remained "sans temoin" and as
such, a secret yet to be disclosed, because it surfaced
during the concealing darkness of the night:
Or, j'etais brule des pieds a la tete; la nuit je
courais les rues, je hurlais; le jour, je
travaillais tranquillement. (Ibid.)
The recit focuses on the non-event of the narrator's eye
injury, "Je faillis perdre la vue, quelqu'un ayant ecrase
du verre sur mes yeux" (p. 21). As in many other instances
in this text where there is a play between and on
boundaries, it must be stated that the eye injury does not
quite blind the narrator; yet, it does not enable him to
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maintain his eyesight unharmed. He states, "Je ne pouvais 
ni regarder ni ne pas regarder; voir c'etait l'epouvante, 
et cesser de voir me dechirer du front a la gorge" (ibid.).
The narrator in fact only begins to see when his eyes 
are bandaged. In his essay, "The Trace of Trauma," Michael 
Newman comments on the double meaning of "verre" as both 
glass and lens. While it is glass that was crushed into the 
narrator's eyes, nearly blinding him, it is "verre" in the 
form of glass or a lens that enables him to see.14 
Therefore, it can be stated that the crushing of glass in 
his eyes harms them in such a way as to precipitate his 
ability to clearly see.
What he sees, or experiences, is indeed the "folie du 
j our":
A la longue, je fus convaincu que je voyais face 
a face la folie du jour; telle etait la verite: 
la lumiere devenait folie, la clarte avait perdu 
tout bon sens. (p. 2 2 )
His initial vision of the "folie du jour" can be linked to
what Derrida calls the "principe de contamination"
(Parages, p. 256) . In fact, Derrida discusses the
exploitation of the word "jour" in this recit by reading
"jour" as synonymous to the law. The glass thrown into the
narrator's eyes induces the "sept jours ensemble, les sept
clartes capitales devenues la vivacite d'un seul instant"
(p. 22). It is in this phrase that Derrida finds oblique
connections to the law in Genesis and in the number seven,
the number of days in the week as well as the number of
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deadly sins. Yet, within this law, within this day resides 
what defies juridical convention and what incites the 
narrator:
Et si voir, c'etait le feu, j'exigeais la 
plenitude du feu, et si voir c'etait la contagion 
de la folie, je desirais follement cette folie.
(pp. 22-23) .
This "feu" or "contagion de la folie" for which the
narrator yearns so intensely can indeed be viewed as that
"principe de contamination" inhabiting the law. In fact
this "contagion" is indeed the "loi de la loi du genre"
which ultimately inhibits compliance with it. According to
Derrida, the "principe de contamination" is actually "une
loi d'impurete, une economie du parasite” (Parages, p.
256). This contagion that contaminates the recit by
disrupting boundaries prevents it from abiding by the law
that prescribes how a text should function.
The parasitic economy marks what Emmanuel Levinas
describes in Sur Maurice Blanchot as "iteration infiniment
repetee de la folie desiree comme lumiere du jour et du
jour qui blesse l'oeil qui le cherche. " 15
Although not initially apparent, this infinite
repetition of the narrator's testimony eventually becomes
clear through the re-citation of the following opening
statement by the narrator:
Je suis ni savant ni ignorant. J'ai connu des 
joies. C'est trop peu dire: je vis, et cette vie 
me fait le plaisir le plus grand. Alors, la mort?
Quand je mourrai (peut-etre tout a l'heure), je 
connaitrai un plaisir immense, (p. 9)
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It is only at the end of the text that we learn that this 
opening corresponds to the statements made by the narrator 
to his interrogators. Therefore, the discourse that 
constitutes the text is actually an attempt to force a 
narrative, a testimony, out of the narrator. His 
interrogators tell him, "Racontez-nous comment les choses 
se sont passes ' au juste' . " (p. 36) . Their request for what
happened exactly, for all the facts - the truth - raises 
two observations. First, it suggests that he is not giving 
us the whole story, as the interrogators' surprise reveals 
when he arrives at the end, prompting them to further 
pressure him for the whole story, "Apres ce
commencement...vous en viendrez aux faits" (p. 36). Second, 
their demand presupposes that "un homme qui parle et 
raisonne avec distinction, est toujours capable de raconter 
des faits dont il se souvient" (pp. 37-38). Yet, this 
requirement that the narrator abide by the law and fully 
complete his testimony remains couched in impossibility for 
two reasons. First, the act of testimony, as I have 
discussed, borders on the impossible of re-presenting what 
was previously present. Second, the eye injury can be 
viewed as constitutive of a non-event since the narrator 
was not blinded. These reasons leave the recit as nothing 
more than the recit of itself. As Levinas writes, it is the 
iteration "d'un recit racontant ce recit meme" (Sur Maurice
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Blanchot, p. 59). In other words, the only thing r e d t-ed 
is the re-citation of the recit itself.
This re-citation as testimony disrupts any clear sense
of temporality as well. In L'espace litteraire Blanchot
describes what can be viewed as the perpetual citationality
of writing as a function of "la fascination de 1 'absence du
temps" {L'espace litteraire, p. 20). Thus we encounter in
La Folie du jour certain instances where references are
made to impending occurrences, yet any sense of their
actual passing is lost as it is revealed that the text is
already a re-citation. For example, the following phrase
appears in the opening passage of the text: "Quand je
mourrai, (peut-etre tout a l'heure), je connaitrai un
plaisir immense" (p. 9). Written in the future tense, this
phrase is rendered disruptive upon arrival at the "end" of
the text, where the text re-begins, with this phrase still
in the future tense. There is no understanding of when or
if "tout a l'heure" takes place, since what is read is
already a citation which at the end becomes re-cited again.
As Levinas states there is a:
Suppression du temps comme evenement dans le 
temps. Ce rebondissement que la syntaxe tolere 
n'est pas non-sens..."Peut-etre tout a l'heure" - 
la parenthese de 1 'auteur suggere le retour 
inevitable de l'heure, 1 'infaillibilite de 
l'heure juste. {Sur Maurice Blanchot, p. 59)
This impending arrival of "tout a l'heure" is never
achieved in effect because of a mise-en-ahime of citations;
the narrative folds back on itself infinitely so that there
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is never a first recit ("sans fin. sans commencement, sans 
avenir, " L'espace litteraire, p. 21), but there is always a 
recommencement, infinitely, "Cela n'est pas, mais revient, 
vient comme deja et toujours passe de sorte que je ne le 
connais pas, mais le reconnais" (ibid.).
The preceding example in the future tense demonstrates 
the impact that citationality, in the form of testimony, 
has on temporality, the disjointedness or disjunction that 
occurs between a present and a past or a present and a 
future. If an utterance can always already be repeated, it 
never just occurs. Another striking example is found midway 
through the recit when the narrator interjects in the 
present, "Tout cela etait reel, notez-le" (p. 20). Yet, 
since the end of the text only marks its re-beginning, the 
temporality of this intercedent as a present is skewed. To 
recall, the act of testimony, the moment of bearing 
witness, is dependent upon the here and now, the presence 
of the witness who offers testimony orally. This has 
previously been shown to be problematic as testimony itself 
is a re-citation of the moment of the witness, when the 
events/facts to which the witness testifies were first 
experienced. Yet in La Folie du jour, the here and now, the 
presence of the witness and his testimony, is even further 
removed from its initial presence during the moment of the 
witness due to the citational effects of mise-en-abime. 
Additionally, curiously, the recit is always already a re­
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citation in which the narrator offers his testimony to the 
doctors, including references to the doctors themselves. 
This detachment, the narrator's participation in, yet 
distance from, the interrogation disrupts further the 
temporality of the text. How can he participate in the 
testimony, offering his story, yet at the same time talk 
about the goings-on related to his "present" act of bearing 
witness? Any real sense of narrative time is skewed as it 
becomes impossible to ascertain the moment of the doctor's 
interjections since the recit has been re-cited en-sibime, 
thereby repeating itself countless times. The testimony 
that constitutes the text of La Folie du jour is revealed 
through the interrogatory nature of the recit itself, 
presented as a story forced out of the narrator by his 
interrogators. The questioning which marks the 
interrogation persists throughout the text as the 
interrogators search for "un savoir invisible dont personne 
n'avait la preuve" (p. 27).
The narrator remains unable to provide the lacking 
evidence, proof, or truth -- to complete the story: "je dus 
reconnaitre que je n'etais pas capable de former un recit 
avec ces evenements" (p. 37) to the satisfaction of the 
interrogators who search for the whole truth, the whole 
story. The testimony of the narrator-witness' 
involvement/response to the interrogators becomes part of 
the testimony that forms the recit itself. In other words,
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aspects of the interrogation that force and draw out the 
testimony are incorporated into that very testimony.
Midway through the recit, there is the appearance of a 
curious interjection that seemingly marks a movement toward 
the end of the narrator's testimony, "Voici qu'elle arrive, 
me disais-je, la fin vient, quelque chose arrive, la fin 
commence" (p. 19). Despite the narrator's attestation that 
the end was beginning, the only thing beginning, or even 
happening, that emerges in La Folie du jour is its own re- 
beginning.
Although the narrator claims to recount "les faits"
and "un evenement vrai," his announcement of the end of the
recit remains a surprise for all precisely because the
recit is clearly no longer a recit at all; there is no
beginning, there is no end. When the interrogators request
the story with the real facts, ("Racontez-nous comment les
choses se sont passees 'au juste'" (p. 36)), the narrator
eagerly begins again ("Un recit?" (ibid.)), with what turns
out to have always already begun:
Je commengai: Je ne suis ni savant ni ignorant.
J'ai connu des joies. C'est trop peu dire. Je 
leur racontai l'histoire toute entiere qu'ils 
ecoutaient, me semble-t-il, avec interet, du 
moins au debut. Mais la fin fut pour nous une 
commune surprise." (pp. 36-7)
In what Derrida terms the chiasmic double invagination of
the borders, the story quite simply folds back on itself
(Parages, p. 132). As we have seen, the opening statements
reappear at the end of the recit only to be reinscribed in
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the recit again. The leading edge of the text becomes just 
a fragment that is in its turn just a quotation of its 
quotation and the text ends exactly where it begins: "Je ne 
suis ni savant ni ignorant..." With all these citations 
punctuating the text, the original source of the 
performance, of the event, becomes difficult if not 
impossible to identify.
What we have seen in La Folie du jour is a textual 
destabilization occurring to such a degree that 
conventional linear narration and narrative become 
disrupted. The narrative rupture of temporality and 
linearity and the break between the double presences of the 
narrator-witness bring about the text's re-citation of 
itself as citation.
L'arret de mort 
If La Folie du jour demonstrates the difficulty and 
possible impossibility of recit-ing, of developing a 
narrative that does not stall as a web of citations,
L'arret de mort then renders this difficulty absolute 
through the interminable testimony of the narrator who 
shows himself incapable of terminating the narration he has 
set into motion.
First published in 1948, this recit, like La Folie du 
jour, has a curious publishing history. The first 
publication of the text includes a sort of cryptic 
epilogue: a two-paragraph page at the end of the recit. In
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subsequent printings of L'arret de mort, this final section
no longer appears. The deletion of the final page
accompanies the elimination of the word recit which
initially appeared just beneath the title. From the outset,
therefore, the text has been doubled, with the appearance
and subsequent deletion of recit and the last page. We
shall see that this act of doubling operates within the
pages of the text as well.
The narrator of the text devotes the beginning of the
recit to the testimony regarding his attempt to achieve his
testimony of events to which he was a witness in 1938. The
recit opens as follows:
Ces evenements me sont arrives en 1938. J'eprouve 
a en parler la plus grande gene. Plusieurs fois 
deja, j'ai tente de leur donner une forme ecrite.
Si j'ai ecrit des livres, c'est que j'ai espere 
par des livres mettre fin a tout cela. (p. 7)
This initial documentation of several previously failed
attempts at bearing witness stands as evidence itself of
the continuation of the rupture seen in La Folie du jour
where the event becomes the recit and the r e d t-ing is the
event as it collapses into its citation and re-citation.
Here, rather than the entirety of the text posing as a
citation of itself, failing to achieve textual closure, the
recit of L'arret de mort reveals the perpetual commencement
of the narrator's testimony -- "plusieurs fois deja -- with
the hope of being at last able to "mettre fin a tout cela."
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However, as the title suggests, the testimony of the 
recit is an "arret de mort" or a "death sentence." Yet, the 
"arret de mort," read literally, is also just that -- an 
"arret" or a halting or arresting of death. Extending this 
double connotation of the title to the narrator's 
predicament as witness prepared to "livrer un secret" 
enables us to comment on the nature of bearing witness in 
this text. The narrator finds himself compelled, even 
condemned, to tell his story, promising that even "les 
paroles, qui ne devraient pas etre ecrites, seront 
ecrites," (p. 8 ) because he says, "je n'ai pas peur de la
verite" (p. 7).
Despite this commitment on the part of the witness- 
narrator to testify and thereby succumb to the testimonial 
imperative, he finds himself incapable of following 
through:
Cependant je dois le rappeler, une fois je
reussis a donner une forme a ces evenements....
Mais, quand elle fut ecrite, je la relus.
Aussitot je detruisis le manuscrit. (p. 8 )
The narrator's r e d t-ing is interrupted and halted with 
each successive attempt, so that the beginning of his 
testimony has already begun and its ending is never ending.
In Parages, Derrida equates "1'arret de mort" with 
"pas de mort," or, as stated previously, with an arresting 
or halting of death. "Pas" also signifies "step" in that 
"1 'arret de mort" is also a step toward death in addition 
to being a halting or negation of that step. Derrida then
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extends this notion of "pas de mort," as derived from the
recit's title, to a "pas de recit," as ample textual
evidence illustrates. In other words, just as L'arret de
mort is a "pas de recit," a step or movement toward
accomplishing the recit, it is also simultaneously a
halting of that very movement in that the recit is never
accomplished and the narrator is never able to "mettre fin
a tout cela."
Textually, this "arret de mort" as a "pas de recit"
manifests itself as the continual dying yet the
impossibility of death of the narrator and his friend J.,
whom the entirety of the first half of the text concerns.
Disease stricken for a decade, J. persists in living. As
the narrator states:
Normalement, elle aurait du etre morte depuis 
longtemps. Mais, non seulement elle n'etait pas 
morte, elle avait continue a vivre, a aimer, a 
rire, a courir par la ville comme quelqu'un que 
la maladie ne pouvait atteindre. (p. 13)
Yet, J. places her doctor in a bind between life and death
as well when she informs him, "Si vous ne me tuez pas, vous
etes un meurtrier" (p. 29), a citation the narrator is able
to attribute to Kafka. Yet, contrary to everyone's opinion,
J. miraculously defies death. Her survival right at the
brink of death contradicts even the predictions of her
doctor of whom the narrator says that "il la tenait pour
morte depuis 1936" (ibid.).
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In a manner similar to J.'s survival at the limit, or
borderline, between dying and death itself, the death of
the narrator has been imminent as well for quite some time
and there are in fact several references in the text to the
doctor's predictions of his death:
"Comme vous devriez etre mort depuis deux ans,
tout ce que vous reste a vivre est sumombre." II
venait de m'octroyer six mois de survie et il y a 
de cela sept ans. (p. 14)
While the narrator, however, does remain alive, what does
come to pass in the text is J.'s death and inexplicable
resurrection:
Tout de suite apres, elle me dit d'une voix basse 
et rapide: "Vite, une piqure." (Elle n'en avait, 
depuis la nuit, jamais reclame.) Je pris une 
grosse seringue, j'y reunis deux doses de 
morphine et deux doses de pantopon, ce qui 
faisait quatre doses de stupefiants. Le liquide 
fut assez lent a penetrer, mais, voyant ce que je 
faisais, elle resta tres calme. Elle ne bougea 
plus a aucun moment. Deux ou trois minutes plus 
tard, son pouls se deregla, il frappa un coup 
violent, s'arreta, puis se remit a battre 
lourdement pour s'arreter a nouveau, cela 
plusieurs fois, enfin il devint extremement 
rapide et miniscule, et "s'eparpilla comme du 
sable."
Je n'ai aucun moyen d'en ecrire davantage. Je pourrais 
ajouter que, pendant ces instants, J. continua a 
me regarder avec le meme regard affectueux et 
consentant et que ce regard dure encore, mais ce 
n'est malheureusement pas sur. De tout le reste, 
je ne veux rien dire. Les histoires avec le 
medecin me sont devenues indifferentes. Moi-meme, 
je ne vois rien d'important dans le fait que 
cette jeune fille qui etait morte, a mon appel 
revint a la vie...Il faut que ceci soit entendu: 
je n'ai rien raconte d'extraordinaire ni meme de 
surprenant. L'extraordinaire commence au moment 
ou je m'arrete. Mais je ne suis plus maitre d'en 
parler. (pp. 51-53)
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In this passage, J. actually undergoes an "arret de mort."
Not only has she been living suspended between death and
dying, condemned by an "arret de mort," or a death
sentence, but she has also managed to bring about an
"arret" or stop to her death, preventing it from becoming a
decisive finality. In Maurice Blanchot: L'Ancien,
1'effroyablement ancien, Roger LaPorte comments on this
preceding passage:
Cet evenement... recuse son nom et tout nom: plus 
vieux que tout passe, tout proche, voire imminent 
--perpetuellement imminent -- il n'accede pas a 
la presence 'elle-meme,' il ne deviendra jamais 
present, et c'est pourquoi J, 1'heroine de 
L'arret de mort, condamnee a mort par les 
medecins, en vient a agoniser, son pouls 
's'eparpille comme du sable,' mais 1'arret du 
coeur est indefiniment differe.16
Her survival, or infinitely differed death, also brings
about the "arret," or halting, of the narrator's testimony,
rendering it impossible and leaving the narrator "plus
maitre d'en parler" because he no longer has any "moyen
d'en ecrire davantage" having arrived himself at the very
limits of testimony and r e d t-ing. As the narrator states,
"L'extraordinaire commence au moment ou je m'arrete."
In effect, this passage marks the moment where the
narrator does indeed stop himself and his testimony. This
break within the narrative of L'arret de mort is even
visible in the text itself since the last line of the
previously cited passage precedes just over one page of
blank space before the story resumes. Here, the "arret de
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mort" or death sentence for the r e d t  erupts in this blank 
space where the redt falters and skips a beat. Yet, this 
blank space is in turn halted and is the halting of death 
of L'arret de mort. In Parages, Derrida elaborates on this 
passage:
Comme cela etait defini, indefini, dans le 
passage de Le pas au-dela, l'arret de mort n'est 
pas seulement la decision arretant 1'ind^cidable; 
il arrete aussi la mort en la suspendant, il 
l'interrompt ou la differe dans le sursaut d'une 
survie. Mais alors ce qui suspend ou retient la 
mort cela meme lui rend toute sa puissance 
d'indecidabilite...Comme la mort, l'arret reste 
(s'arrete, s'arreste) indecidable. (Parages, p.
159)
The text however resumes subsequent to this passage and 
lacuna without any further reference to J. and other 
aspects that constitute the "first redt" of L'arret de 
mort. As Derrida observes, the last passage of the first 
part of the text marks "la bordure inferieure ou finale du 
'premier' des deux 'recits' intitules L'arret de mort.
Cette bordure externe peut aussi etre consideree comme un 
pli interieur" (ibid., p. 158).
The (re)commencement of the story raises with it 
numerous questions as nothing in the text itself announces 
the start of a different or new redt. The testimony begins 
again:
Je continuerai cette histoire, mais maintenant, 
je prendrai quelques precautions. Ces precautions 
ne sont pas faites pour jeter un voile sur la 
verite. La verite sera dite, tout ce qui s'est 
passe d'important sera dit. Mais tout ne s'est 
pas encore passe, (p. 54)
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Although this is announced as a continuation of the same 
story, it apparently has no recollection of what preceded 
it; there lack, obviously, any narrative threads that would 
normally stitch the two parts together. As a result, many 
elements remain in suspense between the double stories: 
characters, narrator, narrative time, story. One must 
wonder, for example, what story is continuing. Is it one 
which preceded the "first" one? Is it even related by the 
same narrator?
Of course, the use of the future tense in the opening 
passage of the "second recit," cited above, is quite 
striking itself for its disruption of temporality. As 
Derrida suggests, what the narrator promises to tell has 
not yet happened; it will not yet be situated in the past. 
It is as if:
le recit serait done la cause -- disons aussi la 
chose -- de cela m§me qu'il semble raconter.
Recit comme cause et non comme relation d'un 
evenement... La chose est le recit. (Parages, p.
189)
With the r e d t-ing of the recit presented as the event of
the recit itself, the text deals with the non-presentation
of the event:
Ce qui se recite ici, cela aura ete cette non­
presentation de 1'evenement, sa presence sans 
presence, son avoir-lieu sans avoir-lieu, etc.
{Ibid.)
Since the narrator arrived at the very limits of narrative 
and testimony in the first recit, he now is faced with 
necessity of taking precautions to tell the story, yet the
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story still remains suspended between its possibility and
its impossibility. Incapable of being recounted, the recit
necessarily stopped itself right on the very threshold of
the event it undertook to recount. Derrida explains:
L'arret de mort est done aussi la decision 
interdictrice qui arrete L'arret de mort au bord 
de 1'evenement qu'il n'a pas le droit de 
raconter, mais qui, aussi bien met en oeuvre, le 
fait raconter, le decide a raconter depuis ce 
suspens interdicteur, le fait repartir vers le 
recit impossible, pour raconter (ce) qu'il ne 
racontera pas. Ce texte commente le titre...mais 
le titre enonce aussi 1'impossibility du 
texte...Sa condition de possibilite et 
d'impossibility. (Ibid., p. 172)
In conclusion, then, what is at stake in L'arret de mort is
the problematization of the testimony of an event that
defies its own articulation. The title of the text itself
announces the suspension of the narrative between its
failure or collapse as an impossibility, as subjected to a
death sentence, and its possibility, as the halting of that
collapse. In any case, efforts by the narrator-witness to
testify are starts and stops and can never be fulfilled.
L'instant de ma mort 
The impossible possibility raised by the title of the 
recit L'instant de ma mort problematizes from the outset 
the testimony offered by the witness-narrator. As 
previously discussed, testimony involves making something 
twice present in view of the requisite temporal spacing 
between the two presences. In other words, the first 
presence, that moment of the witness-event precedes the
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moment of the testimony itself -- the moment of bearing
witness. The stipulation that a witness have first-hand or
personal knowledge renders testimony autobiographical in
nature, resulting in first-person narration. Given the
status of the personal in testimony, one clearly sees how
potentially problematic a recit such as L'instant de ma
mort is since it proposes in its title to talk about one's
own death. The impossibility of the possible arises when
the witness offers testimony about his death. According to
the rules of testimony, as I have previously discussed, "I"
am the only one capable of testifying, because "I" am the
only one in the position of possessing first-hand personal
knowledge of my experience of that event. Each witness is
irreplaceable. However, in the case of "my" death, "I" can
not say "I died" or "I am dead." In Demeure: fiction et
temoignage, Derrida elucidates on the particularities posed
by considering the case of death and testimony. There is a
place/instance where there is no witness for the witness.
No one can testify about someone else's death because it
was not something experienced by that person. Yet, the
person who dies obviously cannot testify, cannot make it,
the experience, and her/him-self re-present. Derrida refers
to this unique situation as the impossible possibility of
the sentence "Je suis mort." He writes:
Je ne peux pas dire, de bon sens, je ne devrais 
pas pouvoir dire: je mourus ou je suis 
mort...S'il y a un lieu ou une instance ou il n'y 
a pas de temoin pour le temoin, ou personne n'est
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temoin pour le temoin, ce serait bien la mort.
(Demeure: fiction et temoignage, p. 55)
The possibility of this phrase, "je suis mort," lies in 
death itself. It is quite possible, even inevitable, to 
die. The catch is the impossibility of the enunciation "Je 
suis mort" (p. 31).
Whereas Derrida has written of the impossibility of 
bearing witness to one's own death and the enunciation "I 
am dead," Natalie Sarraute in L'usage de la parole 
addressed related issues of speaking about death.17 She 
cites the story of Tchaikovsky who, prior to his death, 
uttered, "I am dying." More interesting than his cognizance 
of what was happening is the fact that he stated "I am 
dying" not in his native tongue of Russian, but rather in 
the foreign language of German. For Sarraute, this 
represents the impossibility of conceiving of one's own 
death as anything but "other" (ibid., p. 78). Indeed, it is 
the very otherness of the experience that prohibits one 
from discussing it in the familiar, in one's native 
language.
Sarraute's observation coupled with Derrida's notion 
of the impossible possibility of testifying to "1'instant 
de ma mort" bears heavily on Blanchot's recit. Although 
L'instant de ma mort is not written in the language of the 
"other" as was Tchaikovsky's statement, the effects of 
attempting to enunciate the impossible reverberate 
throughout the text.
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Faced with the aforementioned impossibility; that is,
the presentation of testimony about one's death, the
narrator must make a compensation for it in his text. As
one would expect, following the juridical definition of
testimony, the moment of bearing witness registers in the
first-person. However, the moment of the witness-
experience, the impossible "instant de ma mort," is carried
out through the third-person. This experience-limit of
attempting to bear witness about one's own death deals with
the limit of language itself, of attempting to put into
words what has not yet been said because it cannot be said;
it is indeed Blanchot's "sentiment inanalysable" of a
"legerete que je ne saurais traduire..." (p. 16).
This impossibility forces a rupture in the subject-
witness which occurs in the opening passage of the text:
Je me souviens d'un jeune homme - un homme encore 
jeune - empeche de mourir par la mort meme - et 
peut-etre l'erreur de 1'injustice, (p. 7)
This rupture manifests itself not through the use of a
foreign language, as was the case just referred to
concerning Tchaikovsky, but through a lapse from first- to
third-person which enables the "I" to discuss the "self"
through the detachment of a "he," or "un jeune homme." The
narrator can only attempt a discussion of this event
through a split or a fissure between the two moments of the
witness outlined earlier in this chapter.
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In addition to the preceding passage, L'instant
contains other instances which serve to demonstrate further
the rupture between the moment of testimony, of "je," and
the moment of the "lived" experience of what should have
been and, in a sense, was his death. The most notable of
these occurrences involves the use of the first-person to
describe or introduce evidence of events belonging to that
moment of death. This is not surprising considering that
such textual instances find the testimony at its most
unstable as the limits of the limit-experience are
approached. What is interesting about these examples is
that the narrator is able to testify from the position of
"je" about the "jeune homme" because he himself had been in
the position of a witness. Yet, it is this "sentiment
inanalysable" (p. 17) which marked his death and "changea
ce qui lui restait d'existence" (ibid.) creating an
irrevocable rupture between the moment of the event and the
moment of testimony. This first emerges when the lieutenant
positions the witness against the wall for his execution:
Je sais - le sais-je - que celui que visaient 
deja les Allemands, n'attendant plus que 1'ordre 
final, eprouve alors un sentiment de legerete 
extraordinaire, une sorte de beatitude... (p. 10)
This "senciment de legerete" upon which the recit is
constructed is the closest articulation for the witness of
the feeling of death encountering death. With the
indescribable on the verge of taking place, the narrator
poses the question, "la rencontre de la mort et de la
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mort?" (ibid.). The question mark that terminates this 
phrase accentuates the uncertainty and, ultimately, the 
impossibility of attempting to articulate that which 
remains impossible to be articulated, situated right at the 
limits of experience and bearing witness about one's own 
death.
Apparently making an effort to address the questions
of this "sentiment" the narrator-witness adds:
A sa place, je ne chercherai pas a analyser ce 
sentiment de legerete. Il etait peut-etre tout a 
coup invincible. Mort - immortel. Peut-etre 
l'extase. Plutot le sentiment de compassion pour 
l'humanite souffrante, le bonheur de n'etre pas 
immortel ni eternel. Desormais il fut lie a la 
mort, par une amitie subreptice." (p. 11)
Allowed to flee by the Russian soldiers who had already
assumed the firing squad formation for his seemingly
imminent execution, the narrator retreated "toujours dans
le sentiment de legerete" to the woods for an indeterminate
amount of time (p. 12). After having regained "le sens du
reel," all that the narrator-witness discovers upon
emerging from the woods "post-mortem" is the remains of
people and animals ("...il apprit que trois jeunes
gens...avaient ete abattus. Meme les chevaux
gonfles...attestaient une guerre qui avait dure." (ibid.))
as well as the still burning fires of the farms. The
narrator-witness' brutal return to the post-war world is
underscored by an interesting inversion. The witness who
should have died has survived and people who should still
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be alive were, for no apparent reason, killed. Further
compounding the senselessness of the war is the fact that
all the surrounding farms were destroyed by fire and yet
the chateau of the narrator was spared ("Tout brulait, sauf
le Chateau" (p. 15)).
The unjust destruction of local farms marks the
narrator's entrance into a period of survival escaping his
comprehension: "Alors commenga sans doute pour le jeune
homme le tourment de 1'injustice" (p. 16). This torment of
injustice is indeed the veritable torment of survival. It
is, in other words, the burden of living with the fact that
one is living due to social status and class. Being spared
the firing squad's bullets does not enable the narrator to
overcome this torment of injustice, for although he was
spared at the last moment from certain death, the escape
from death has in a sense left him dead ("la rencontre de
la mort et de la mort?" and "Mort - immortel"). The
deadness inhabiting him stemming from the experience of
senselessly not having been killed is clearly demonstrated
in the following passage:
Demeurant cependant, au moment ou la fusillade 
n'etait plus qu'en attente, le sentiment de
legerete que je ne saurais traduire: libere de la
vie? l'infini qui s'ouvre? Ni bonheur ni malheur.
Ni 1'absence de crainte et peut-etre deja le pas 
au-dela. Je sais, j'imagine que ce sentiment 
inanalysable changea ce qui lui restait 
d'existence. Comme si la mort hors de lui ne 
pouvait desormais que se heurter a la mort en 
lui. "Je suis vivant. Non, tu es mort". (pp. 16- 
17)
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There are several points I would like to make in view of 
this passage. First, the "sentiment de legerete" incapable 
of being analyzed earlier is now pronounced untranslatable, 
and certain indeterminacy surrounds any attempt to define 
it. Untranslatable, the "sentiment" remains inaccessible in 
its otherness. Additionally, the reference to "pas au-dela" 
is a direct citation of Blanchot's plurivocal text of the 
same name in which Blanchot explicates his concept of the 
Neuter ("il"). Gerald Bruns describes this notion as 
involving the other in the same and as always in 
displacement, which appears to be how the rupture in the 
witness-narrator functions.18 Furthermore, the final 
sentence of this excerpt is set off in quotation marks.
This provides yet another example indicating that the 
narrator as witness cannot access the event of the limit- 
experience in terms of "I."
For Gary Mole, this inaccessibility is also revealed 
through a certain paralysis of the witness-narrator. In 
fact, he reads L'instant as a double event of passivity 
situated on two levels. The first is the level of the 
story: the witness does not seek escape; indeed, he is 
"passive, frozen before the firing squad, a real-fictive 
event, real because supposedly experienced, fictive because 
related" {Levinas, Blanchot, Jabes: Figures of 
Estrangement, p. 164). Ample evidence of the narrator's 
passivity abounds in the text which, moreover, can be read
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as the inevitable rupture of temporality and the loss of a 
"sens du reel." Numerous times in the text words are used 
to suggest immobility and fixedness.
Second, the repeated use of the word "demeurer" and 
its various forms provides an excellent example of this 
passivity which in turn disrupts any real sense of time. 
"Les Allemands restaient en ordre, prets a demeurer ainsi 
dans une immobilite qui arretait le temps" (p. 12) ("il 
demeura abrite..." (p. 12); "Demeurait cependant...le 
sentiment..."(p. 16); "Seul demeure le sentiment..."(p.
2 0 ) ) .
In contrast to the immobility denoted by the 
appearance of "demeurer" in the text, the passage of time 
remains indeterminate and this disrupts the progression of 
the r e d t. Examples are found in the following statements: 
"Apres combien de temps" (p. 13) and "En realite, combien 
de temps s'etait-il ecoule?" (ibid.) .
The passivity/immobility permeates the relation of the 
event and the fluid indeterminacy of the "sentiment de 
legerete," described repeatedly as "inanalysable" and 
defined as "ni bonheur ni malheur." Despite its 
indeterminate status, the "sentiment" is the only thing 
that remains at the recit's conclusion, "1'instant de ma 
mort desormais toujours en instance" (p. 20).
The narrator's acceptance of his impending fate, 
according to Mole, occurs because "the relating is the
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experience, the narrator passive before his own event, the 
recit itself, deprived of his "'i'" in remembering his 
"'self'" (ibid.).
Because the event lies beyond representation it cannot 
be brought into the fictive present of the recit, it cannot 
be r e d t-ed and therefore necessarily remains "ce sentiment 
inanalysable." Thus, the attempted relation of an event is 
impossible and the relating, the testimony, in turn becomes 
the event.
Conclusion
In concluding this chapter, I will provide a brief 
recapitulation of my discussion of testimony. First, I have 
figured testimony itself as a mode of citationality 
differing from that of hearsay. With testimony, the law 
stipulates the first-person presentation of facts pertinent 
to the case that only that witness in particular has 
experienced. The fact that the witness maintains privileged 
access to this information renders him/her irreplaceable 
and therefore unique, an important consideration in 
L'instant de ma mort. With the presentation of the 
testimony, there is the problematization of the presence of 
the witness, who was first present during the event's 
occurrence and who re-presents him/herself in an effort to 
re-present the event as testimony. This doubling points to 
the citational effects of testimony, which we have examined 
in terms of Maurice Blanchot's recits.
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In La Folie du jour, for example, we find a text that 
is merely the mise-en-ablme of itself as a citation. The 
text as testimony is already cut off from the initial 
moment of the witness and event and therefore, can only be 
the citation of the moment of bearing witness.
L'arret de mort problematizes the attempt at testimony 
through the narrator's perpetual recommencement of his 
testimony, a testimony that remains interminable. The 
aporia which Derrida considers to be the "pas de Blanchot," 
where each step toward completion of the testimony is also 
the negation of that movement, leaves the narrator-witness 
suspended between dying and death, as the title indicates. 
It is in this recit that the rupture becomes definite, that 
the possibility of testimony becomes impossible to achieve.
L'instant de ma mort radicalizes the testimony to such
an extent that it remains necessarily an impossible
possibility. In other words, the narrator-witness finds 
himself placed in the impossible position of attempting to
testify about his own death.
The following chapter on Derrida's polyvocal texts 
marks a departure from these chapters on Duras' and 
Blanchot's texts where we have explored the textual 
implications of the citational modes of hearsay and 
testimony. In Derrida's work, we will discover how 
conference is employed as a response to the effects of 
citationality.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CONFERENCE: THE POLYLOGUES OF JACQUES DERRIDA
Introduct ion
The previous chapters on Duras and Blanchot have 
considered their works as the instanciation of two 
functions of citationality. Both hearsay and testimony 
enter into operation as citational practices that disrupt 
and destabilize narrative progression. The insistence on 
hearsay in the Lol V. Stein cycle demonstrates, for 
example, the impossibility of containing textual threads 
with the result that a plurality of other "texts" is 
engendered. In Blanchot's recits, testimony problematizes 
narrative progression to such an extent that it renders 
narrative impossible.
In this chapter I will focus on Derrida's polyvocal 
texts to discuss how he radicalizes the question of 
citationality through what I will call the "conference" of 
his polylogues. These texts establish a new discourse which 
is neither fiction nor criticism yet stands as something of 
each, on the borderline between the two, functioning 
therefore like the hymen he describes in "La Double seance" 
and other texts. The conference he enacts to accomplish 
these polylogues results in an irrevocable rupture of 
boundaries. My use of the term "conference," as in the case 
of my other terms "hearsay" and "testimony," arises out of 
Jacques Derrida's work on citationality. Therefore, my
158
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analysis of Derrida's polyvocal texts is indebted to his 
concept of citationality. This chapter then marks a shift 
in my project from using Derrida's work on citationality to 
enable my analyses in the previous chapters to reading him 
as another object of analysis which renders him a 
practitioner of citationality in the same way as Duras and 
Blanchot.
Conference
In the legal sense of the term, conference refers to a 
formal meeting or colloquy invoked in order to address a 
matter of serious consequence. In juridical proceedings in 
the courtroom, a conference takes place secretly. Its 
purpose is to allow a meeting between the judge and lawyers 
to clarify technicalities of the law or the proceedings in 
progress. Additionally, the judge may use the forum of a 
conference to admonish lawyers. Occasionally, the judge may 
call a recess of the proceedings and summon the lawyers 
into his chambers to conduct a conference in secret. The 
closed doors obviously prevent the jury or others in the 
courtroom from being privy to what is discussed.
I choose to use this term of conference in my 
discussion of these texts because of what it suggests about 
the polyvocal and the way it accounts for how Derrida calls 
into question issues of authority, property and origin 
while deconstructing the boundaries that traditionally 
regulate them. Whereas a conference, in the conventional
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sense, subscribes to a certain set of rules governing its
procedure, Derrida uses the format of the conference to
deconstruct that very system. He effectuates this by
demonstrating that the conference, while subject to laws
regulating it, cannot indeed be contained by those laws.
The subject of the conference will always overrun or exceed
its parameters. Derrida's polylogues carry this out through
their exploitation of a plurality of voices.
The three polylogues I have chosen to discuss in this
chapter are "Restitutions," Feu la cendre and Droit de
regards. What I see as a practice of conference in these
texts developed out of various cases of "double session" in
other texts by Derrida, notably "La Double seance," Glas
and "Envois." The notion of a double session refers to a
writing informed by indecision and instability as denoted
by the hymen:
L'hymen, confusion entre le present et le non­
present, avec toutes les indifferences qu'elle 
commode entre toutes les series de 
contraires...produit un effet de milieu (milieu 
comme element enveloppant les deux termes a la 
fois: milieu se tenant entre les deux termes). 
Operation qui "a la fois" met la confusion 
"entre" les contraires et se tient "entre" les 
contraires. (La Dissemination, p. 261)
The "double seance" therefore is what functions in two
places at once; it is a writing that "opere en deux lieux
absolument differents, meme s'ils ne sont separes que d'un
voile, a la fois traverse et non traverse, entr'ouvert"
(ibid., p. 273). The "indecidabilite" invoked by the
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concept of the hymen comes into play in the three 
polylogues discussed in this chapter. Through a blurring of 
borders that delineate fiction from criticism, these texts 
situate themselves on that very boundary and in so doing 
play out the rule of the hymen. They are at once fictional 
texts and critical texts and yet they are neither one nor 
the other. While functioning in the sense of the hymen, 
these texts also call into question "conference."
"Restitutions"
An aspect of the secrecy surrounding a conference is 
that it allows only the participants themselves to be privy 
to each other's identity. If others, who are actually not 
part of the conference, heard the voices of the 
participants, they would not be able to restitute these 
voices to the people they see. Indeed, it is this 
undecidability which Derrida exploits in "Restitutions." 
This text comprises the final section of La. Verite en 
peinture, a title which cites Cezanne who promised: "Je 
vous dois la verite en peinture, et je vous la dirai."1 The 
performative nature of this utterance is explored by 
Derrida throughout the text, as he reveals the ultimate 
impossibility of fulfilling such a promise and successfully 
restituting a work of art. Cezanne's affirmation 
underscores Heidegger's assertion that art "lets truth 
originate" and "is the spring that leaps to the truth of 
beings in the work."2 Indeed, according to Heidegger, the
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very nature of truth is "aletheia" a "devoilement" or 
"unconcealment," an event where the truth is disclosed. In 
Is There Truth in Art?, Herman Rapaport describes the work 
of art according to Heidegger's principle of "aletheia." He 
writes, "...the work of art is not something to be 
pragmatically adjudicated in terms of fixed principles 
wherein its correspondence to the world is deemed true or 
false..."3 Therefore, the question turns on the 
(im)possibility of performing the act that Cezanne 
promised, on restituting the truth in painting. In order to 
accomplish his exploration of the problematic of 
restitution, Derrida orchestrates a "double session" in the 
form of a conference that questions this very concept, 
especially in its relation to issues of property and 
propriety.
Described in the note which opens the text, 
"Restitutions" is a polylogue "a n + 1 voix - feminine" (La 
Verite en peinture, p. 2 92). However, in spite of Derrida's 
attestation as to the number and gender of the speakers, 
the difficulty in determining how this is configured 
becomes immediately evident in the text.
The first voice of "Restitutions" commences the 
proceedings, which seem to have already begun, "Et 
pourtant" (p. 293). This first speaker decides that there 
should be more than two participants present for there to 
be a conference, "Mais il faudrait atteindre d'etre plus de
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deux pour commencer" (ibid.) . The second speaker agrees, 
"Pour appareiller plutot, et meme plus de trois," at which 
time the first speaker adds, "Les voila. Je commence..."
(ibid.).
Although this opening passage clearly indicates the 
participation of more than three speakers, there still 
remains a certain level of indeterminacy as to the exact 
number of participants. However, throughout La Verite en 
peinture there is a constant emphasis on the number four.
As Derrida writes in "Passe-partout," which functions as 
the introductory section, "J'ecris ici quatre fois autour 
de la peinture" (ibid., p. 14) addressing four different 
aspects relating to the question of truth in painting: 
"Parergon," "+ R (par dessus le marche)," "Cartouches" and 
"Restitutions." These four essays "autour de la peinture" 
frame the question of painting just as paintings themselves 
are framed on four sides. "Restitutions," as the fourth 
essay, weaves together the threads of the previous three in 
the form of a polylogue. The three ("n") find themselves 
supplemented by "1 voix, qui se trouve etre de femme"
(ibid., p. 15). Yet, as explained in "Passe-partout" each 
"se divise, par greffe et contamination de toutes les 
autres, et vous n'en aurez jamais fini de traduire" (ibid., 
p. 5) .
This doubling and contamination functions to such an 
extent in "Restitutions" that it is impossible to
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determine which of the voices is female. The following 
example chosen somewhat at random from the text fails to 
syntactically disclose the gender of the speaker(s) as a 
female: "Je suis pour le moment interesse a la 
correspondance entre Meyer Schapiro et Martin Heidegger" 
{ibid., p. 309). What we can ascertain from this example is 
that this particular speaker is definitely not the female 
voice of the group. "Je suis...interesse" reveals that the 
speaker in question is male since there is no feminine 
ending to indicate the "je" as female. In the case cited 
below, one speaker addresses the others, as clearly shown 
in the use of the direct object pronoun "vous" and the 
plural agreement: "Je vous vois choques, dans votre 
deference, par la scene" {ibid., p. 335). Once again, the 
presence of a female participant cannot be determined 
syntactically, since the agreement of "choques" with "vous" 
indicates simply a plurality of speakers. Yet another 
example of this type surfaces later in the text: "Vous 
paraissez aussi trop surs de ce que vous appelez interne" 
{ibid., p. 377). There also remains a question as to the 
exact number of conference participants, since there is the 
tardy arrival of another speaker, "J'arrive en retard. Je 
viens d'entendre..." {ibid., p. 333). While there is a 
tendency to assume that "'n' + 1" voices equals four, 
because of the predominance of that number in La Verite en 
peinture, there can still be no certainty as to the number
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peinture, there can still be no certainty as to the number 
of speakers.
Even if one of the excerpts cited above did indeed
disclose the gender of the speaker in question as female,
an uncertainty of gender would still exist throughout the
text for the very reason that the participants speak in no
clearly determined order. One loses very quickly any sense
of who is speaking any given time. In other words, it is
impossible to track any particular speaker.
In spite of those uncertainties, what does become
evident is that Derrida himself is one of the participants:
Pour ma part, j'ai souvent traite, en tous sens, 
de la marche et, c'est a peu pres le meme mot, le 
meme sens, de la marque et des Marges dont j'ai 
fait un titre. Pas meme en fut un autre. Ai-je 
alors parle des pieds? J'en suis pas sur...(p.
301)
Obviously the "je" in question must be Derrida, the 
author/signatory of both Marges and Pas. This raises the 
question as to the identity of the other participants. It 
is quite possible given the evidence in "Restitutions" that 
Derrida has actually engaged in a discussion with himself 
or even "revenants" that have haunted his own readings of 
Heidegger and Schapiro. Since the text deals with the 
attempt to place the owner of the empty shoes of Van Gogh's 
paintings back into those very shoes, Derrida views the 
shoes as haunted by ghosts ("revenants") that persist in 
returning, in coming back ("revenir") . The opening passage 
in fact attests to this haunting, "Or nous avons bien la
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une histoire de fantoraes" (ibid., p. 293). Just as Derrida 
refers to Heidegger's projection of a peasant owner into 
the shoes as his hallucination or fantasy, Derrida perhaps 
projects his other voices, including a feminine one, into 
the polylogue.
In any case, what is readily apparent in 
"Restitutions" is the fact that Derrida effects a 
deconstruction of the logic of restituting works of art. 
Having already established that "Restitutions" is a 
conference in which the restitution of the speakers' voices 
is rendered impossible, I will summarize how the topic of 
that discussion, that of restituting the work of art,
involves a reading of "The Origin of the Work of Art, " by
philosopher Martin Heidegger and "Still Life as a Personal 
Object" by art historian Meyer Schapiro. Both of these 
essays address a series of paintings of shoes by Van Gogh
and seem to take as their object the restitution of these
painted shoes.
"Restitutions" invokes therefore a double session 
between the Schapiro and Heidegger texts and indeed, in so 
doing, establishes a mise-en-abime of the text; that is, a 
conference of an indeterminate number of speakers set on a 
"dialogue" (to which Heidegger never agreed and in which he 
never took part) of a painting of shoes considered first as 
real shoes outside of the painting, then, as objects in the
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painting and finally, as the painting itself, in their 
truth as painting.
This "effet de milieu" produced by the hymen comes 
into play in "Restitutions" through or as the figure of the 
shoes in Van Gogh's painting. Moreover, as Herman Rapaport 
elucidates, the hymen, while marking the difference between 
difference and non-difference, effaces it at the same time. 
Rapaport contends that the shoes function as the hymen and 
themselves stage a double session insofar as they are a 
pair, although perhaps not matching, and thus are 
inherently divided, split, double and so forth (Is There 
Truth in Art?, pp. 99-100).
By taking the figure of the shoes as the hymen,
Derrida allows them to demonstrate how Heidegger's and 
Schapiro's claims about the painting fall prey to issues of 
indecidability, itself a function of the hymen. In fact, 
their essays are based, after all, on a "celebre tableau de 
Van Gogh" which Heidegger never identifies and which 
remains unidentifiable for Schapiro, since there were a 
series of such paintings of peasant shoes. The fact that 
Heidegger did not name or identify which painting in 
particular is the "famous painting of Van Gogh" renders 
impossible the attempt to ascertain to which one he 
referred. Needless to say, Schapiro reproaches Heidegger 
for not naming and specifying it. As a result, Schapiro 
commences a movement to recall or to restitute the real
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shoes, a movement which carries him beyond the frame of the
painting of shoes:
They are clearly pictures of the artist's own 
shoes, net the shoes of a peasant... Later in 
Arles he represented, as he wrote in a letter of 
August 1888 to his brother "une paire de vieux 
souliers," which are evidently his own...4
t
Derrida adds that Schapiro is thus "tire hors du tableau, 
ce qui suppose un trou dans la toile" ("Restitutions," p.
305) .
This "trou dans la toile," through which both
Heidegger and Schapiro pass in their quest to re-attach the
shoes of the Van Gogh painting to the "real feet" of a
"real" proprietor, obviously raises questions of borders
and framing as addressed in "Restitutions." Indeed, it is
the parergonal structure of Derrida's text that provides
the textual space for the playing out of the double session
of the shoes. In La Verite de la peinture, Derrida writes:
Un parergon vient contre, a cote et en plus de 
1'ergon, du travail fait, du fait, de l'oeuvre 
mais il ne tombe pas a cote, il touche et 
coopere, depuis un certain dehors, au-dedans de 
1'operation. Ni simplement dehors ni simplement 
dedans. Comme un accessoire qu'on est oblige 
d'accueillir au bord, a bord. {Ibid., p. 61)
As the border, as that which is presumed to delimit the
interior, the text, from its exterior, from that which is
not considered a part of it, the parergon is simultaneously
interior and exterior to the text. Certainly, the parergon
is not limited to the concept of the frame and Derrida
ascertains this by citing, after Kant, the example of a
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statue upon which clothing is placed such that the statue, 
or ergon, relates to the parergon, or clothing, by means of 
the idea of an accessory. In other words, one can consider 
the clothing as non-essential, as something at once part of 
the statue and not. The accessory nature of the parergon 
underscores its detachability from both the ergon and its 
"milieu."
As for the Van Gogh painting presumably in question,
the parergon takes the form of both the frame and
shoe(lace) and disrupts any potentially fixed demarcation
between interior and exterior:
Et l'externe ne reste jamais dehors. Il y va ici 
d'une decision quant au cadre, a ce qui separe 
1'interne de l'externe, par une bordure elle-meme 
double en son trait et ajointant ce qu'elle 
partage. II y va de tous les interets engages 
dans le proces de ce partage. La logique du 
parergon ici a 1'oeuvre ote a cet egard toute 
securite. D'autant plus que le parergon a peut- 
etre ici la forme de ce lacet (dedans-dehors) a 
moitie defait dans le tableau, il figure aussi le 
rapport du tableau a son dehors. Le tableau est 
pris dans le lacet qu'il semble pourtant 
comprendre comrae sa partie. (Ibid., pp. 377-78)
The partially undone lace represents the "trou dans la
toile," mentioned above, which allows access to the outside
of the painting by leading Heidegger and Schapiro to
formulate opinions as to the shoes' proprietor. Moreover,
Heidegger's attribution is "not essential - thus
detachable. Schapiro contends Heidegger has ignored mimesis
- not real shoes in the painting," explains Rapaport (Is
There Truth in Art?, p. 138). In fact the lace weaves in
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and out of the eyelets, emerging exterior to the shoe only 
to disappear as it passes under the leather of the shoe, 
and by extension behind the canvas. For Rapaport, the shoes 
carry out a double session that "deconstructs the 
difference of inferiority (what is proper or attachable to 
the shoes) and exteriority (what is merely outside, or 
detachable from the shoes)" {ibid., p. 160) .
The effects of the double session become even more 
apparent as "Restitutions" calls into question both 
Heidegger's and Schapiro's blind assumptions regarding the 
proprietorship of the shoes and their desire to name, to 
re-attach and restitute the shoes to a real subject, 
thereby returning them to their source of origin and 
detaching them from their painted form. Derrida discloses 
an elemental assumption made by both Schapiro and Heidegger 
which enables them to consider the rightful owner of the 
shoes. The fact that they have no doubt that the two shoes 
depicted by Van Gogh automatically form a pair is crucial 
to their pursuit of the shoes' proprietor and makes Derrida 
wonder whether "Schapiro et Heidegger ne se hatent pas de 
faire la paire pour se rassurer" despite the 
phenomenological impossibility of discerning whether the 
shoes actually constitute a pair {ibid., p. 302). This in 
turn opens the detached, empty shoes to a sort of haunting 
by their subject-owner and forces one to ask, "s'il s'agit
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de savoir quel pas de revenant, citadin ou paysan, vient
encore les hanter" (ibid., p. 295) .
Described in "Restitutions" as a "pathetic fantasmic"
attribution of the shoes in the painting to a peasant
woman, Heidegger's essay reveals this so-called
"hallucinogenic" projection of a pair of peasant shoes on
to a peasant woman immediately subsequent to a peculiar
break in the progression of "The Origin of the Work of
Art;" that of: "And yet -" (p. 163) :
From the dark of opening of the worn insides of 
shoes the toilsome tread of the worker stares 
forth. In the stiffly rugged heaviness of shoes 
there is accumulated tenacity of her slow trudge 
through the far-spreading and ever-uniform 
furrows of the field swept by a raw wind. On the 
leather lie the dampness and richness of the 
soil. (Ibid.)
This passage expresses essentially the apparent refusal on 
the part of Heidegger to entertain the detachment of the 
shoes from their owner. His inability to accept the shoes 
as they are, that is, as painted objects, results in the 
projection of the peasant woman into the painting and into 
the shoes. The detachment of the shoes from their owner, as 
evidence in "Restitutions" demonstrates, can be considered 
doubled because it involves the shoes removed not only from 
the feet of a presumed subject-wearer, but also from 
reality -- they are but painted objects or a representation 
of shoes. Yet Heidegger appears driven to concoct and 
reconstitute the story behind the shoes and their alleged
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owner -- a peasant woman -- an assertion for which Schapiro 
reproaches him.
Schapiro himself falls prey to the same trap by making 
his own assumptions concerning the proprietor of the shoes. 
Proclaiming Heidegger's belief that the shoes are a peasant 
woman's to be a case of error and false testimony, he moves 
forward with his assertion that the shoes in the painting 
are actually those of the artist himself. This allegation 
prompts Derrida to inquire, "Que fait-on quand on attribue 
des chaussures (reelles) au signataire presume d'une 
peinture dont on presume qu'elle represente ces memes 
chaussures?" (p. 3 03).
Another aspect of the Heidegger-Schapiro essays 
brought to light during the conference and revealing a lack 
of decidability is the question of gender, in that both the 
subject-owner and the shoes are doubled as masculine and 
feminine. They are neither one nor the other but are 
figured as bisexual. This doubling of sex occurs on several 
levels. First, regarding the subject-owner of the shoes, in 
that Heidegger unwittingly designates the wearer of the 
real shoes outside of the painting initially as masculine, 
or, at the very least, he accords an indeterminate gender 
to the owner ("une paire de chaussures de paysan"). Second, 
Heidegger later transforms, without warning, the sex of the 
proprietor from male to female, to "la paysanne." Within 
his own discourse there operates a certain indeterminacy
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that, as the conference participants note, Schapiro never
addresses, ignoring instead this doubling of gender in "The
Origin of the Work of Art." Third, there is, of course, no
question for Schapiro as to the gender of the shoes' owner;
he insists that they are not only the shoes of a man, but a
city dweller, Van Gogh himself.
Apart from the difference of opinion over the shoes'
owner, an indeterminacy of gender also emerges with respect
to the notion of fetishism evoked by the shoes and is
another instance of doubling of gender in the conference.
Derrida indeed wonders whether they themselves can be
attributed to a particular sex, whether there exists:
une equivalence symbolique entre le pretendu 
'symbole' 'chaussure' et tel ou tel organe 
genital ou si seule une syntaxe differentielle et 
idiomatique pouvait arreter la bisexualite, lui 
conferer telle valeur entrainante ou dominante, 
etc. (p. 349)
As explained by Derrida, the form of the shoe corresponds 
at once to both the male and female genitalia, "allonges, 
solides ou fermes sur une surface, creux ou concaves de 
1'autre" (p. 307). This parergonal quality of the shoe's 
form, where sex, among other things, is doubled, promotes 
an indeterminacy that haunts the polylogue. Indeed, the 
double session staged through the figure of the shoes 
allows Derrida to carry out his critique of the concept of 
restitution. In fact, his insistence on the "n + 1 voix" 
formula to structure "Restitutions" plays on an 
indeterminacy evident in any conference. By demonstrating
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the difficulty of attributing, or restituting, the voices, 
disembodied from their "owners," Derrida deconstructs the 
logic of restitution. The voices participating in this 
conference on the shoes of Van Gogh's paintings in the end 
remain disembodied, and like the shoes, unable to be 
restituted. The pluralization of voices used to invoke a 
conference opens the text to allow the dissemination of 
doubling. This doubling is obviously set in abime since it 
involves pairs of shoes (owned by Van Gogh or a peasant 
woman) doubled by the pair formed by Heidegger and 
Schapiro. These pairs are pluralized (doubled again) by the 
already doubled (fourth) essay of "Restitutions" which 
pluralizes its own voices. This essay of course commences 
as already split or double with two initial speakers 
waiting for the arrival of others.
As we have seen in "Restitutions," both Heidegger and 
Schapiro propose to unveil truth. Yet their essays unveil 
the fact that the restitution or re-attachment of shoes to 
their owner, to their source or origin, is impossible. What 
Derrida reveals in this text is the, "Deconstruction of the 
difference between what frames and what is framed, with the 
result that the painting by Van Gogh becomes an abyssal 
mimetology...of frames upon/within frames" (Is There Truth 
in Art?, p. 23). He accomplishes this because the polylogue 
or conference that constitutes "Restitutions" mimics the 
Heidegger-Schapiro "dialogue" and places it within the
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abyss it forms by framing again the painting(s) of Van
Gogh.
Feu la cendre 
Feu la cendre is comprised of a polylogue of an 
indeterminate number of voices on the right-hand pages, 
offset by "Animadversiones," which runs intermittently 
throughout the text on the facing left-hand pages. Meaning 
"observations" or "assessments," "Animadversiones" 
additionally recalls the now defunct journal Anima in which 
Derrida first published his polylogue treating the concept 
of ashes or cinders. In Feu la cendre the "Animadversiones" 
are indeed a gathering of citations apropos of cinders 
taken from other texts by Derrida such as Glas, La Carte 
postale and La Dissemination. In addition, although there 
is no direct reference made to it, this text alludes to 
Telepathie. Schibboleth, a text published in homage to Paul 
Celan in 1986 was not yet published when Feu la cendre 
appeared, but that text also addresses cinders, "il y a la 
cendre, peut-etre, mais une cendre n'est pas."5
By placing the "Animadversiones" on the facing pages 
of the polylogue, Derrida demonstrates the disseminative 
quality of cinders as trace. For Ned Lukacher, the text's 
English translator, this construction of Feu la cendre 
"destabilizes the genealogical inquiry into antecedents and 
consequences in the very act of posing it. When did the 
gathering of cinders begin?" (p. 7). In other words, by
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grafting these citations on the facing pages from the 
polylogue, Derrida underscores the impossibility of being 
able to determine which part preceded and gave rise to the 
other, the "Animadversiones" or the polylogue. Such a 
textual graft, where two discourses are bound side by side, 
establish reverberations which Jonathan Culler compares to 
a tympanum which both divides and acts as a sounding board 
creating vibrations between the two texts (On 
Deconstruction, p. 136). This construction, as Lukacher 
explains, belies what questions the text seems to be 
addressing, those concerning the origin.
A special 1987 edition of Feu la cendre included an 
audio cassette recording by Derrida and Carole Bouquet 
vocalizing the written text. As Derrida cautions in his 
prologue, the recording of one male voice and one female 
voice does not imply that this text is a duet. In an effort 
to emphasize the irreducibility of Feu la cendre to a one- 
on-one conversation, the recording ("gramaphonie") makes 
reference periodically to "une autre voix," itself a voice 
possibly present during the proceedings and quite possibly 
the silent voice of the other. Therefore rather than 
reducing the number of voices, the nuances of the recording 
allow a multiplicity of voices to be engendered. Yet, even 
allowing for the plurivocality, there is always a call for 
another voice.
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While the recording is of a male and a female voice, 
the written text contains other grammar-based gender 
markers that remain inaudible in the recording. Such 
markers are writing-based so that they become imperceptible 
when the text is vocalized. An example is found in the 
sentence, "J'en suis presque sure," where there is 
agreement between the subject "je" and the adjective 
modifying it, "sure" (p. 35). The addition of the "e" to 
belie the feminine gender of the speaker does not affect 
pronunciation in any way, although it is visually marked. 
Such a strategy allows Derrida to further problematize the 
relationship of speech to writing. As he states in the 
prologue to Feu la cendre, the inaudibility of written 
gender markers "aggrave une certaine indecision entre 
I'ecriture et la voix," an indecision which is already in 
place in the phrase "il y a la cendre" since "la" must be 
considered both with and without the legible but inaudible 
accent mark (p. 8 ).
In the text itself the citations gathered for this 
project attest to the long-term haunting to which Derrida 
has been subjected by the phrase "Il y a la cendre," upon 
his text focuses. For Derrida, "la cendre" provides the 
means for him to discuss his conception of the trace. In 
Schibboleth, for example, he even writes, "Trace ou 
cendre," suggesting the effectiveness of "cendre" in 
portraying the breadth of meanings he attributes to "trace"
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(Schibboleth, p. 67). One must therefore be careful here to 
not limit a consideration of the trace to the word 
"cendre," for this word is by no means the only one which 
allows access to a conceptualization of Derrida's notion of 
the trace. However, it can be said that, "cendre," as 
disclosed in this text, best approaches an understanding of 
the trace.
Lukacher explains in his introduction to the English
translation of Feu la. cendre:
Cinder is at once the best name for the absence 
of a truly proper name for that which holds all 
beings and entities in presence, and by the same 
token just another name that cannot begin to 
assess its distance or proximity to the final 
proper name (or names) of the truth of Being, 
whose very existence remains undecidable. (p. l)
Cinders therefore offer Derrida a paradigm for the trace, 
which, he writes, "n'est pas, comme certains l'ont 
cru,...la piste de chasse, le frayage, le sillon dans le 
sable, le sillage dans la mer...mais la cendre" (p. 27).
If the cinder allows for an understanding of trace, 
then the conference Derrida employs in Feu la cendre plays 
out the nuances of the cinder as trace by problematizing 
questions of origin. This stems from the cinder's post­
incineration status.
In fact, as that which remains after the burning, the 
remains of the remainder, the cinder raises numerous 
questions related to origin and proper name, difference, 
the holocaust and mourning as well as their dissemination
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and citation. The cinder as trace marks absence in such a 
way that it is a "reste de ce qui n'est pas, pour ne 
rappeler au fond friable d'elle que non-etre ou impr£sence" 
(p. 23) . This effacement, where the trace marks, erases 
itself only to re-inscribe itself: "... voila une matiere - 
visible mais lisible a peine - qui ne renvoyant qu'a elle- 
m§me ne fait plus trace, a moins qu'elle ne trace qu'en 
perdant la trace qu'elle reste a peine" (p. 27).
Unlike smoke which also remains after fire, after the 
burning, as its by-product, ultimately dissipating, the 
cinder is not completely dispersed. Instead, the cinder 
remains as a material that can be touched and frittered 
away. In its post-pyrification fragility, the cinder is 
infinitely divisible. Each cinder can fall away and thus 
yield to numerous other cinders and resultingly become the 
cinder of its cinders. This disseminative incineration 
serves to prevent the return to the cinder; it in fact 
defers any access to it. This is much the same as the 
conference itself, which is composed of a plurality of 
voices that can neither be traced throughout the conference 
nor restituted to their bodies, their point of origin.
Of course, the distinction must be made between the 
word "ash" and "cinder" in English. As the translator of 
Feu la cendre, Lukacher chooses the word "cinder" which he 
describes as a "very fragile entity that falls to dust;
[yet], cinders also name the resilience and intractability
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of what is most delicate and most vulnerable" (Cinders, p.
2). Cinders smolder; they can still be burning and
therefore evoke Derrida's notion of "restance."
The word "cinder" is even a cinder of the cinder
itself, for this common name cannot grant access to the
proper name ("Cinder," the Other, the Being) hidden within
it. This deferral holds implications for any attempt at
gaining access to the proper name whose locus we would
presume to be at the origin of language itself:
Je comprends que la cendre n'est rien qui soit au 
monde, rien qui reste comme un etant. Elle est 
l'etre, plutot, qu'il y a - c'est un nom de 
l'etre qu'il y a la mais qui, se donnant, n'est 
rien, reste au-dela de tout ce qui est, reste 
imprononqable pour rendre possible le dire alors 
qu'il n'est rien. (p. 57)
The cinder then signals the possibility of language without
being able to name the conditions that allow it. According
to Lukacher, it names therefore neither truth nor its
impossibility. He writes:
Because we do not know whether or not there is a 
final proper name of Being, we will always hear a 
residual, silent promise of the name. (Cinders, 
p. 7)
The smoldering cinders that are the name/trace of the 
proper name are always there; yet the naming of that proper 
name is impossible. The conference functions similarly in 
that the voices participating cannot be named; they remain 
necessarily disembodied.
In De 1'esprit: Heidegger et la. question, Derrida 
elucidates on that text's relation to Feu la cendre by
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discussing the primordial beginning of language. He 
accomplishes this by reading Heidegger's "On the Way to 
Language," in which Heidegger refers to the spirit as a 
flame that glows and shines.6 Additionally, Heidegger makes 
reference to the delicacy of the relation between language 
and truth. His concept of "Ereignis" is described by 
Lukacher as a "double movement in which language is incised 
by the withdrawal of the unnameable otherness of its origin 
and is thereby set into its own proper nature" (Cinders, p. 
2). This anticipates Derrida's notion of the cinder as a 
trace that effaces itself as it makes itself present. In 
the polylogue, this occurs on the level of the participants 
in the conference. At times, a particular voice, the female 
voice, for example, makes itself recognizable through the 
gender markers of written language. Yet, the instant this 
voice becomes "present," it becomes lost again.
Corresponding to the undecidability of which voice is 
speaking when is the question of origin. Again, we find 
that the matters discussed in the conference are played out 
by the very (citational) act of the conference itself. For 
example, in Feu la cendre Derrida makes allusion to Hegel's 
notion of "Klang" as found in Hegel's Philosophy of Nature. 
For Hegel, the "Klang" is a ringing noise at the origin of 
language itself. In Derrida's terms, a cinder burns at the 
origin between speech and Klang. Before it enters 
meaningfulness, "il y a la cendre" is initially a ringing
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 8 2
sound, similar to glas. This almost pre-linguistic sound 
reverberates like the "unnameable otherness" discussed by 
Heidegger and located at the origin.
The "difference" that is the "beginning" of language 
takes place in Feu la cendre by means of the word "la" as 
it functions in the sentence "II y a la cendre." Throughout 
the text, there is an oscillation operating within this 
word. At times read and considered without the accent mark 
as the definite feminine article "la cendre," "the cinder," 
it suggests equally the word "there" or "la" when the 
"accent grave" is in place. Lukacher suggests that it 
inscribes the trace of something beyond itself that remains 
always inaccessible. As such, it is what is there and is 
not. It makes itself present only to withdraw again. Double 
and divided, "la" operates as this silent undecidability. 
The format of the conference functions in much the same 
manner and the fact that the topic of the conference 
focuses on the phrase "il y a la cendre" sets the entire 
project in abime while simultaneously deconstructing the 
ontological concepts related to it.
The phrase "Il y a" functions in a manner similar to 
"Es gibt" in German since both phrases carry the meaning of 
the "there-ness" of the being as a type of presence. The 
English formulation of the phrase "il y a," "there is/are," 
is misleading since it has the sense of the verb "to be." 
This shifts the emphasis from the "there-ness" to "being"
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as in the essence of the entity- In the sentence "Il y a la 
cendre," for example, the (non-)being of cinders remains 
indeterminate and indeterminable.
The question of origin resurfaces in Feu la cendre 
through the problematization of the word
"s'androgynocident," which is played out in the conference 
with the undecidability of origin and gender. In his essay 
"La Pharmacie de Platon," Derrida regards the back room as 
the site of origin, prior to the emergence of difference 
and oppositions like speech and language as well as gender
difference.7 This is the place where the cinders
"s'androgynocident," a neologism of Derrida's that combines 
the French words for androgynous and genocide and whose 
oral form evokes the word "cendre." This neologism emerges
from the verb "s'andrent," which carries the same
pronunciation as "cendres" and suggests the primordial pre- 
differentiation of gender. The verb "s'androgynocident" 
denotes as well genocide as in the Holocaust, where all 
burns and only cinders remain. In Feu la cendre, the 
cinders are the citations of the conference and they remain 
severed from their origin. Once irrecovably detached and 
grafted in a new context, that of Feu la cendre, they take 
on another meaning and function differently. Because they 
are now what remains, yet also what differs, they cannot be 
restituted or re-attached to their various sources.
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Another way in which the conference problematizes the 
question of origin is through its insistence on the 
undecidability of the very word precipitating the 
conference itself: "cendre." Although the feminine "la 
cendre" plays an important role in Feu la cendre, the 
gender of "cendre" remains indeterminate. This stems from 
the conference participants' vacillation between "la" and 
"la." The reference to "la Cendre" as "Cendrillon" 
("Cinderella") of the fairy tale recalls the passage in 
which Cinderella is covered in ashes and mocked by her 
stepsisters. Yet the instability of what is "there" or what 
is present at any given moment propels the movement away 
from "la" to "la" which effaces the gender, the "she" of 
"la cendre."
In addition to the conference disclosing the "cinder" 
as female at times and as the trace of what remains 
subsequent to the fire which burned at the origin, the 
speakers also address, or are addressed by citations, other 
voices, gathered in the "Animadversiones," taken from "La 
Pharmacie de Platon" as twice published in Tel Quel and La 
Dissemination. In the version of the essay from Tel Quel, 
Derrida writes, "Aussitot que tu auras lu et relu cette 
lettre, brule-la."8 However, the version that appeared in 
La Dissemination, contains the phrase "il y a la cendre" 
appearing immediately after the imperative "Brule-la." It 
reads as follows: "Vite, un double...graphite...carbone...
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relu cette lettre...brule-la. II y a la cendre" (La
Dissemination, p. 213). In terms of the letter, or "envoi,"
the message cannot reach its destination without being
burned, without already being a trace or cinders.
Referred to as the "mission impossible" a veiled
reference to the television program where an audiotape
self-destructs, reduced to cinders in a puff of smoke, the
following phrase stands for the cinder of "toutes nos
etymologies perdues." This cinder "ne dit pas ce qu'elle
est mais ce qu'elle fut" (p. 19). The passe simple verb
form "fut" is quite similar to "fut" the imparfait form of
the subjunctive of the verb "to be." The emphasis placed on
the word "fut," meaning "departed" in the sense of "passed
away," holds interesting implications for this particular
text, in that cinders are what remain after the burning,
the fire. Signifying what was once, or what is now dearly
departed, "fut" suggests mourning following the holocaust:
...discretement ecartee, la dissemination phrase 
ainsi en cinq mots ce qui pour le feu se destine 
a la dispersion sans retour, la pyrification de 
qui ne reste pas et ne revient a personne. (p.
23)
The discussion on the holocaust in fact occupies the 
majority of the "Animadversiones." For Derrida, as Lukacher 
explains, the holocaust, or "brule-tout," is "entirely 
other, non-present and outside the theorizable limits of 
ontology, leaving only the cinder traces of an absolute 
nonmemory" (p. 13).
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What destabilizes the text as the conference on 
(access to) the origin of language, of holocaust, of gender 
difference is the insistence on the conference format 
itself with its indeterminate voices and its play between 
oral and written connotations inherent in the phrase "il y 
a la cendre." The conference that constitutes Feu la cendre 
explores the deconstruction of ontological questions raised 
by the undecidability of that phrase.
Stitching together the citations or cinders, which 
function themselves as voices in the conference, from La 
Carte postale, La Dissemination and Glas on the left-hand 
pages and the voices in conference on the right-hand pages, 
Derrida demonstrates that each cinder can always generate, 
or fritter away into, more cinders. Yet, in spite of the 
disseminative quality of cinders, the access to the origin 
of those cinders, in their pre-incineration state cannot be 
gained or achieved. Whereas "Restitutions" demonstrated 
through its conference the ultimate failure of the 
performance of presenting the truth, Feu la cendre 
similarly discloses the inability of accessing the Other, 
of naming the name at the origin.
Droit de regards
The third of the polylogues I will discuss is 
Droit de regards, a text found to pose questions relating 
to the visual in a similar manner to "Restitutions."
However, instead of addressing the question of restituting
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the shoes of Van Gogh's painting to their "rightful" owner, 
Derrida here provides the written text, in the form of a 
conference, to accompany a photo-essay by Belgian 
photographer Marie-Frangoise Plissart. Her "photo-roman" is 
in fact a series of black and white photos capturing 
various episodes in the personal lives of several 
"characters." Plissart's text of photos leaves its story 
open to interpretation and waiting to be constructed, even, 
by those who dare to "regard" it in the same way as the 
photographer.
In Droit de regards, Derrida's conference is appended 
to the "roman-photo" and was released with it in the same 
book under the same title thereby immediately raising 
questions of the parergonal that are also played out within 
the "roman-photo." As appendix or accessory to the photos, 
Derrida's text problematizes the way it informs a reading 
of the photos. This is carried out through the effects the 
polylogue has on them. Droit de regards is less a viewing, 
or looking, of this photography in terms of voyeurism, than 
it is a reading and a questioning of the laws that 
determine what such a reading entails, "Au lieu du 
spectacle, les voila qui instituent un lecteur ou une 
lectrice, et au lieu du voyeurisme l'exegese" (p. v).
Initially what is at stake in Droit de regards is the 
question of "genre" as in the double connotation of both 
"genre" and "gender." In terms of genre, or rather the
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attribution of the text(s) to the genre "proper" to
it/them, Droit de regards escapes any clear cut
delineation, teetering instead on the borderline between
various genres. The subheading "roman-photo" indicates, for
example, the impossibility of categorizing the photos,
which are neither a novel nor merely photographs. Not
unlike a "nouveau roman, 11 the work lacks a progressive
linear form as one would find in conventional narrative
forms. Yet, because it does present a grouping of photos
with recurring characters, indicative, therefore, of
narrative elements, the photos must be viewed as something
more than "just" photography.
For this reason, Derrida insists on the "generique"
elements of the photos. Related to the word "genre," forms
of which these photos exceed, "generique" refers to the
written text ("credits") that is an appendix to, say, a
film, but more importantly to the generating aspects
inherent in the photo-text. In this sense, "generique" is
the way in which this series of photos continually
generates new and divergent narrative threads:
Il nous a semble qu'il n'y avait, dans cette 
centaine de pages, que des generiques, une suite 
de generiques dans lesquels on passe comme d'une 
piece a 1'autre. Les photographies generatrices, 
l'une incluse dans 1 'autre, sont a la fois plus 
grandes et plus petites que toute leur suite, (p. 
ii)
These narrative threads reveal a playing out of gender 
issues, in what Derrida calls "une partie de dames." For,
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of the eight characters photographed, all but one are 
female. Yet, problems associated with (in)determinacy arise 
here as a translation issue, since the French word for the 
game piece, "une dame" is the equivalent of "King" in 
English. The translation of the term "dame" as "king" in 
English, therefore, finds the question of decidability 
always in suspense between itself and gender and itself and 
language. This play of sexual difference evidenced in 
Derrida's metaphorical usage of the game terms "partie de 
dames" and "dame" is not limited, however, to a simple 
question of gender difference in translation.
The indeterminacy of gender is best exemplified in the 
figure of the "she-male" who appears midway through the 
"roman-photo." Attired in black with a shaved head and 
angular facial features, this (wo)man is masculinized to 
such an extent that, from a distance, her gender is in 
question. It is perhaps not without coincidence that she is 
the character who wields the pen as a writing subject and 
remains detached and objective in the narrative series 
constituting the photos.
Since Derrida reads the photos in terms of a boardgame 
and the characters in those photos as "dames," this allows 
his consideration not only of gender but also of spacing or 
movement reflecting the indeterminacy and fluidity of the 
photo series. The issues of genre and gender are in fact 
indeterminate and perhaps indeterminable, because they
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hinge on a certain mobility, or play, which impedes the 
designation of fixed meaning. Indeed, the ever-shifting 
positions, sexual, authorial and otherwise, serve to call 
into question genre, in the sense of gender as well as in 
the sense of literary genre.
In addition to the mobility of verbal play in the 
text, there is also a mobility of the images or the visual. 
In fact, the positions that shift usually involve the 
sexual positions of the female lovers photographed placed 
on top of one another and then lying next to one another.
The shifts evident in the ever-changing physical 
positioning of the photographed subjects, occur also with 
authorial voice which remains indeterminate both in the 
"roman-photo" and in Derrida's conference. Throughout the 
text(s) the constant re-positioning of subjectivity and 
voice reveals disunity as an effect of the play in 
Plissart's and Derrida's work. In the "roman-photo," for 
example, the shifts in photographic subject echo the shifts 
in photographer, displaying a multiple subjective 
perspective. At times, the various photographers are 
themselves folded into the series of photographs making it 
obvious that there is an indeterminate number of shooting 
subjects. In fact, several shots reveal different female 
characters holding cameras and shooting various other 
characters, placing "en abime" Plissart's work as 
photographer and destabilizing her own authority as unified
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subject controlling all the shots. Of course, the 
photographing characters are photographed simultaneously by 
other photographers whose identity remains undisclosed.
Such a technique, or a maneuvering, on the part of Plissart 
gives the impression that the reader encounters the 
narrative from the perspective of any number of character- 
subj ects.
Derrida, of course, employs much the same technique in 
his contribution. A conference, after all, is the assembly 
of persons for a meeting or discussion on a particular 
topic and necessarily entails an exchange where a 
multiplicity of voices comes into play. In Droit de 
regards, the number of voices participating in the 
discussion is never specified; indeed, the shifts from "tu" 
to "vous" deny any such determination, as the following 
passage indicates, "Vous ne saurez jamais, toi non plus, 
toutes les histoires, ni meme en totalite l'une seulement 
des histoires que je me suis encore racontees" (p. iii).
Although there is an indeterminate number of 
participants in the conference, there is definitely at 
times the ability to determine the gender of some of those 
speakers. Syntactically, this is revealed several times 
during the text in phrases such as, "Je te vois pensive et 
aussi indecise" (p. iv) where there is agreement made with 
adjectives indicative of a female participant.
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In spite of the designation of gender, which I was
unable to determine in "Restitutions," Droit de regards
functions in much the same way as the other texts by
preventing a clear understanding of who is speaking when.
It is impossible to track the order in which the conference
participants speak. Occasionally, gender identification
becomes possible, as in the example cited above; yet, the
instant it comes into focus, it is lost again.
The above-described shifts between narrative voices
and perspectives in the photo-text and in Derrida's
parergonal text underscore an explicit resistance to
determining "one" story; there are a plurality of stories
that perpetually slip in and out of focus. This lack of
univocity reinforces the notion that "il y a des recits
impossibles, illisibles ou interdits...tout cela n'est pas
racontable" (p. iii).
In "Deposition" David Wills reads such remarks
regarding forbidden texts as a commentary on the state of
reading in general at a time when certain texts and genres
are taboo and off-limits:
...there is a profound modification in respect of 
reading, the politics of reading, reading as a 
political act...Right of Inspection questions the 
logic of a written text in apposition to a 
photographic text, it questions that logic in 
terms of the law, or institutional restraint. It 
seeks therefore to perform "looking" as, and to 
transform "looking" into, a type of reading.9
Carried out only through the discourse of the polylogue,
this text undertakes a deconstruction of the law of
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looking. As Derrida writes, "tu es libre mais il y a des 
regies. II y a la loi qui assigne le droit de regard, tu 
dois observer ces regies qui a leur tour te surveillent"
(p. ii). This law grants one the right to look; it allows 
a certain level of freedom, of mobility, as on the game 
board, but it still attempts to regulate that movement, a 
regulation which this text calls into question. Derrida 
explains:
On ne peut que lire. Je repete, il n'y a que du 
regard et du droit de regard dans cette oeuvre, 
mais comme tout y fait la guerre en vue du droit, 
on n'y releve que des lignes de demarcation, des 
marques, des limites, des bordures, et des traces 
de debordement. (p. ix)
Just as the photo series itself questions the law of genre,
which would regulate and clearly demarcate the status of
what one reads/sees, the conference, as an accessory,
parergonal to the photo series, raises similar questions.
The indeterminacy informing the conference results in a
plurality of perspectives that can be read with or without
the photo text.
Conclusion
Derrida's polylogues, "Restitutions," Feu la cendre 
and Droit de regards offer an approach to the question of 
citationality that differs from that of both Duras and 
Blanchot. Previously I have used Derrida's work on 
citationality to read Duras and Blanchot in terms of 
hearsay and testimony, respectively. In this chapter I have 
conducted a reading of Derrida as an object of my analysis.
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This maneuver folds Derrida into my practice of 
citationality and makes his work part of that practice and 
not just a means of access to it.
What I have found through my reading of Derrida's 
polylogues is the insistence on conference as means of 
problematizing issues of borders, origin and genre. As a 
conventionally oral mode of communication, conference, in 
the juridical sense, subscribes to certain regulatory 
codes. Derrida's texts reveal the deconstruction of these 
codes and boundaries with an emphasis on the undecidability 
of a plurality of ever-pluralizing voices.
With citationality, in general, there is always the 
potential to break the conventions that govern how a 
conference is conducted and the regulations that limit its 
content and function. In terms of conference, therefore, 
there exists a certain level of undecidability that impedes 
interpretation and restitution. One of the citational 
effects we have seen in this chapter is the mise-en-abime 
of conference topics without any means of accessing what 
would be considered to be the origin.
In "Restitutions," for example, we saw the conference 
as a means of demonstrating the impossibility of 
restituting, of delivering the truth in a work of art.
Feu la cendre with its double conference taking place on 
facing pages of the text problematizes the question of 
origin as the vacillation between the left-hand pages and
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the right-hand pages underscores the inability to determine 
which conference precedes the other. This reflects the 
indeterminacy in the phrase around which the text centers, 
"Il y a la cendre." Finally, the "photo-roman" Droit de 
regards uses conference to play with genre in such a way as 
to render the gender of the characters and the genre of the 
text(s) itself as blurred.
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CHAPTER FIVE
BEARING WITNESS: CULTURAL SITES OF CITATIONALITY
Introduction
The previous chapters have focused exclusively on a 
discussion of the implications of citationality as found in 
the texts of Duras, Blanchot and Derrida. I have examined 
citationality as a condition of the law of iterability, 
according to which there exists the potential inherent in 
any sign to cite and to be cited, to overrun the borders 
which appear to contain it and to come to function in a 
plurality of new contexts.
This potential for a sign to break from its "present" 
context and to be re-cited in a new one holds particular 
implications for the so-called performative utterance, 
which is a speech act that performs the act of what is 
uttered. To accomplish this, the performative subscribes to 
certain conventions and codes which regulate its use. 
However, as Derrida has shown, iterability enables any 
utterance to be detached from its source or origin, thereby 
irrevocably severing it. Furthermore, Derrida has 
demonstrated the condition of potential failure for any 
performative utterance.
This principle of iterability, from which 
citationality stems, raises important questions, which I 
have addressed in the previous chapters. Among these 
questions are certainly those related to origin, since
196
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citational effects are such that the origin, especially in 
the sense of the originary event, always already escapes 
accessibility. With the means of access severed, there 
remains the infinite dissemination of its traces, as 
citations, or even as cinders, as previously seen, in a 
movement that attempts the recuperation of the origin or 
originary event.
Another element called into question by the function 
of citationality is that of property. This relates to the 
signatory of an utterance, or the so-called "proprietor" of 
an utterance. In terms of performative speech acts, the 
signatory or proprietor enters into what can be considered 
a contractual agreement, committing him/her-self to act in 
good faith and fulfill the promise of the performative.
Owing to its disseminative character, citationality 
produces effects that result in the crossing of borders as 
well. In general, this involves a movement from the private 
sphere to the public sphere instigated by the enactment of 
bearing witness, of disclosing a secret.
These questions relating to origin, property and 
borders between private and public have been raised 
throughout my discussion of hearsay, testimony and 
conference and have been shown to problematize the texts 
which insist on these citational modes. These fundamental 
issues have become pertinent in other contexts, 
particularly the political and cultural realms, where there
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has been, in recent times, what can be considered a 
"crisis" of citationality.
I attribute this crisis to changes in what constitutes 
the private and the public. The status of the private has 
been altered by the advent of the internet and the 
proliferation of media. Related to the blurring of 
boundaries between private and public spheres is the 
increased secularization of "confession." This 
traditionally religious act of bearing witness is no longer 
confined to the private disclosure of a testimony to a 
priest. Instead, confessional acts have moved out of the 
church and into the secular, public domain as evidenced by 
certain television programs. Another possible explanation 
of the citation crisis involves the altered status of the 
printed text. This change stems directly from rapid 
advances in technology, particularly in video and 
telecommunications. These examples are but a few of the 
possible explanations contributing to what I view as a 
general crisis in citation. These changes, in the private 
and public spheres, confession and the printed text, raise 
the very questions about citationality that I have already 
addressed in this project. Therefore, the relevance of 
questions stemming from citational practices such as 
hearsay, testimony and conference and the increasing crisis 
related to the status of citation in other textual forms 
explicates the shift this chapter makes to discuss
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citationality in the broader context of cultural studies. 
This shift allows the exploration of politically and 
sociologically pertinent "texts" in terms of my project.
Textual forms I will discuss in this chapter include 
Latin American testimonio, Holocaust survivors' 
testimonies, President Clinton's impeachment and television 
talk shows. To begin, I will consider the Latin American 
tradition of testimonio. Since it quotes the idea of 
testimony but its function and purposes differ in important 
respects from the work of Maurice Blanchot, I feel 
compelled to devote some attention to this "genre" 
considered unique to Latin American studies. I will also 
address the highly politicized debate this genre has 
provoked in the United States over multicultural studies. 
After discussing testimonio, I will explore the rise in 
interest in another manifestation of testimony, that of 
Holocaust survivors. The rise in interest in documenting 
survivors' testimonies has been enabled by technological 
advances which have engendered such projects as Yale 
University's Video Archives for Holocaust Survivors and 
paradoxically, have allowed what I consider a 
personalization of testimonies, in that the videotape 
attributes a face to the testimony.
Next, I will turn to the Clinton and Lewinsky scandal. 
The investigation and impeachment trial elicited a double 
confession from Clinton, in addition to the differing
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testimonies, and thus "truths," by him and Lewinsky. 
Independent counsel Kenneth Starr's investigation raised 
questions of truth and perjury indispensable in any 
consideration of acts of bearing witness. This allows us to 
investigate citationality as a political and legal 
practice.
After discussing the Clinton matter, I will turn to 
talk shows, a phenomenon that has exploded in popularity 
and interest over the last decade. Questions of bearing 
witness are particularly evident in this context since what 
is at stake with regard to television talk shows is not 
only citational effects such as border-crossing between the 
public and private, but also the doubling of witness and 
event. As I will discuss, talk shows operate, in effect, as 
explicit citations of juridical proceedings, granting 
authenticity and credibility to the show. Yet, implied 
claims of credibility are called into question with 
allegations of collective perjury on the part of these 
shows and their producers.
Before proceeding to the examination of these cultural 
and political instances involving acts of bearing witness,
I will review the principles associated with the 
performative utterance since they bear heavily on questions 
of iterability and citationality. In what David Wills 
describes as the signatory utterance, the performative 
utterance deals with the universal human acts of
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witnessing, promising and relating experiences of faith.1 
The performative's relation to witnessing stems from its 
definition as an utterance which produces meaning through 
the carrying out, or enactment, of what it states. It is 
according to Judith Butler a "coincidence of signifying and 
enacting" ("Burning Acts: Injurious Speech," p. 150). The 
utterance gains meaning, in other words, when it coincides 
with the performance of a ritualized act, such as the words 
"I do" spoken during a wedding ceremony or "I hereby 
declare..." to officially launch a ship while smashing a 
bottle of champagne over it.
Austin, of course, was either unable to or unsure of 
how to treat cases which did not conform to his model and 
therefore sought to exclude such cases with the aim of 
"temporarily" eliminating potential problems. Admittedly, 
he did qualify this exclusion as provisional or temporary, 
but that does not however compensate for this maneuver. 
Furthermore, Austin's description of these cases as 
"parasitical" and "etoliations" of the normal or standard 
use of language is equally problematic.
In my first chapter, I traced Derrida's line of 
argument as seen primarily in "Signature Evenement 
Contexte" and "Limited Inc a b c..." where he refutes 
Austin's and Searle's claims of the "deviant" nature of the 
examples of performative utterance and the necessity of 
eliminating them from discussion.
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To briefly summarize, Derrida reads such cases of 
parasitical discourse not as exceptions to the rule of 
performative but rather as necessary possibilities that 
hold true for any and all performatives, as possibilities 
that constitute the rule. If such a plethora of "non- 
serious" and "parasitical" utterances is possible, then 
these cases should not, and moreover, cannot be dismissed 
as aberrations delimited from so-called serious uses of 
language. As Derrida contends, (the) failure, parasiting 
and non-serious are but instances of what is possible for 
any utterance and mark. In fact, he insists that this 
condition of possibility is inscribed in each and every 
mark and is the condition of iterability or citationality 
of language in general.
This law of iterability informs the performative in 
ways other than the exclusion of certain types of 
utterance. Indeed, one of the reasons adduced by Austin in 
delimiting the category of the non-serious is the misuse or 
misfire of otherwise "legitimate" performatives, meaning 
the carrying out of the performative in bad faith, with 
poor or questionable intentions. As discussed earlier, 
Austin's requirement that both speaker and receiver impart 
purely good intentions in the enactment of the performative 
presupposes a determinacy as well as the ability of 
interlocutors to be fully present throughout the 
performance of the performative. Additionally, these
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stipulations institute a set of boundaries that seek to 
limit each performative in such a way as to prohibit its 
citation. Yet, interestingly enough, each case of a 
performative is already the citation of another, because 
its obeys pre-established conventions that regulate its 
enactment. Therefore, the putative singularity of the 
occurrence of the performative is actually but the citation 
of another performative, itself a citation. The iterable 
structure of performatives must be recognized. Just as each 
instance of a performative is the citation of a preceding 
one, each performative, in fact, every sign, is subject to 
being iterated or cited. As stated previously, any mark can 
be subjected to a disseminative process, whereby it can be 
lifted, or stolen, and carried into a different context to 
function in a different manner. Once grafted into a new 
context, the mark has been repeated and altered. This 
condition of possibility enables the breaching and 
broaching of borders supposed to separate contexts. Whereas 
Austin's conception of the performative maintains a 
delineation between felicitous and non-felicitous 
utterances based in part on the fully present and involved 
interlocutors acting in good faith, iterability or 
citationality recognizes the possibility of dissemination 
and graft that resists closure by borders. If we accept 
these principles of citationality, we can then view various 
cases of performative, such as witnessing and promising, in
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those terms. This in turn provides the space for my 
addressing questions related to the boundaries between the 
public and private and truth and falsehood. As I mentioned 
earlier in this chapter, these questions have become 
increasingly important in recent times, as evidenced by the 
proliferation of cases of bearing witness and testimony.
Generally, acts of witnessing involve the attempt to 
gain access to the truth, to the originary event. The fact 
that witnesses in the American courtroom must swear on the 
Bible to "tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but 
the truth" shows quite clearly that the desire for the 
revelation of the truth serves as the impetus for bearing 
witness. In the chapter on Maurice Blanchot, I have 
explained that the law requires that the witness be present 
in the courtroom to testify. Bearing witness is normally 
conducted live, in the first-person, as if the "presence" 
of the witness to the truth ensures its veracity, an idea 
that can be traced back to Aristotle's privileging of 
speech for its proximity to the soul and, therefore, to the 
"word," or logos, the "truth" in its purest possible state.
Since the witness is present during the proceedings 
and delivers testimony live and in his/her own voice, 
witnessing is generally considered a moment of truth that 
is pure and unmediated. Such an act presumably offers the 
most direct access to the truth that is conceivable 
without external influence or technological intervention.
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Taking this desire for a lack of technological influence in 
conventional matters of testimony into consideration, it is 
all the more pertinent that the increased contemporary 
interest in acts of bearing witness is occurring in a 
highly mediated context.
Although the reasons for the proliferation of acts of 
bearing witness are not necessarily clear or 
distinguishable, one possibility is the incredibly rapid 
technologization of society in recent years. Obviously, the 
result of these advances in technology is an increased 
reliance on automation which produces a reduction in the 
amount of contact and interaction with other human beings. 
One example is found in the evolution in banking procedures 
in the last decade that have placed an increased reliance 
on technology coinciding with the reduction in direct 
contact with bank employees. Other examples include the 
automation of telecommunications and the explosion of on­
line markets. Although these technological advances 
facilitate business operations, they minimize interaction 
with others.
In addition to reducing human contact, technological 
advances also serve to produce a general sense of anxiety 
or mistrust for what is received or accomplished 
electronically. For example, there exists a general 
suspicion about the use of automatic teller machines for 
making deposits.
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I view this minimized contact, produced by a greater 
reliance on automation and technology and the accompanying 
general anxiety regarding that reliance as an enabling 
condition for our renewed interest in pure moments of 
bearing witness, where we presume to have access to the 
truth devoid of mediation. Yet, paradoxically, this 
interest in "pre-technological" moments that characterize 
acts of witnessing is actualized, or fulfilled, precisely 
because of technology. This in turn generates even more 
interest in such testimonies since its mediatisation grants 
greater and seemingly more direct access to them. President 
Clinton's depositions and impeachment trial, for example, 
were aired live on national television. Talk shows, 
obviously, enable the presentation of nearly daily acts of 
witnessing through the use of technology that broadcasts 
these moments nationwide. Holocaust survivors' testimonies 
are recorded on videocassette in an effort to document 
their stories before no survivors remain. The indigenous 
Latin Americans who supply their testimonio through a 
journalist or anthropologist benefit from the technology 
that enables their work's dissemination to the policy 
makers in the United States, in particular, where pressure 
can be applied to effect change in their native countries.
Latin American Testimonio 
Testimonio emerged as a recognizable literary form in 
the sixties, a period defined by movements of national
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liberation and armed struggles against oppression in Latin 
America. In general terms, the testimonio is a bearing 
witness, a first-person narrative differing from 
autobiography and other citational forms owing to its 
explicit politicization. As representative of a particular 
group or class with certain political or ideological 
concerns to be advanced, the witness stands as one of many, 
a singular instance of a plural. Singular in that any one 
witness, as we have explored in the chapter on Maurice 
Blanchot, is irreplaceable and not interchangeable; no one 
else can occupy the place of any particular witness except 
the witness in question. Plural, or universal, in the sense 
that, as far as testimonio is concerned, the witness 
becomes the voice of the numerous oppressed and 
disenfranchised of the witness's community who have been 
denied a voice, who do not and cannot speak. Paradoxically, 
however, once the witness is empowered with speech s/he in 
a sense loses status as the subaltern or other, which 
necessitated the urgent struggle to find a voice, and 
enters the sphere of the privileged. In In Other Worlds, 
Gayatri Spivak has argued that the subaltern cannot speak.2 
For illustrative purposes, let us take the case of Richard 
Rodriguez whose well-received autobiography Hunger of 
Memory, recounts the education and assimilation of a 
Mexican-American born into the working-class immigrant 
section of Sacramento. His ascent to the middle class
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involves the mastery of English and the anglicization of 
his name from Ricardo Rodriguez. In Spivak's 
conceptualization of the term subaltern, Rodriguez is no 
longer to be considered as such. His transformation, his 
anglicization, enables him to speak but not from the place 
of the other.
Yet, testimonio does enable a vocalization of the 
plight of the oppressed in Latin America. Textual 
production of such acts of witnessing involves a movement 
into the "literary." In fact, the Cuban publishing house, 
Casa de las Americas, accorded formal status to the 
testimonio as a bona fide literary genre with its award, 
beginning in 1970, of an annual prize in this category. 
Obviously, testimonio is not directed to members of the 
group to which the witness belongs, since these people, as 
impoverished and marginalized, constitute the greatest 
percentage of illiterates in Latin America. According to 
John Beverley in Against Literature, the literary, as 
understood in terms of high culture, epitomizes the 
European and colonial ideologies and remains inaccessible 
to the majority of indigenous people.3
Testimonio like other citational forms of narrative, 
is by no means a genre born out of a vacuum. Beverley 
reveals that testimonio grew out of a rich tradition of 
first-person and documentary type writings. He cites, for 
example, colonial era "cronicas," war diaries, nationalist
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essays, etc., as testimonial-type texts that provided the 
ground work for the emergence of testimonio. Indeed, 
Beverley claims that all Latin American writing occurring 
post-Conquest is testimonial (Against Literature, p. 19).
For him, the legal connotation carried in the word 
testimonio is essential so that it maintains a distinction 
from oral history (ibid.). Testimonio implies, therefore, a 
certain veracity given to the account as if the witness 
narrator were under oath to divulge the truth as in the 
courtroom or in the sense of religious acts of confession, 
or bearing witness. Because it lacks this connotation, oral 
history allows for a less rigorous insistence on accuracy, 
truth and authenticity.
With the recognition of testimonio as a literary 
genre, and its resulting dissemination beyond regional and 
international borders, it is obvious that testimonio, an 
act of bearing witness to the suffering of the misaligned 
group, serves to advance their socio-political cause. 
Through this dissemination emerging out of technological 
advances in communication, testimonio is received in the 
First World countries where its readers are in a position 
to apply pressure on their leaders and various humanitarian 
organizations to effectuate foreign policy changes that 
would ameliorate the oppressed's situation.
Such is the case of the most well-known testimonio of 
Rigoberta Menchu, first published in 1977 and subsequently
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translated and released in English as I, Rigoberta Menchu. 
Menchu bears witness to the atrocities inflicted upon her 
and her community in Guatemala. As a Mayan Indian of the 
western Quiche highlands of Guatemala, Menchu is a member 
of the indigenous population that remains cut off 
ethnically, culturally and linguistically from the so- 
called "ladinos," or fair-skinned, Spanish speaking Latin 
Americans of European descent who maintain political and 
economic power in the region.
Menchu's testimonio was told to Elisabeth Burgos- 
Debray, an anthropologist who invited Menchu to meet with 
her in Paris so she could record her story. Burgos' 
introduction to the text stands as her testimony to the 
testimony she received from Menchu. In this introduction, 
Burgos bears witness, in effect, to her work with Menchu 
and to the bond forged between them during the week Menchu 
spent with her. She also discusses her role as editor of 
the transcript. This job involved grouping various segments 
of the interviews by theme and then placing them in 
individual chapters. During this project, Burgos decided to 
delete her questions and comments so that the testimonio 
would read as a monologue, giving the illusion of no 
outside interference or mediation in Menchu's story. In 
addition, Burgos acknowledged making corrections to 
Menchu's speech since Menchu still had not acquired an 
advanced level of proficiency in Spanish, the language in
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which they worked. She writes that it "would have been 
artificial to leave them uncorrected and it would have made 
Rigoberta look 'picturesque'. . . "4
It is precisely Burgos' role as editor that 
problematizes the question of testimonio in general.
Indeed, according to Craft in Novels of Testimony and 
Resistance from Central America, the level of intervention 
on the part of the editor becomes a serious concern as the 
potential exists for "cvercorrection" of the testimony, 
which would result in the overpowering mark of the 
interlocutor on the project.5 The fact that the witness, as 
a marginalized and often illiterate party, must rely on a 
journalist or anthropologist, a member of the educated 
elite, as an interlocutor poses certain problems. Critics 
such as Elzbieta Sklodowska have called into question the 
mediation that enables testimony to take place. In the case 
of Burgos and Menchu, for example, the editing undertaken 
by Burgos to make the testimony publishable threatens the 
integrity of the text and raises the question of exactly 
how much of the text is really Menchu and how much is 
Burgos.6 Doris Sommer, however, views the mediation in 
terms of a solidarity and complicity between recorder and 
witness. According to Sommer, the mediation results in a 
destabilization of the roles of oppressor, as recorder, and 
witness, as oppressed, rather than a reaffirmation of the 
boundaries between the two.7
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It is my contention that such boundaries are called 
into question through the recording of testimonio by 
another party. The author-ity of the witness is 
destabilized, especially in the case of Menchu because of 
the extensive editing on the part of Burgos. What is at 
stake in this case is the issue of property and 
proprietorship, one of the effects produced by such a 
practice of citation, a structural issue that obtains in 
any utterance, but that comes into explicit focus in the 
case of testimonio.
While there are questions as to the intervention of 
the editor-recorder and its potential to alter the 
witness's testimonio, questions have also arisen regarding 
the truthfulness and accuracy of the witness's story. As we 
will see, these concerns have played out in the United 
States as a conservative attack on multicultural studies 
where Rigoberta Menchu's text seems to have sparked the 
debate.
In Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, 
Psychoanalysis and History, Dori Laub relates her 
experience as one of several interviewers for the Video 
Archive for Holocaust Testimony at Yale. She recalls a 
session with a woman bearing witness to her incarceration 
in Auschwitz. During the interview, the woman recalled her 
work at the camp as well as the Auschwitz uprising. 
Subsequent to her testimony, a fellow interviewer, a
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historian, called into question her account of the uprising 
because of the incompleteness of her knowledge of the 
event. The historian saw these limitations as inaccuracies, 
as perhaps an indication of a lack of veracity of her 
alleged experiences at Auschwitz. For Laub, however, these 
limits simply demonstrate that an eyewitness, any witness, 
cannot have a totalizing experience and certainly not 
achieve a totalizing testimony to that event.8 Instead of 
questioning the witness's authenticity, Laub respects the 
limits of knowledge, stating that they do not detract from 
the importance or significance of what the witness is 
saying.
A similar question of validity has arisen in the case 
of Rigoberta Menchu. David Stoll, an anthropologist at 
Middlebury College, has released the findings of his 
research in and around the Quiche Highlands where Menchu 
has spent much of her life. According to Stoll, Menchu's 
life-testimony is replete with historical inaccuracies and 
grave exaggerations of the hardships and tragedies she and 
her family were said to have suffered at the hands of the 
"ladinos" and the Guatemalan Army.9 Menchu's account, for 
example, of the torture and burning death of her brother 
along with other prisoners in the town square of Chajul may 
not be historically accurate. Stoll claims to have 
interviewed inhabitants of that town who say that was never 
any such public torture death there. Stoll also disputes
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Menchu's descriptions of her childhood working on the 
"finku," or plantations. His research indicates that Menchu 
was perhaps a bit more privileged than others and actually 
spent her childhood at a Catholic boarding school, 
receiving thereby an 8th grade education and never setting 
foot on a "finku" {ibid.).
Stoll apparently has quite a few critics who see his 
work as a right-wing attempt to discredit Menchu and thus 
silence her and her supporters working to gain justice from 
the Guatemalan Army and the "ladinos." In addition to 
discrediting Menchu, Stoll and his supporters are placing 
multicultural studies in jeopardy, since their claims of 
perjury in her case result in a movement against the use of 
such "political" texts in the classroom. Menchu's accounts 
of army atrocities against the impoverished and indigenous 
people of Guatemala are seen as indispensable to the 
movement seeking to rid Guatemala of such abuses of power 
and human rights violations.
David Levine, a political science professor at the 
University of Michigan finds it alarming that scholars are 
willing to overlook untruths and inaccuracies when it comes 
to a figure like Rigoberta Menchu. His concern is in 
response to Stoll's critics who claim that regardless of 
his research findings, regardless of alleged problems with 
her testimony, they will continue to vaunt the importance 
of her work and they will persist in using it in the
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classroom where it has gained the status as the epitome of 
its genre as testimonio (ibid. , p. A16) .
This situation echoes that mentioned earlier involving 
the Auschwitz survivor whose lack of complete story and 
details led one interviewer to call into question her 
entire testimony. In the case of Menchu, the discrepancies 
between historical fact and her account of these events 
have also jeopardized her presumed authority as witness and 
have led some, notably Stoll, to discredit the entirety of 
her work. Others, like Allen Carey-Webb, of Western 
Michigan University, remind Menchu's critics of the 
importance of realizing that even if there are 
discrepancies, even if the murder of her brother did not 
occur as she claims, the indisputable fact is that the 
Guatemalan Army did murder people like her brother and the 
indigenes have been oppressed (ibid.). Being able to speak, 
to bear witness to these hardships is crucial in provoking 
change and the importance of granting the marginalized a 
voice cannot be disputed, so rarely are they able to speak. 
What has become clear from the polemic based on questions 
regarding the veracity of Menchu's testimony is that those 
of the opposing positions inhabit the same space of 
testimony which is at once truth and fiction.
To conclude, I will state that advances in 
telecommunications have opened a political discourse on 
testimonio by allowing such texts to be disseminated beyond
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the borders of Latin America into industrialized first- 
world countries. This dissemination, generated by 
technological advances, stimulated by a general desire for 
pre-technological, non-mediated instances of bearing 
witness. Yet, in the case of Latin American testimonials, 
the witnesses act of bearing witness is highly mediated.
The fact that these indigenous, oppressed people testify to 
the intellectual elite of first-world countries raises 
questions regarding the author-ity and proper-ty of these 
testimonios.
These issues notwithstanding, the citation of 
testimonio in this country has sparked a highly politicized 
debate on the status of multicultural studies. Although the 
ramifications of conservative movements to discredit the 
testimonios of indigenous Americans such as Menchu have not 
yet been determined, it can be said that the practice of 
testimonio and its citation in the United States has 
allowed the voice of these people to finally be heard.
Holocaust Survivors' Testimonies
As we have already seen in the previous section, the 
increased demand for pure acts of bearing witness is in 
partial response to the increasingly mediatised age in 
which we live. The paradox, of course, is that this 
interest in accessing acts of bearing witness thrives 
because of that same increased mediatisation which allows 
for a rapid dissemination of testimonies while collapsing
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borders between the private and public spheres. One of the 
functions of bearing witness is to make sense out of a 
traumatic event suffered by the witness. The Holocaust 
stands as the traumatic event that defies its eventhood, an 
event, in the words of Dori Laub, without witnesses.
In "Truth and Testimony: The Process and the 
Struggle," in Trauma: Explorations in Memory, Laub calls 
the Holocaust the event that produced no witnesses for a 
couple of reasons. First, the extermination of its victims 
left literally few witnesses. The Holocaust sought to 
eliminate any potential witnesses through the execution of 
Hitler's plan. Those who did manage to survive in the 
concentration camps had undergone such dehumanizing 
psychological trauma that their capacity to bear witness to 
what they had lived through and experienced was severely 
reduced. Witnesses, however, do exist among the survivors 
of the Holocaust. Some critics even consider those who did 
not survive the concentration camps as witnesses too.
Indeed, the testimonies they left in the form of 
concentration camp diaries, poetry and art attest to their 
desire to bear witness by leaving a record of what they 
were experiencing even as they were dying.10
That experience, that event, is presumably tidily 
summarized in the word "holocaust." Yet, even the use of 
the Greek word "holocaust," meaning "burnt ashes," seems 
quite inadequate to express the horrors it constituted.
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Decades later, we are still struggling in our attempt both 
to come to terms with what transpired and to represent it. 
This has led to a movement, especially in recent years, of 
bearing witness, of testifying to the horrors of the 
Holocaust in an effort to speak that which remains 
unspeakable and which can never be fully represented.
The purposes served by bearing witness to various 
aspects of the Holocaust are multiple. First, the catharsis 
stimulated by witnessing carries with it a distinct 
therapeutic value. Dori Laub writes that it offers a way 
for the witness to begin healing, since most survivors were 
initially left unable to speak, still reeling from the 
trauma they underwent at the hands of the Nazis (Testimony: 
Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis and 
History, p. 131) .
The psychological scars were so severe that many 
survivors repressed memories of the Holocaust and did not 
even speak to their families of their experiences for years 
following the end of World War II. Instead, they began to 
strive for some semblance of normalcy and acted as if none 
of those horrors had ever taken place. Dori Laub recounts 
her work with one survivor in particular whose family had 
never heard him speak at all about that period of his life.
Once a survivor regains access to these experiences, 
bearing witness commences and for some it never ceases. 
Primo Levi, for example, whose Survival at Auschwitz is one
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of the best known testimonies of the Holocaust, devoted the 
rest of his life to testifying about his experience as a 
Holocaust survivor.11 His writings, both fictional and non- 
fictional, treat various aspects of the Holocaust and as 
such allowed Levi the opportunity to work out on paper a 
sort of survivor's therapy. In a therapeutic sense, 
therefore, testifying enables the survivor to attempt to 
come to terms with the significance of the experience.
Because the Holocaust is unfathomable, bearing witness 
also serves to reaffirm what was experienced. It renders 
the Holocaust, which seems so unimaginable and so far 
removed from reality, real. Testifying concretizes the 
lived experience of the survivors, which in numerous cases 
had been repressed. As Dori Laub has remarked, one of the 
greatest fears of survivors is that nobody will believe 
them and their testimony, that history will not accept 
their claims and allegations of their trauma. As one 
survivor stated, she felt the need to survive, to live one 
day more than Hitler so she could tell her story ("-Truth 
and Testimony: The Process and the Struggle," in Trauma: 
Explorations in Memory, p. 67). Just as surviving enables 
one to testify, so too does testifying enable one to 
survive.
The very real fear common to all of the victims was 
that there would be no survivors and that, if there were 
survivors, they would not be heard or listened to. This can
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be seen as a result of the dehumanization to which the Jews 
were subjected. As we have seen in the previous section on 
the Latin American testimonio, bearing witness is an act of 
empowerment since it grants a voice to witnesses who, as 
members of a defined community, have been marginalized and 
oppressed, to the point of genocide in the case of Jews, at 
the hands of those maintaining a position of power over 
them. The methodical extermination program instituted by 
the Third Reich commenced with the dehumanization of those 
marked as members of inferior communities. This was 
accomplished first by cutting off contact and communication 
with those on the outside, thereby eliminating the 
necessary interlocutors required for witnessing to take 
place.
So silenced, the victims of the Holocaust became 
dehumanized; having lost their voice and, having been 
denied the right to speak, the survivors emerged from the 
concentration camps believing they have no right to possess 
a voice. They felt they were not worthy to speak or to be 
listened to. The incomprehensible structure of the event 
that silenced its victims through genocide and through the 
removal of their voices produced, in this sense, no 
witnesses, as Laub has stated (Testimony: Crises of 
Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis and History.). The 
Holocaust extinguished the possibility of address, of 
communication. The reduction to silence persisted following
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the liberation of the camps for the previously mentioned
reasons.
Laub's research has revealed that survivors feel they 
belong to a secret community, membership of which hinges on 
possession of a secret that can never be divulged. They 
feel they are sworn to silence. The reasons for this 
feeling can be attributed first to the magnitude of the 
trauma inflicted upon the survivors on whom the earlier 
mentioned sense of unworthiness to speak bears heavily.
Along with this is the additional feeling that those 
outside of the event would not believe them. Furthermore, 
even if the so-called outsiders were to believe and to 
accept their stories, survivors feel no one could ever know 
the "real" truth. Because the scope of the Holocaust is so 
far-reaching, so incredibly traumatic, no one individual 
account could ever fully explain what really happened. For 
this reason, the Holocaust defies its eventhood and escapes 
reality.
There can never be, therefore, any totalizing 
testimony which could subsume the event. Although documents 
and other historical records exist, the knowing, as Laub 
describes it, is born during witnessing (ibid.) . Yet, this 
knowing can never be totalizing. It is constituted only by 
the accumulation of singular instances provided by each 
survivor-witness. In fact, the survivor testimonies 
comprise the main record of what took place at the hand of
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the Nazis. These testimonies, made possible when the 
survivor regains access to his/her voice, allow the 
repossession of the act of witnessing through which the 
event crystallizes and comes into existence. The re­
presentation of the event by the witness brings the event 
to the real, according reality to it not only for the 
outsiders but also for the survivors themselves, as Dori 
Laub asserts in her work with such survivors (ibid.) .
This function of bearing witness belongs to what can 
be considered the more "affirmative" side of iterability. 
Because of iterability, in fact, witnessing is able to keep 
the past alive, by bringing it into the reality of the 
present. Testimony, as previously discussed, involves the 
attempt to re-present the event or lived experience, an act 
which makes it much more than just restituting the past. If 
it were simply a matter of reminiscing or restituting, the 
event-experience would remain anchored in the past with the 
potential to be forgotten. Through iterability, the 
previously present moment of the witness (in the past) is 
re-presented and ensures that it will always be remembered 
and that the survivors will always live on. While keeping 
the past alive, witnessing as a function of citationality 
also allows the witnesses to reconcile themselves to their 
trauma, which is therapeutically significant.
In fact, the therapeutic significance of witnessing 
for these survivors is indisputable. Their repossession of
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voice and the act of witnessing itself has been made 
possible by the growing movement to document their 
testimonies. As stated earlier, I attribute this increasing 
interest in recording these acts of testimony by Holocaust 
survivors to an impossible attempt and a collective need, 
to process and fully represent this event defying its 
eventhood. The extreme privacy that is the singularity of 
each witness' experience moves into the public sphere with 
the enactment of testimony. In the case of the Yale Video 
Archive for Holocaust survivors, this border crossing from 
the private to the public is highly mediatised. The 
witnesses testify on camera before a panel of interviewers, 
including historians, psychologists and anthropologists.
The videotaping, a public, mediatised disclosure of 
testimony, paradoxically marks what I view as a movement to 
the personal. I have explained how technological advances 
have provoked a change in the status of the printed text, 
allowing its more rapid circulation, but perhaps more 
importantly, allowing other media, such as videotaping, to 
supersede its usage. This is precisely the case with the 
Yale project. It is my contention that the preference for 
video documentation of the testimonies underscores the 
interest in the return to the "purely" personal non­
mediated act of bearing witness. Unlike the printed text in 
which the testimony is detached in numerous ways from the 
witness, the video text reinstates the connection between
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story and witness, thereby providing the illusion of a 
truly personal testimony. The video assigns a face to the 
witnessing which serves to (re-)personalize the already 
intensely personal testimony. The Video Archive brings into 
focus again the paradox of every testimony which stems from 
its iterable function. Once uttered, testimony becomes 
technologized; this is because iterability, or 
repeatability, involves a certain automation which allows 
for the repetition or citation of the utterance. Yet, with 
the increased movement to a pre-technological, pure moment 
of personal testimony, there is a multiplication of the 
effects of technology, as in the case of the Yale project.
Clinton and Lewinsky: Truth and Testimony
The technological advances that have facilitated the 
Yale project have played an important role in other 
contexts, most notably that of the Clinton impeachment.
The case of President Clinton's trial raised the very 
questions that my project has addressed in the preceding 
chapters on Duras and Blanchot in particular. In fact, the 
reliance on hearsay and testimony as functions of 
citationality in the narratives of those writers has been 
played out in the contemporary political and public spheres 
related to the Clinton and Lewinsky scandal.
If we recall, the hearsay and testimony that inform 
the Duras and Blanchot fictions emerge out of an 
overwhelming movement in favor of accessing the truth. In
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Duras' Lol V. Stein cycle, for example, the attempt to re­
present the event which generates the texts remains just 
that: an attempt to access the origin, the truth of Lol's 
ravishing. The impossibility of achieving access results, 
as we have seen, in the propagation of hearsay which 
circulates beyond the limits of Le Ravissement de Lol V. 
Stein, engendering a plurality of other texts.
The Blanchot recits focus on the attempt to achieve 
testimony, or first-person disclosure of the event 
witnessed. Like the Duras cycle of texts, the recits 
purport to re-present the event, by doubling the presence 
of the witness. However, the originary event, or moment of 
the witness, cannot be re-presented. With the two moments, 
event and testimony, severed from one another, the recits 
become the events themselves. Obviously, the Duras and 
Blanchot texts demonstrate the problematization of bearing 
witness, of telling or re-presenting the whole truth 
thought to lie "beyond performance," beyond the act of 
bearing witness.
These problematic realities of bearing witness -- 
doubling of presence, collapse of boundaries between 
private and public, etc. -- have been staged in the very 
public and political context of the Clinton trial. As 
stated previously, this case functions not unlike the cases 
of Duras and Blanchot which are marked by the movement to 
access the originary event, or the truth, deemed to lie
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beyond the "present" act of witnessing. In the Clinton 
case, of course, the plurality of overwhelmingly mediatized 
citational acts, or re-tellings, attempting to access the 
originary event are problematized by that very event 
thought to be at the origin. The problematic of the origin 
or source of the Clinton affair stems from questions of the 
private sphere as well as questions of what constitutes 
sexual relations. The event at the heart of the trial -- 
sexual contact between Clinton and Monica Lewinsky, 
normally a private activity with relatively insignificant 
implications beyond the closed doors which presumably 
contain it -- fails to correspond accordingly to the degree 
and level of public and political attention it generated.
With the relative insignificance of their private and 
personal activities inaccessible, the array of its 
mediations -- congressional hearings, depositions, 
testimonies and the impeachment trial -- became the event 
itself, as in Elanchot's recits. Since iterability involves 
a technologization, it is, in effect, an automated 
repetition functioning beyond the control of the law and 
exceeding boundaries, especially those between the public 
and private.
In the Clinton case, the private became the public to 
such a degree that Clinton even opted to offer a national 
confession to the American people in which he proceeded to 
apologize and ask for forgiveness, despite the fact that
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confessions normally are carried out in secret and are 
thought to be pure, pre-mediatized moments of witnessing.
As explained previously, there is recently an increased 
movement in favor of such pre-technological moments of 
bearing witness with the paradox being that such moments 
are already technological and mediatized. Morevover, 
Clinton's confession was purely "mediatic," aired directly 
on national television.
Although any act of witnessing involves a 
transgression from the private to the public and a certain 
degree of mediatization, the borders that would normally 
delineate the two spheres is overrun; and, once the 
borderline is overrun, control or containment of the 
information becomes impossible. Here, in the case of a 
public figure such as President Clinton, the movement from 
private to public becomes extreme and the debate over the 
private lives of public officials renewed. Interestingly, 
Clinton's aides conducted polls of Americans in order to 
determine how politically threatening the scandal would be 
for Clinton. Repeatedly, these polls revealed that the 
public is much more willing to forgive adultery than 
perjury. This can be attributed in part to the fact that 
adultery is a private act whereas perjury is by nature a 
public commission, having already been situated in the 
public sphere of the courtroom.
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Another aspect related to the question of public and 
private that surfaced during the Clinton impeachment was 
the level of public access to the legal proceedings. Not 
only did the testimony become public within the courtroom, 
the traditional setting for such acts of witnessing, but it 
also took place live on national television, overrunning 
even the presumed boundaries of the courtroom. The 
increasing mediatization of society, considered with the 
general blurring of boundaries between the private and 
public (especially public figures) results not only in a 
greater interest in acts of bearing witness, but also in 
the increased access to such events. As seen in the example 
of Clinton's confession, such acts rely on technology and 
always involve a certain mediatization, even when they are 
thought to be devoid of media.
In addition to calling into question the boundaries 
delineating the private and public spheres, the problematic 
of the original event in the Clinton case involves the 
definition of "sexual relations." The indeterminacy of this 
definition obfuscated an understanding of what it was 
exactly that occurred between Clinton and Lewinsky.
In fact, much deliberation ensued during Clinton's 
1998 deposition in the Paula Jones sexual harassment case 
over an acceptable definition of the phrase "sexual 
relations." The judge in the case ultimately ruled that 
"sexual relations" signified that the person deposed
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engages in or causes sexual contact with another, with the 
intent to arouse or gratify sexual desire. According to the 
judge's definition, this contact excludes sexual 
intercourse. The attempt to access and re-present the 
originary event of the entire impeachment proceedings 
resulted in multiple and differing re-tellings. All of 
these citations failed to perform successfully what they 
purported to do: to present the truth by re-presenting the 
event generating those re-tellings.
An early mediation of the originary event occurred 
during the deposition in the Paula Jones case when Clinton 
denied having had sex with Monica Lewinsky. When questioned 
days later during a conference at the White House, Clinton 
again asserted that he had not had "sexual relations with 
that woman... These allegations are false."
On August 17th, Clinton appeared again before a grand 
jury, this time to give testimony in reference to the 
Monica Lewinsky issue for which prosecutors were 
investigating the possibility of charging him with perjury 
and obstruction of justice in light of Lewinsky's testimony 
of August 6th. During the proceedings of Clinton's 
testimony, the prosecutors for the Office of the 
Independent Counsel emphasized repeatedly that the law 
stipulates that the witness's appearance for a deposition 
or testimony entails taking a sworn oath to officially and 
legally commence the proceedings. This oath is, of course,
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a promise on the part of the witness to tell the whole 
truth and nothing but the truth. As one who is unique and 
irreplaceable, who possesses knowledge from a perspective 
that no one else can have, and who has taken an oath to be 
completely and utterly truthful, a witness enjoys a certain 
level of authority and credibility. Yet, as we have seen in 
the Blanchot chapter on testimony, there is always a 
certain "embroidery" of truth and fiction that the witness 
stitches together.
By stating one's name at the opening of the testimony 
proceedings, the witness, in effect, offers an oral 
signature to his/her testimony and, coupled with the oath, 
is held accountable and responsible for what takes place as 
a performative. According to Austin's definition of 
performative, this would suggest good intentions on the 
part of the speaker to fulfill his/her promise to be fully 
truthful. The witness is assumed to act in good faith in 
order to uphold the oath to which s/he swore.
During the course of his four hour-long testimony, Clinton 
was repeatedly questioned about the previous statements he 
had made under oath "to tell the whole truth" for his 
deposition. Sections regarding the definition of "sexual 
relations" were cited as well as conversations he had had 
prior to the deposition which he re-presented during the 
deposition and which Lewinsky also re-presented during her
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testimony and which Clinton then re-cited again during his
testimony.
In advance of his testimony, Clinton entered into the 
record a signed statement in which he admitted having 
conducted himself inappropriately with Lewinsky yet denied 
having had sexual intercourse with her. In fact, he denied 
having had "sexual relations" with her in the strict sense 
of the phrases used during the deposition. His argument was 
that he did not cause, in the sense of forcing, contact 
with Lewinsky; therefore, this definition did not apply to 
his encounters with her. To avoid answering directly "yes" 
or "no" to the more explicit questions relating directly to 
those encounters, Clinton reverted to this statement in an 
attempt to protect himself from self-incrimination. This 
maneuver, in effect, helped to impede access to the origin, 
since it maintained an indeterminacy about the nature of 
the activity engaged in by Clinton and Lewinsky.
Another point re-cited from the deposition was the 
statement made by Clinton's lawyer, Robert Bennett, who 
said that there was no sexual relationship between Clinton 
and Lewinsky. This statement obviously contradicted the new 
truth emerging subsequent to Lewinsky's testimony. At this 
point in the proceedings, Clinton's testimony collapsed 
into a game of semantics in that the prosecutors disputed 
the truthfulness of Bennett's statement with Clinton. 
Clinton testified that, if taken literally, at the present
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and in that moment, when Bennett uttered those words, then 
he spoke accurately and truthfully. Because at that instant 
and for some time prior to that moment, there were indeed 
no sexual encounters with Lewinsky. Such contact had been 
terminated by Clinton some time before the deposition. The 
veracity of the statement therefore hinged on the 
interpretation of the word "is." Understood in the present 
tense, the use of "is" speaks of the then-present moment of 
the deposition without making any reference to any past 
moments, thereby rendering the statement true.
The matter of Lewinsky's affidavit in regard to the 
Jones case arose as well during the testimony. It was in 
this legally binding paper validated by Lewinsky's own 
signature that she denied having had an affair with 
Clinton. In response to questions concerning the 
truthfulness of her statement, Clinton explained that the 
phrase "sexual relationship" or "affair" as used by 
Lewinsky and as most likely understood by the majority of 
Americans would imply "sexual intercourse." This affidavit 
is therefore truthful in that Lewinsky was not bound to the 
context of a deposition in which Clinton had been placed, 
which in turn forced him to adhere to a strict definition 
as issued by the judge.
The question of context reveals the iterability of any 
sign. This is to say, of course, that any sign has the 
capacity to be brought to function and have meaning in a
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plurality of different contexts. Therefore, for Lewinsky, 
and in her affidavit, the definition of "sexual 
relationship" would operate differently -- although 
presumably still truthfully -- from the definition to which 
Clinton was bound by the judge in the deposition and which 
was still being called to function in the different context 
of his testimony.
Yet another aspect of the Clinton affair relates to 
the status of truth and perjury. In fact, Kenneth Starr's 
investigation into Clinton's alleged illegal activities 
raised questions of what constitutes truth and perjury in 
the context of Clinton's statements taken under oath before 
a grand jury. This again involves the problematization of 
borders. In terms of truth and fiction, these borders 
become indistinguishable, leaving it impossible to decide 
where truth ends and fiction begins.
Clinton's responses to questions referring to 
statements and testimonies by others at times contradicted 
others' versions. Yet, testimony is itself the presentation 
of first-hand knowledge and experiences by the witness who 
occupies a place that no other can possibly take. It seems 
to become a question of perspective then, as Clinton 
himself alluded to in his testimony, when he stated that 
the truth for one person might differ from another's 
understanding or experience of the "same event." In other 
words, no two people see the same thing nor define it in
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the same way; but, according to Clinton, that should not 
suggest that one person is necessarily committing an act of 
perjury.
Yet, the "truth" that emerged during Clinton's 
testimony seemed to contradict the "truth" he propagated 
for months prior to this moment. The argument can certainly 
be made that Clinton's statements to his friends, family 
and staff in which he denied a sexual relationship with 
Lewinsky were not necessarily lies -- indeed, if we adhere 
to the definition that Clinton feels most Americans would 
intend by that phrase, then he did not lie when he said 
there was no sexual intercourse with Lewinsky. Yet, he was 
not entirely truthful either. For his denial of a sexual 
relationship denies the non-intercourse aspects of his 
"inappropriate relationship" with her. Therefore, what is 
at stake here is the question of truth and perjury. If 
Clinton was not completely truthful does that mean he 
perjured himself? Does not disclosing the "full truth" 
render one a liar? How can the truth be determined when one 
is treading the border we think firmly exists to utterly 
demarcate truth and lies?
Although the answers to these questions are not 
clearly evident, they demonstrate the problematic inherent 
in the act of testimony and in the practice of taking a 
witness at his/her word because of the oath sworn which 
commences the testimony. The performative status of bearing
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witness, of swearing to tell the truth, is called into 
question if we recall that the access to the moment of the 
event, to the truth that lies beyond the performance 
constituting the moment of testimony, is impossible. Of 
course, the question of a totalizing truth arises as well.
The truth unveiled during Clinton's four hours of 
testimony contradicted, as mentioned earlier, the "truth" 
Clinton presented to those nearest to him for the months 
preceding this event. His family, friends and aides had 
supported him during this time, accepting him at his word 
and granting him an almost privileged status of authority 
due in part to his position as president and as political 
leader of the United States, a position for which he had 
taken an oath, according to which he would honor and uphold 
the laws and duties of that office.
Only when Lewinsky's lawyers had worked out an 
immunity deal with Starr, did Clinton issue a "truth" 
different from that of "I did not have sexual relations 
with that woman, Monica Lewinsky" amounting to an admission 
of an inappropriate relationship with her.
Another function of witnessing as a technological, 
mediatized iteration is that it has the potential to be 
cited and re-cited in such a way that it exceeds its 
boundaries. In a similar manner to the citationality at 
work in the Duras and Blanchot texts, the Clinton affair 
resulted in a plurality of iterations so that much of the
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testimony, in fact, re-cited previously cited statements, 
thereby placing it en ajbfme. The testimony within which the 
deposition was framed also framed Lewinsky's affidavit as 
well as pre-deposition conversations, encounters and 
contact with not only Lewinsky but other friends, staff and 
aides.
The testimony, as is usual, is a citation, a 
repetition of witness and event testified to, a double 
presence of witness during event and subsequent testimony. 
In the Clinton case this became complicated by the 
"presence" of Clinton during the alleged events, during 
deposition and during the testimony, all of which was re­
cited further during the testimony.
We have seen in this section how the case of the 
Clinton's impeachment has played out questions of truth and 
origin through the multiple testimonies it generated. The 
mediatization of these acts of witnessing problematized the 
borders delineating public and private as well as veracity 
and fiction.
Bearing Witness on Television Talk Shows
In the preceding section on the Clinton-Lewinsky 
affair, I discussed how the truthfulness of Clinton's 
testimony was called into question by a multiplicity of 
highly mediatized re-tellings, or acts of witnessing. In 
this final example, I have chosen to discuss a purely 
"mediatic" event that parodies the staging of questions of
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truth and testimony: the immensely popular television talk 
shows. These shows run the gamut from Oprah Winfrey, with 
its recent interest in reawakening the spiritual self in 
all of its viewers to the notorious Jerry Springer Show, 
with its bellicose guests and bloodthirsty audience incited 
by topics about secret adulterous affairs where the guilty 
parties confront each other.
Despite the incredible range of talk show styles and 
themes, the common thread that stitches them together is 
that of witnessing. All of these programs entice their 
spectators with specially selected guests to bear witness 
to the particular topic for that show. In fact, the 
proliferation of talk shows has engendered a plethora of 
guests making appearances to divulge various secrets about 
their personal lives, which has directly resulted in a 
renewed interest in the "memoir" or "confessional text." 
Such a crossing of boundaries, whereby regular Americans 
relate on national television the deepest and darkest 
secrets of their private lives pertains directly to the 
function of citationality which calls into question 
conventional limits and boundaries that attempt to control 
the dissemination of information by keeping it in its 
proper place. Talk shows by their very nature --on 
national television where an entire country has access to 
them -- exceed these limitations.
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In what I view, therefore, as a citation of the 
courtroom, talk shows appear to mimic this structure and 
the legal proceedings implicated in testimony and bearing 
witness. First, the guests appear as witnesses to divulge, 
in a truthful manner, their secrets before a live audience 
just as the courtroom witness does. Recent topics have 
involved questions of paternity, out-of-control teens and 
their mothers, secret affairs and crushes. Guest-witnesses 
supposedly reveal all, bearing witness from their very 
unique places, testimony that at times conflicts with that 
of the potential father in question or the teenage daughter 
who appears with the initial guest-witness.
Resolution is sometimes sought on these shows between 
the guests. The Montel Williams and Maury Povich shows, in 
particular, appear especially serious about finding an 
acceptable solution for their guests in conflict and quite 
often arrange for an "expert witness" to appear. In 
general, these experts are counselors and psychologists, 
even nutritionists for shows on obese teens. They first 
address in general the theme of the show before turning to 
deal specifically with the guests sharing the stage with 
them. Interestingly, when the services of the professionals 
are offered to certain guests, there is a reversion to the 
private sphere as guests and experts go backstage to 
discuss in an intimate setting the issues in question.
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The guest-witnesses and expert witnesses appearing on 
stage face the audience and remain separated physically 
from them just as in a courtroom. The audience in the talk 
show studio, however, fulfills, in a sense, the role of 
jury. That the audience members behave similarly to a jury 
becomes quite clear when we consider that the applause and 
jeers directed at various guests indicate a sort of verdict 
the audience has made regarding those guests. Occasionally, 
shows such as Ricki Lake actually allow the audience to 
hand down a verdict to its guests. The topics of these 
shows appear to deal with relationship issues, such as "To 
Dump, Or Not To Dump?" At times, rather than taking a mass 
vote from the spectators, a panel, or jury, is selected 
from the studio audience. After hearing the testimonies of 
the witnesses, they present their verdict to the guests who 
are presumably supposed to abide by it.
If the audience functions as jury, then, the talk show 
host, by extension, carries out the role of judge, or even, 
prosecutor, to keep the audience and guests under control 
and to direct questions to them. Yet, maintaining a certain 
decorum is not always of primary concern. Since these 
programs depend on the nature of their topics and the 
personality of their guests to captivate audiences, some 
talk shows have resorted to such levels of outrageousness 
that violent outbursts amongst the guests occur regularly, 
with the added incitement of the spectators.
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As mentioned earlier, the talk show presents its 
guests as witnesses who, as such, are granted a special 
credibility by the spectators. The talk show, after all, 
creates this air of authenticity by publicizing, 
periodically, the steps and background checks to which 
potential guests must submit in order to be considered for 
an appearance on television. With control measures in 
place, the show's producers weed through the pool of 
applicants to select the best ones for the program. The 
fact that these shows air on national network television 
with a live studio audience affords an additional 
legitimacy to the shows and plays off the viewers' 
willingness to suspend disbelief.
The guests themselves represent a cross-section of 
ordinary Americans who could easily be our neighbors, or 
even ourselves. The facility with which viewers are able to 
identify with the guests for their ordinariness makes it 
easier to accept the word of the guests as true. After all, 
what would be served by an average person making an 
appearance on the Maury Povich Show in order to concoct a 
story that is untruthful? Furthermore, with the pre-show 
interview and selection process it seems that producers 
would have eliminated any such "false" guest.
Of course, the allure of talk shows lies exactly in 
the transformation of the seemingly ordinary into the 
extraordinary. The appearance of an anonymous, regular
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American, who would normally never be on network 
television, entices and fascinates the viewer. This can be 
attributed to the simple reason that the guest's testimony 
is so outrageous or shocking, that the viewer takes 
pleasure in realizing that s/he would never do any such 
thing.
With its inherent legitimacy -- live audience, major 
network airing, expert witnesses, ordinary and authentic 
guests -- the "realness" of the talk show has been accepted 
as a given. However, it is this very anonymity of guests 
taken from Anywhere, U.S.A. that provides for the deception 
of viewers who are so willing to accept as true the guests 
and their statements. Allegations have in fact surfaced 
recently that some of these unscrupulous talk shows have 
resorted to hiring actors to play the role of guests. The 
shows' producers provide these actors scripts based on the 
chosen topic for the show and allot the actors time to 
rehearse their lines prior to taping. These reports of paid 
guest-actors and carefully scripted and rehearsed shows 
surfaced when some of these actors came forward to bear 
witness to their experiences and to confess to what they 
had done for these shows. This testimony about the 
"testimony" they willingly and falsely presented on the 
talk shows, citations themselves of the courtroom, offers 
an excellent example of the function of citationality.
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As parodies of traditional modes of testimony or legal 
proceedings, talk shows inhabit the space of the event that 
carries the potential of iterability with it. Every event, 
or utterance, from the simplest to the most outrageous, 
gives rise in its wake to that possibility. Once the space 
of iterability is opened, citations, parody, mimicry and 
recontextualizations, all of which are already 
mediatizations, multiply beyond control. The "out of 
control" nature of talk shows is structurally the same as 
Duras' Lol V. Stein cycle and Blanchot's recits where 
hearsay and testimony, as citational modes, function beyond 
attempts to limit them and allow the citational and 
dissemination of events and utterances ad infini turn.
The phenomenon is set further en abime when the guests 
appear in order to tout recently published books that stand 
as their memoirs or life-testimonies. For instance, on a 
recently aired talk show, a woman promoted her book as a 
sort of confessional text, or tell-all, that publicly 
disclosed her incestuous relationship with her father. On 
Regis and Cathy Lee, a veterinary psychologist, who makes 
periodic appearances on the show in the capacity of an 
animal care specialist, appeared on this occasion for the 
sole purpose of promoting his newly published book entitled 
Memoirs of a Pet Therapist.
In a final twist, as the Jenny Jones Show tragedy has 
demonstrated, another "originally real" event occurs,
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thereby returning the show to the courtroom on which it 
was modeled. In fact, the talk show industry is, of course, 
still reeling from the involvement of this show in a very 
real tragedy. As pressure mounts to supply the national 
viewing audience with ever more guests who share tales ever 
more outrageous, some shows have come under fire with 
allegations of setting up guests with the "ambush, " as it 
is known in the industry. The Jenny Jones Show, in 
particular, has borne the brunt of such criticism since the 
taping of an episode in 1995 that resulted in the murder of 
one guest by another. The topic of that particular program 
was 1 Surprise Crushes." The show was set up in such a way 
that guests, who had a secret crush on someone they knew, 
were invited to reveal their interest publicly, which 
would, of course, be certain to provoke intense reactions 
from the studio audience while bolstering ratings on the 
network televising the show. This type of program functions 
by misleading the other guest, on whom the initial guest 
has the secret crush, into appearing on the show, by 
convincing him/her of a false and innocuous topic. Duped in 
such a way, this person is totally unaware of what is going 
to transpire, which adds to the outrageously scandalous 
nature of making a private crush public on national 
television in front of a live audience. To further create a 
scandal, these ambushes involve at times a homosexual 
guest, a practice which raises its own questions about the
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homophobia some of these shows exploit and which I 
unfortunately will not be able to address here.
On the now-infamous ambush episode of the Jenny Jones 
Show, Scott Amedure appeared to reveal his crush on his 
friend Jonathan Schmitz. Apparently, Schmitz had a history 
of mental illness and the humiliation of being implicated 
in a gay crush proved too much for him to handle. Three 
days following the taping of the show, Schmitz murdered 
Amedure. As a result, Amedure's family sued the show and in 
May 1999 they were awarded a $25 million settlement by a 
jury. Although for some it seems unthinkable that a show be 
held responsible for a criminal act committed by a guest 
following a show, the Amedure family lawyers successfully 
showed that the producers did not sufficiently check 
Schmitz's history to determine if he would be emotionally 
fit to withstand such a public disclosure of a crush, 
particularly a gay one.
While we can directly attribute these developments of 
paid actors and off-the-air tragedies to the increased 
competition these shows face, which forces them to have 
wilder and wilder topics and guests, it calls into question 
the authenticity to which these shows lay claim as models 
of the courtroom and testimony. Unfortunately, in the case 
of Jenny Jones, the secret crush ambush on national 
television has led the show's producers and host straight
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into the very real courtroom in Michigan where the jury 
decided the show was liable.
Conclusion
The preceding sections of this chapter have revealed 
the significant effects of bearing witness and testimony as 
a mode of citationality in various cultural contexts. What 
is at stake in all of these instances are questions of 
borders, origins and property. In terms of citationality, 
the movement from the private to the public and from the 
voiceless to the voiced is necessary in order to achieve 
the act of witnessing and therefore demonstrates the 
impossibility of maintaining the boundaries that presumably 
limit and control the dissemination of information. 
Additionally, bearing witness problematizes the 
conceptualization of presence through its doubling of the 
presence of witness during the event and during the 
testimony.
To conclude, these instances of bearing witness 
demonstrate what was previously seen in the Blanchot and 
Duras chapters where reality and its mediation as testimony 
are placed in abime. The logic of iterability reveals a 
complicity between truth and fiction, between reality and 
media. The crisis of citationality seen in the public and 
"mediatic" domain underscores the problematic of the 
questions that citationality raises. In my study I have 
addressed these questions first in the fictional texts of
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Duras and Blanchot and subsequently in several 
philosophical polylogues by Jacques Derrida. In this 
chapter, I address these questions as a problematic of this 
turn of the twentieth century, as the culture is undergoing 
a technological and media revolution.
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CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, I have discussed the 
implications of various modes of citationality. I began 
this discussion by tracing the relevant theoretical 
approaches indispensable to the development of my analysis 
of the practice of citationality. I established the 
theoretical framework for this project, therefore, through 
my reading of Jacques Derrida's work on the concepts of 
iterability and citationality. It is from this perspective 
that I examined what I consider to be the citational modes 
of hearsay, testimony and conference. The juridical 
connotations of these terms raise pertinent questions 
relating to the status of the performative utterance 
especially in terms of presence, origin and property.
In the Duras chapter, I analyzed the Lol V. Stein 
cycle of texts which I found to function through a reliance 
on hearsay which emerges in the seminal text of the cycle, 
Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein. From this narrative and its 
insistence on hearsay, the generation of other texts 
commences. Each of these texts persists, in its turn, in 
the propagation of hearsay not only as a means of 
attempting to recover the originary, "true" event, but also 
as a response to the impossibility of obtaining access to 
it. What I contend is that the cycle is marked by the 
progressive radicalization of hearsay. While much of what 
constitutes the hearsay in the early texts of the cycle is
247
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eventually filtered out of circulation, the scream or cry 
remains in a state of dissemination. In my opinion, the 
scream in the cycle functions as the (in)articulation of 
the "mot-trou," an impossible word which, if it existed, 
would be able to name the unnameable that lies at the 
origin. Since this word remains an impossible possibility, 
the scream comes to reverberate as its trace. With the last 
text of the cycle, Son Nom de Venise dans Calcutta dSsert, 
the scream is all that is still heard where nothing is said 
anymore.
Chapter three focused on the use and function of 
testimony in three recits by Maurice Blanchot. In a similar 
manner to the radicalization of hearsay in the Duras texts, 
the Blanchot narratives problematize testimony as a 
performance purporting to gain access to the truth, to the 
moment of the event. Since testimony requires the 
impossible re-presentation of this event, I show the impact 
of these attempts to testify on fiction.
The polylogues of Jacques Derrida function slightly 
differently than the narratives of Duras and Blanchot. 
Derrida's reliance on what I view as conference enables the 
deconstruction of the logic of restitution, of origin and 
presence and of genre. The conferences that constitute 
these polylogues operate in such a way as to play with the 
limits of genre imposed on texts.
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Since the citational modes operating in the chapters 
on Duras, Blanchot and Derrida raise questions 
contemporarily relevant to other textual forms, I expanded 
my topic. The decision to address the political and 
sociological implications of these questions stemming from 
the attempt to achieve access to a truth, or originary 
event allows me to situate acts of bearing witness in other 
pertinent contexts and thereby leaves my analysis of a 
practice of citationality open for further discussion.
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